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PREFACE

Before she turned to novel writing, George Eliot translated several important
religious and philosophical works which she fel t needed a wider English audience:
David Strauss's Life of Jesus (1846), Ludwig Feuerbach's Essence of Christ:ianity
(1853) and Spinoza's Ethics.

She worked on the Ethics from November, 1854 through

February, 1856, and her translation would have been the first in English.

However,

because she was not able to arrange a sui table financial arrangement with Henry
Bohn, the publisher of Bohn's Philosophical Library, her translation was not published during her lifetime or since.

In 1942 Yale University Library purchased

the manus cript from Mrs. Elinor Ouvry, George Henry Lewes's granddaughter, and it
is presently housed in the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University.
The manuscript (Eliot, IV 11) consists of 654 leaves in George Eliot's hand.
Each of the five Parts of the Ethics translation is preceded by a half-title leaf
in what appears to be Lewes's hand.

The half-title for Part I reads: "Introduc-

tion and Spinoza's Ethics Part I," but the manuscript contains no introduction.
The title/contents leaf is in Lewes'S hand.

The translation is written on alter-

nate lines of lined notebook paper, recto only (except for occasional insertions on
verso).

The leaves measure 19x32 cm. and consist of several different kinds of

paper stock.
Accompanying the Ethics translation are nine leaves in Lewes's hand titled "Notes
and Addi tions to the Theo1ogico-Poli tical Tractate."

This consists of twenty-two

notes; nine are translations of some of Spinoza's notes to the Tractatus, thirteen
are comparisons by Lewes between pages in the Tractatus and sections of the Ethics.
v
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I have not included this accompanying manuscript here because it relates primarily
to the TPactatus.
The Ethics manuscript translation is substantially complete and shaped for publication, with all but a few of the translation problems settled, though it would
have required extensive edi torial work before printing.

Evidence of her re-draft-

ing and extensive revision in the form of cancellations and interlineations is
present on almost every page.

In some instances she did not choose between two

possible renderings of the Latin; she omitted some elements through faulty transcription; and throughout she left capitalization, ptmctuation and other accidentals for the editor to correct and make consistent.
The purpose of this edition is to present a coherent text of the translation
based on George Eliot's final choices, and to do so with a minimum of edi torial
intrusion in order to convey the style and flavor of the original.

Except as noted

below, I have not corrected her text; her errors, omissions and additions are recorded in the textual notes.

Where she did not choose between alternative render-

ings of the Latin, both are given.

Her inconsistencies in abbreviations, ptmctua-

tion, use of italics and variant spellings (such as show/shew, connection/connexion) are retained.

Punctuation, though, when in gross error, is corrected.

To avoid confusion, I have made consistent certain elements of the "text.
have made consistent the abbreviations,

s~elling,

I

italics, numerals, capitaliza-

tion and punctuation in the following areas: the table of contents, the centered
headings, the side headings by which the Ethics is divided into propositions and
thei r parts, and the cross references.

Throughout the text I have presented her

"e.g." and "i.e." in roman type, her "&" and "+" as "and," and her "&c" and "+c"
as "etc."
The manuscript contains some omissions which are clearly minor slips in transcription rather than faulty translations.

In these instances I have carried over

cancelled material or have supplied omitted material.

These restorations are in-
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dicated in the text with the appropriate symbols.

I have silently supplied a

closing parenthesis or quotation mark which she forgot.
Her single underlinings are presented as italics; double and triple as capitals.
I have omi tted catch words and instructions to the printer like "See Back," and for
economy of space I have omi tted the hal f-ti tle page whi ch precedes each of the five
Parts in the manuscript.

All footnotes are George Eliot's unless otherwise indi-

,

cated, and all insertions of Spinoza's Latin into the text are hers.

When she

0-

mits a Part number in a cross reference, the present Part is to be understood.
The textual notes serve three functions.

First, they record all substantive

differences between George Eliot's translation and Spinoza's Latin text.

These

include her errors, omissions and additions.
Second, they point out unusual or significant choices of wording in her trans lation.

They indicate where George Eliot gives an unusual or possibly imprecise

translation of a Latin expression.

They do not urge blame or suggest inexactness,

but remind the reader of the Latin words behind the translation.

They also show

the reader where she translated a single Latin expression with various English expressions.

These notations are made when the instances first occur, and thereaf-

ter only if they might affect the sense of the passage.
Third, the notes inform the reader how George Eliot's choice of Latin text compares to the modern standard edition of the Ethics, by Carl Gebhardt.
critical edition of the Ethics in her time.

There was no

Rather than base her translation on a

single one of the Latin editions available to her, she acted as textual editor by
comparing several Latin editions of the Ethics, as well as by consulting at least
two translations.

She refers in her footnotes to the Latin editions of Paulus

(1803), Gfr6rer (1830) and Bruder (1843-46), the French translation by Saisset
(1842) and the German translation by Auerbach (1841).

All these editions and

translations derive their texts from the first Latin edition, the Opera Posthuma
(1677), which George Eliot also used.

A comparison of these editions indicates
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that she relied most consistently on Bruder, especially in Parts III, IV and V.
His was the most recent Latin edition available to her and the one which shows the
most concem for a reliable text.

When Bruder differs with reasonable cause from

the Opera Posthuma, she chooses Bruder; yet she does not follow Bruder into error.
She tums often to Saisset's translation both for choosing between textual variants,
especially in Part I, and for aid in translation.
George Eliot had finished her translation before the first truly critical edition of Spinoza's works appeared in 1882.

The van Vloten-Land edition was based

on a comparison of all the previous editions and contained previously unpublished
works of Spinoza, including the Short TPeatise and some letters.

Further, van

Vloten-Land introduced a second substantive text, the Nagelate Bohrriften, a Dutch
translation by Glazemaker, which, according to Gebhardt, was made under Spinoza's
supervision and published in 1677, the same year as the Opera Posthuma.
relies in his edition on van Vloten-Land and the Nagelate Scihriften.

Gebhardt

Because the

latter was a rare book, it was apparently not used by the Spinoza editors of George
Eliot's day or by George Eliot herself.

I have indicated Gebhardt's text in the

notes when his choice differs in significant matters from George Eliot's.
I wish to thank the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University
for making the manuscript available to me and for permission to publish.

I am par-

ticularly indebted to Miss Marjorie G. Wynne of the Beinecke for her kind assistance.

I also thank the National Endowment for the Humanities for a Fellowship in

Residence at the University of Chicago, which allowed me time to complete a substantial part of this project, and Saint Xavier College for financial. grants which
helped its preparation for publication.
This edition would not have been possible without the very substantial and expert assis tance of my colle ague, Professor John Crean of the Oepartmentof Philosophy.

His knowledge of Spinoza and Spinoza' s Latin was invaluable throughout the

project, and it is reflected on every page.

I also wish to thank Professor Doro-
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thy Atkins of Loras College, Professor K.K. Collins of Southern Illinois University
and Professor Stuart Tave of the University of Chicago for their advice.
Saint Xavier College
Chicago, Illinois
February, 1981
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E1HICS

GeometPicaZZy Demonstrated
and

Divided into Five Parts,

Treating of

I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

God
The Nature and Origin of the Mind
The Origin and Nature of the Emotions
Human Servi tude or Men's Emotions
The Power of the Intellect or Human Liberty

1

Part I
Of God

Definitions

1.

By a thing whiah is its own aause, I understand a thing the essence of which

involves existence, or the nature of which cannot be conceived except as existing.
2.

A thing is said to be

finite~

suo genere, when it can be limited by another

of the same nature, e.g. a body is said to be finite because we can always conceive
another body larger.

Again, one thought is limited by another thought.

But body

is not limited by thought, nor thought by body.
3.

By substanae I understand that which exists in itself and is conceived

~hrough,

or by means of, itself; i.e. the conception of which does not require for

its formation the conception of anything else.
4.

By attribute I understand what the mind perceives of substance, as consti-

tuting the essence of substance.
5.

By mode I understand the affections of substance, or that which exists in

something else, through which it is
6.

conceiv~~.

By God I understand a Being absolptely infinite, i.e. a substance consist-

ing .of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an infinite and eternal essence.
Explan.

I say absoZutely infinite, not infinite suo genere; for if a thing be

infinite suo genere only. we can deny that it has infinite attributes; but that
2

3

which is absolutely infinite includes in its essence whatever expresses essence
and involves no negation.
7.

I call that thing fPee, which exists solely by the necessity of its nature

and is determined to action by itself alone.

I.call a thing necessary, when it is

determined by another to exist and act according to a certain and definite law.
8.

By eternity I understand existence itself, conceived as following solely

and necessarily from the definition of the thing which is eternal.
Explan.

For existence so conceived is an eternal truth, inasmuch as it is the

essence of the eternal thing; consequently, it cannot be explained by duration or
time, even though the duration be conceived as without beginning or end.

Axioms

1.

Whatever is, is either in itself or in something else.

2.

That which cannot be conceived through, or by means of, something else,

must be conceived through, or by means of, itself.
3.

From a given determinate cause an effect necessarily follows; and if there

be no given determinate cause, it is impossible that an effect should follow.
4.

The knowledge of an effect depends on, and implies, the knowledge of its

cause.
S.

Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood by means of each

other, i.e. the conception of the one does not involve the conception of the
other.
6.

A true idea must agree with its object.

7.

If a thing can be conceived as not existing, existence does not belong to

its essence.
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Propositions

Prop. I.
Oem.

Substance is prior in nature to its affections.
This is evident from def. 3 and 5.

Prop. II.

Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with

with each other.
Oem.

This is also evident from def. 3.

For each substance must exist in itself

and be conceived through itself; i.e. the conception of the one does not involve
the conception of the other.
Prop. III.

If two things have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the

other.
Oem.

If they have nothing in common with each other, they cannot (by ax. 5)

be understood by means of each other, and thus (by ax. 5) one cannot be the cause
of the other; q.e.d.
Prop. IV.

Two or more distinct things are distinguished from each other either by

the difference of the attributes of substances, or by the difference of their
affections.
Oem.

Whatever is, is either in itself or in something else (by ax. 1), i.e.

(by def. 3 and 5) there exists nothing out of the intellect but substances and
their affections.

Therefore, nothing exists out of the intellect whereby several

things can be distinguished from each other, besides substances, or what (by def.
4 and 5) is the same thing, their attributes and affections; q.e.d.
Prop. V.
Oem.

There cannot be two substances of the same nature or attributes.
If there were several distinct substances, they must be distinguished

from each other either by the difference of their attributes or by the difference
of their affections (by preced. prop.).

If by the difference of their attributes,

it is then conceded that there is only one substance of the same attributes.

But

if by difference of affections, it follows, since substance is prior in nature to
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its modes or accidents (ace. to prop. 1), that these affections being abstracted
and one substance considered in itself, i.e. (by def. 3 and 4) rightly considered,
it cannot be conceived as distinguished from another substance; i.e. (ace. to
preced. prop.) there cannot be several substances of the same attributes, but only
one; q.e.d.
Prop. VI.
Oem.

One substance cannot be produced by another substance.
There cannot be two substances of the same attributes (by preced. prop.),

i.e. (by prop. 2), having anything in common with each other; and therefore (by
prop. 3) one cannot be the cause of the other.
Coroll.

Hence it follows that substance cannot be produced.

For there is

nothing in existence besides substances and their affections, as is evident from
ax. I and def. 3 and 5.
prop.).

Therefore it is absolutely impossible for substance to be produced; q.e.d.

Another demo
trary.

But it cannot be produced by a substance (by preced.

Fo~

This is more easily demonstrated by the absurdity of the con-

if substance could be produced, the knowledge of it would depend on

the knowledge of its cause (by ax. 4); and thus (by def. 3) it would not be substance.
Prop. VII.
Oem.

Existence belongs to the nature of substance.

Substance cannot be produced (by coroll. of preced. prop.); it must

therefore be its own cause; i.e. (by def. 1) its essence

necess~rily

involves

existence, or, existence belongs to its nature; q.e.d.
Prop. VIII.
Oem.

Substance is necessarily infinite.

There is but one substance of the same attribute (by prop. 5), and to its

nature belongs existence (by prop. 7).
infinite.

This existence must be either finite or

It cannot be finite; for (by def. 2) it must then be limited by

another of the same nature, which also must necessarily exist (ace. to prop. 7);
and thus there would be two substances having the same attribute, which is absurd
(by prop. 5).

Therefore the existence of substance is infinite; q.e.d.
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Schol. 1.

As, in fact, finiteness is the partial negation and infinity the

absolute affirmation of the existence of any nature, it follows from prop. 7
alone that all substance must be infinite.
Schol. 2.

I have no doubt that to all who judge confusedly of things and are

not wont to inquire into their first principles, it will be difficult to understand the demonstration of prop. 7; chiefly because they do not distinguish between the modification of substance and substance itself, and are ignorant how
things are produced.

Whence, seeing that natural things have a beginning, they

ascribe a beginning to substance also.

For those who are ignorant of true causes

confound all things and see no reason why trees should not talk as well as men,
or why men should not be formed from stones as well as from seed, or why anyone
form should not be changed into any other form.

So, those who confound the

divine nature with the human, find no difficulty in attributing human emotions to
God, especially when they are ignorant how emotions are produced in the mind.
But if men attended to the nature of substance, they would not in the least doubt
the truth of prop. 7; nay, this proposition would be an axiom to all and would be
numbered among common notions.

For by 8ub8tanoe they would understand that which

is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., that, the knowledge of which
does not require the knowledge of any other thing; whereas, by modifioation8 they
would understand that which is in something else, and the conception of which is
formed from the conception of the thing in which they exist.

For this reason we

can have true ideas of modifications which do not exist; since although they do
not actually exist out of the intellect, yet their essence is so comprehended' in
something else that they can be conceived by means of it.

But the truth of sub-

stances out of the intellect lies in themselves alone, because they are conceived
through themselves alone.

If therefore anyone say, that he has a clear and dis-

tinct, i.e. a true idea of substance and nevertheless doubts whether such a substance exists, it would be the same (as will be manifest on sufficient attention)
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as if he were to say that he has a true idea and nevertheless doubts whether it
may not be false; or, if anyone maintains that substance is created, he in so
doing maintains that a false idea has become a true one, which is the height of
absurdity.

Thus it must necessarily be admitted that the existence of substance

is, equally with its essence, an eternal truth.

And hence we can arrive in ano-

ther way at the conclusion that there is but one substance of the same nature;
la <position> which I think it <worth while to exhibit here more fully.>IIand this
addi tional demonstration I will now give. I

That I may do this in strict order, it

is necessary to lay down the following premisses.

1. A true definition of anything

includes and expresses nothing besides the nature of the thing defined,

2. It

follows, that no definition can include any particular number of individuals,
since it expresses nothing else than the nature of the thing defined.

For ex-

ample, the definition of a triangle expresses nothing else than the simple nature
of a triangle, and not any particular number of triangles.
thing must necessarily have a definite cause why it exists.

3. Every existing
4. This cause, owing

to which a thing exists, must either be contained in the nature and definition of
the existing thing (that is to say, existence must pertain to its nature), or it
Brust lie out of that thing.

From these premisses it follows, that if in nature

there exists a particular number of individuals, there must necessarily be a cause
why that number of individuals, and neither more nor less.,

exi~t.

If, for exam-

ple, there are twenty men existing (whom for the sake of perspicuity I suppose to
exist at once, and that no others have existed before them), it will not be enough
(in order to render a reason why twenty men exist) to shew the cause of the human
nature in general, but it will be necessary also to show the cause why neither
more nor less than twenty exist; since (by premo 3) each of them must necessarily
have a cause.

And this cause (by premo 2 and 3) cannot be contained in the human

nature itself, since the true definition of man does not involve the number twenty.

Thus (by premo 4) the cause why twenty men exist, and consequently why each
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of them exists, must necessarily be external to each of them; and therefore it is
absolutely to be concluded that whenever several individuals of the same nature can
exist, there must necessarily be an external cause why they exist.

Now since (ac-

cording to what has been shewn in this scholium) existence belongs to the nature
of substance, its.definition must involve necessary existence and consequently its
existence must be concluded from the mere definition of it.

But from this defini-

tion (as we have already shown in premo 2 and 3) there cannot follow the existence
of a pZuraZity of substances.

Hence it necessarily follows, that there exists

only one substance of the same nature; q.e.d.
Prop. IX.

The more reality or being a thing has, the more attributes belong to

it.
Oem.

This is evident from def. 4.

Prop. X.

Each attribute of the same substance must be conceived through and by

itself.
Oem.

For an attribute is that which the intellect perceives of substance as

constituting the essence of substance (by def. 4); and thus (by def. 3) it must be
conceived through and by itself; q.e.d .
. Schol.

From this it appears, that, although two attributes may be conceived as

really distinct, i.e., one may be conceived without the aid of the other, we cannot thence conclude that they constitute two beings or two diverse substances.
For it is of the nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived
through and by itself; since all the attributes which it has, always co-existed in
it, and one could not have been produced by the other, each expressing the reality
or being of substance.

Hence it is far from being absurd to ascribe several at-

tributes to one substance; indeed, nothing in Nature is clearer than that every
being must be conceived under some attribute, and that the more reality or being
it has the more attributes it has, which express both necessity, or eternity, and
infinity; consequently, nothing is clearer than that an absolutely infinite being
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must necessarily be defined (as we have stated in def. 6) as a Being of infinite
attributes, everyone of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence.

If any

one asks, by what sign we can distinguish the diversity of substances, let him
read the following propositions which shew that in the nature of things there
exists but one substance, and that that substance is absolutely infinite, for
which reason it would be in vain to seek such a sign.
Prop. XI.

God, or the substance consisting of infinite attributes, everyone of

which expresses an eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.
Oem.

If'you deny this, then, if it be

possible, conceive God not to exist.

It would follow (by ax. 7) that his essence did not involve existence.
(by prop. 7) is absurd.
Ariother demo

But this

Therefore, God necessarily exists; q.e.d.

Of every thing there is necessarily a cause to be assigned,

either why it exists or why it does not exist.

For example, if a triangle exists,

there must be a reason or cause why it exists; but if it does not exist there
must be a reason or cause which prevents it from existing, or which has put an end
to its existence.

And this reason or cause must either be contained in the nature

of the thing, or must be external to it.

For example, the reason why a square

circle does not exist is indicated by its very nature; the terms imply a contradiction.

Again, why substance exists, is also evident from its nature alone,

because that nature involves existence.

See prop. 7.

But the, reason why a circle

or a triangle exists or why it does not exist, does not lie in the nature of these
forms, but in the order of universal Nature.

For from this order it must follow

either that a triangle already necessarily exists, or that it is impossible for it
to exist: which is self-evident.

Whence it follows, that a thing necessarily

exists, when there is no reason or cause why it should not exist.

If, therefore

there can be no reason or cause which prevents God from existing, or which may
have put an end to his existence, it is absolutely to be concluded that he necessarilyexists.

Now, if there be such a cause or reason, it must be either in the
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nature of God, or out of that nature; i.e., in another substance of a different
nature.

For if this substance were of the same nature it would then be conceded

that God exists.

But a substance which is of a different nature can have nothing

in cOJJlllon with God (acc. to prop. 2) and thus can neither posit his existence nor
exclude it.

As therefore a reason or cause which excludes the divine existence

cannot exist out of the divine nature, it follows that if God does not exist, the
reason or cause must lie in the divine nature; namely, that nature must involve a
contradiction.

But to affirm this of the absolutely infinite and perfect being is

absurd; therefore, neither in God nor out of God is there any cause or reason
which excludes his exiStence, and hence, God necessarily exists; q.e.d.
Another demo

The possibility not to exist is impotence, and on the contrary,

the possibility to exist is power (as is self-evident).

If therefore what already

necessarily exists consists only of finite beings; it follows, that finite beings
are more powerful than the absolutely infinite being; but (as is self-evident)
this is absurd.

Therefore, either nothing exists, or there necessarily exists an

absolutely infinite being.
which necessarily exists.

But we exist either in ourselves or in something else
See ax. 1 and prop. 7.

Therefore the absolutely infi-

nite being, i.e. (by def. 6) God, necessarily exists.
Schol.

In this last demonstration I have chosen to shew the existence of God

a posteriopi, because such a demonstration is more readily apprehended, and not
because the existence of God does not on the same ground follow a priopi.

For as

the ability to exist is power, it follows, that the more reality is combined in
the nature of any being the more power must it have in itself to exist; and thus
the absolutely infinite being, or God, must have in himself absolutely infinite
power to exist and therefore absolutely exists.

Nevertheless, many will perhaps

not easily see the evidence of this demonstration because they are accustomed to
contemplate those things only which proceed from external causes; and seeing these
they perceive the things which come into existence rapidly, i.e., which exist
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easily, also perish easily, and on the other hand, they regard those things which
they conceive to have many properties, as more difficult to be produced, i.e., as
not existing so easily.

To liberate them from these prejudices it is not necessary

for me here to shew for what reason this saying: quod cito

fit~

cito perit, is

true, nor to inquire whether taking into consideration the whole of Nature all
things be equally easy or otherwise; it is enough simply to observe, that I do not
here speak of things which proceed from external causes, but solely of substances,
which (by prop. 6) cannot be produced by any external cause.

For things which

proceed from external causes, whether they consist of many parts or of few, owe
whatever degree of perfection or reality they have to the power of the external
cause, and not to themselves.

On the contrary, whatever perfection a

substance

has is due to no external cause; and hence its existence also must follow solely
from its own nature.

The perfection of a thing therefore does not exclude exis-

tence, but on the contrary posits it; while, on the other hand, imperfection is
the negation of existence; and thus we cannot be more certain of the existence of
any thing than of the existence of the absolutely infinite or perfect being, i.e.
God.

For since his essence excludes all imperfection and includes absolute per-

fection, it in itself nullifies all cause of doubt as to its existence and gives
the highest certainty of that existence; which I believe will be evident on
moderate attention.
Prop. XII.

No attribute of substance can be truly conceived from which it would

follow that substance can be divided.
Dem.

For the parts into which substance so conceived would be divided, would

either retain the nature of substance or they would not.

If the former, then (by

prop. 8) each part must be infinite, and (by prop. 6) the cause of itself, and (by
prop. 5) must consist of a different attribute, and thus several substances might
be constituted out of one, which (by prop. 6) is absurd.

Add, that the parts (by

prop. 2) would have nothing in common with the whole, and that the whole (by def.
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4 and prop. 10) could exist, and could be conceived, without its parts, which no
one can doubt to be absurd.

But if we adopt the latter supposition, namely, that

the parts would not retain the nature of substance; it follows that, when the whole
substance was divided into equal parts, it would put off the nature of substance
and cease to exist, which (acc. to prop. 7) is absurd.
Prop. XIII.
Dem.

Absolutely infinite substance is indivisible.

For if it were divisible, the parts into which it was divided would either

retain the nature of substance or they would not.

If the former, there would then

be several substances of the same nature, which (by prop. 5) is absurd.

If the

latter, then (as above) the absolutely infinite substance could cease to exist,
which (acc. to prop. 11) is also absurd.
Coroll.

From these premisses it follows that no substance and consequently no

corporeal substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible.
Schol.

That substance is indivisible, is more simply demonstrated thus: The

nature of substance cannot be conceived otherwise than as infinite, and by part of
a substance nothing else can be understood than finite substance, which (by prop.
8) implies a manifest contradiction.
Prop. XIV.
Dem.

As

No substance besides God can exist or can be conceived.
God is the absolutely infinite being, of whom no attribute which ex-

presses the eSSence of substance can be denied (by def. 6) and as he necessarily
exists (by prop. 11); if there were another substance besides God, it must be
possible to explain that substance by some attribute of God, so that there would
exist two substances having the same attribute, which (by prop. 5) is absurd; and
thus there can be no substance besides God, and consequently no such substance can
be conceived.

For if it were conceivable, it would necessarily be conceived as

existing; but this (by the first part of this demonstration) is absurd. Therefore,
besides God no substance exists or is conceivable; q.e.d.
Coroll. 1.

From this it clearly follows, 1st, that God is sole of his kind,
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i.e. (by def. 6) there exists but one substance and that substance is absolutely
infinite, as we have already intimated in the scholium to prop. 10.
Coroll. 2.

It follows, 2dly, that extension and thought are either attributes

of God, or (acc. to ax. 1) affections of the attributes of God.
Prop. XV.

Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived without

Goo.
Oem.

No substance besides God can exist or can be conceived (acc. to prop.

14), i.e. (ace. to def. 3), besides God there can be nothing who exists in itself
and is conceived through and by itself.

But modes (by def. 5) can neither exist

nor be conceived without substance; and hence they can exist in the divine nature
alone and can be conceived through it alone.
and mooes (by ax. 1).

But nothing exists besides substances

Therefore nothing can exist or be conceived, without God;

q.e.d.
Schol.

Many imagine God after the likeness of man, consisting of body and mind,

and liable to passions; but how far such persons are from the true knowledge of
Goo, is sufficiently apparent from what has already been demonstrated.

These, how-

ever, I pass by; for all who have in any degree contemplated the nature of God,
deny that Goo is corporeal; and they bring excellent proof of this when they urge
that by a body we understand some quantity, with length, breadth and depth, some
determinate figure, a conception which it is the height of absurdity to apply to
God. i.e. to the absolutely infinite being.

Meanwhile, other reasons by which they

endeavour to demonstrate the incorporeality of God. clearly show that they altogether exclude corporeal or extended substance from the divine nature. and regard it
as created by Goo.

But by What divine power it could have been created they are

entirely ignorant; which plainly proves that they do not understand what they themselves say.

In my opinion. at least. I have shown clearly enough (see coroll.,

prop. 6 and schol. 2. prop. 8), that no substance can be produced or created.

Fur-

ther, we have shown (prop. 14) that no substance besides God exists or can be con-
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ceived.

And from hence we have concluded, that extended substance is one of the

attributes of God.

But for the sake of fuller explanation, I will refute the

arguments of adversaries, which may all be reduced to the following.

First, that

corporeal substance, in so far as it is substance, consists, as they suppose, of
parts; and hence they deny that it can be infinite, and consequently, that it can
belong to God.
two.

This they explain by many examples, of which I will adduce one or

If, say they, corporeal substance is infinite, let it be conceived as divi-

ded into two parts: each of these parts will be either finite or infinite.

If the

former, it will follow that the infinite is composed of two finite parts, which is
absurd.

If the latter, it will follow that there is an infinite twice as large as

another infinite, which is also absurd.

Again, if infinite quantity be measured

into equal parts by feet, it must consist of an infinite number of such parts, and
in like manner if it be measured into equal parts by inches; and thus one infinite
number will be twelve times larger than another infinite number.

Lastly, if it be

conceived that from one point of an infinite quantity two lines as AB, AC, having

a certain and determinate distance from each other' at the commencement, were infinitely produced; it is undeniable that the distance between B and C would continually increase and at length from a determinate would become an indeterminate distance.

Since, therefore, according to them, these absurdities follow from the sup-

position that quantity is infinite; they hence conclude that corporeal substance
must be finite, and consequently cannot pertain to the essence of God.
argument also is derived from the perfection of God.

The second

For God, they say, since he

is the supremely perfect being, cannot suffer; but corporeal substance, inasmuch as
it is divisible, can suffer; it follows, therefore, that corporeal substance does
not belong to the essence of God.

These are the arguments by which I find writers
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attempting to show that corporeal substance is unworthy of the divine nature and
cannot belong to it.

But anyone who has followed me attentively will be aware

that I have already answered these arguments; since they are founded solely on the
supposition that corporeal substance is composeq of parts, which I have already
(prop. 12 with coroll., prop. 13) shown to be absurd.

Further, anyone who rightly

weighs the subject \Jill see that all those absurdities (if indeed they are all absurdities, a point which I do not now discuss) from which they would conclude extended substance to be finite, do not in the least follow from the supposition that
quantity is infinite, but from the suppos-ition that infinite quantity is measurable
and is composed of finite parts; consequently, nothing else can be concluded from
those absurdities than that infinite quantity is not
of finite parts.

and is not composed

kld this is the very conclusion which we have already demonstra-

ted (prop. 12 etc.).
upon themselves.

me~surable

Thus the weapon which they directed at us, in fact recoils

And when they conclude from the absurdities above stated that

extended substance must be finite, they do essentially the same as the one who on
the ground that he imagined a circle to have the properties of a square should
conclude that a circle has not a centre from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal.

For corpor~al substance, which cannot be conceived except as

infinite, one and indivisible (see_ prop. 8, 5 and 12), they conceive as finite, as
composed of finite parts, as complex and divisible.

In like manner, others, after

imagining that a line is made up of points, can find many proofs by which they
show that a line cannot be infinitely divided.

And, assuredly, it is not less ab-

Surd to suppose that corporeal substance is composed of bodies or parts, than to
suppose that a body is composed of superficies, that superficies are composed of

1in~;;~ ~d that, lastly, lines are composed of points.

This all must admit who

know that a clear reason is infallible, and most of all those who deny a vacuum.

Po r , if corporeal substance could be thus divided and if its parts were really distinct, why should not one part be annihilated, the other parts remaining in the
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same connexion with each other as before?
that there is no vacuum?

and why must all be so fitted together

Surely of things which are in reality distinct from each

other, one can exist and remain in the same state without the other.

As, there-

fore there is no vacuum in nature (of which elsewhere) and all parts must so coincide that there is no vacuum; it follows also, that. those parts cannot be in reality distinct, i.e. that corporeal substance, in so far as it is substance, cannot
be divided.

If, however, any orie now asks why we are so naturally inclined to

divide quantity; I answer. that quantity is conceived by us in two ways,

~amely

superficially or abstractly, as it is represented in our imaginations; or as substance, which is conceived by the intellect alone.

Thus if we consider quantity by

means of the imagination. which is· the most easily and frequently done, it will be
found finite, divisible and composed of parts; but if we consider it by means of
the intellect; which it is extremely difficult to do. then, as I have already sufficiently demonstrated. it will he found infinite, one and indivisible.

And this

will be manifest enough to all who know how to distinguish between imagination and
intellect; especially if they also consider, that matter is everywhere the same.
and is not distinguishable into parts, except

~n

so far as we conceive matter to be

diversely affected, whence it follows that its parts are distinguished in mode
only and not in

reality~

For example, water, in so far as it is water. we con-

ceive to be divided. and its parts to be separated from each other; but not in so
far as it is corporeal substance; for as such it is neither separated nor divided.
Again, water, in so far as it is water, is generated and destroyed; but in so far
as it is substance, it is neithet'

l~ne1'at8d tiM

destroyed.

Hereby I consider my-

se If to have suffiaiently replie'ld to the second argument; * since that also is
grounded on the suppositi01l that matter, in so far as it is substance, is divisi-

* Namely that corporeal substance is capab Ie 'of suffering and therefore cannot
belong to the nature of God.
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ble and consists of parts.

And even if my answer were insufficient, I know not

why matter should be unworthy of the divine nature, since (by prop. 14) there can
be no substance except God, from

\~hich

matter could suffer.

All things, I repeat,

are in God, and all things that exist, exist solely by the laws of the infinite·
nature of God, and follow from the necessity of his essence (as I shall presently
shew).

Wherefore on no ground can it be said that God suffers from something

else, or that extended substance is unworthy of the nature of God, even though it
be supposed divisible, provided it be admitted to be eternal and infinite.

But

enough of this for the present.
Prop. XVI.

From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinity of

modes (that is everything which can Ifall underllbe comprehended inl an infinite
intellect).
Oem.

This proposition must be manifest to everyone if it be only considered,

that from the given definition of any thing the intellect infers a number of properties, which in truth necessarily follow from that definition (i.e. from the essence of the thing), and the more reality the definition of the thing expresses,
i.e. the more reality the essence of the thing involves, the more properties are
concluded from it.

But as the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes

(by def. 6), of which each in its kind expresses an infinite essence, there must
follow from the necessity of that nature an infinity of modes~ in other words
every thing which can be comprehended
in an infinite intellect; q.e.d.
I
Coroll. 1.

Hence it follows, 1st, that God is the efficient cause of all

things, which can be comprehended in an infinite intellect.
Coroll. 2.

It follows, 2dly, that God is a cause in himself (per se) and not

by accident (per accidens).
Coroll. 3.
Prop. XVII.

It follows, 3dly, that God is absolutely the first Cause.
God acts solely from the laws of his nature and is not constrained by

any other being.
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Oem.

That an infinity of modes absolutely follows solely from the necessity of

the divine nature, or (which is the same thing) solely from the laws of that nature. we have just shown in the preceding proposition; and under prop. 15 we have
demonstrated that nothing can exist or be conceived besides God,--that all things
are in God.

Consequently nothing external to him can exist by which he can be de-

termined or compelled; and therefore God acts solely from the laws of his nature
and is constrained by no other being; q.e.d.
Coroll. 1.

Hence it follows, 1st, that there is no cause which extrinsically

or intrinsically incites God to action, besides the perfection of his own nature.
Coroll. 2.

It follows. 2dly. that God alone is a free cause.

For God alone

exists solely from the necessity of his nature (by prop. 11 and coroll. 1. prop.
14) and acts solely from the necessity of his nature (by preced. prop.).

And thus

(by def. 7) he alone is a free cause; q.e.d.
Schol.

Others suppose God to be a free cause. on the ground that he can as

they imagine effect that those things which we have shown to follow from his nature. i.e. which are in his power. should not come into existence. or should not
be produced by him.

But this is equivalent to saying that God can cause that it

should not follow from the nature of a triangle that its three angles should be
equal to two right angles; or that from a given cause no effect should follow;
which is absurd.

Farther on I shall shew. without the aid of this proposition,

that neither Will nor Intellect belongs to the nature of God.

I know indeed that

there are many who suppose themselves able to demonstrate that supreme intellect
and free will belong to the nature of God; for, say they. we know nothing more
perfect which we can attribute to God than that which is in us the highest perfectiori.

Further, although they conceive the supreme intelligence of God as existing

in act (actu),* they nevertheless do not believe that he can cause everything

* Deum aotu summe inteZZigentem.
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which his intellect thus embraces in act, to exist; for they hold that they should
thus destroy the power of God.

If, say they, he had created all things that are

in his intellect, there would then be nothing further which he could create; and
as, according to them, this consequence is inconsistent with the omnipotence of
God, they prefer regarding God as indifferent to all things, and as creating nothing else than that which he has determined to create by so-called absolute will.
But I think I have sufficiently shown (see prop. 16) that from the perfect power
or infinite nature of God an infinity of modes, i.e. all things whatever, have necessarily flowed, or are always following from the same necessity; just as from
eternity to eternity it follows from the nature of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right angles.

Thus, the omnipotence of God has been from all

eternity in act, and will eternally remain in act.

And in this manner the omnipo-

tence of God is, at least in my judgment, far more perfectly established.

Nay, to

speak openly, it is our opponents who appear to deny the omnipotence of God.

For

they are obliged to admit that God conceives an infinity of creatable things which
he can never create; since otherwise, namely, if he created all that he conceives,
he WOUld, according to them, exhaust his omnipotence and render himself imperfect.
Hence in order that they may maintain the perfection of God, they are driven also
to maintain that he cannot effect all things to which his power extends; and anything more absurd than this, or more inconsistent with the omnipotence of God, can
hardly be imagined.

Further, to say a few words here on the Intelligence and Will

Which are commonly attributed to God.

If intelligence and will belong to the eter-

nal essence of God, something else must be understood by these attributes than what
men usually understand by them.

For the intelligence and will which constitute the

essence of God must differ toto aaeZo from our intelligence and will, and indeed
can agree in anything else than in name: they resemble each other as the dog, a
heavenly constellation, resembles a dog, a barking animal.
in the following manner.

This I will demonstrate

If intelligence belongs to the divine nature, that intel-
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ligence cannot have the same relation as ours to the objects it embraces.

It can

neither be posterior in nature to its objects (as ours is generally supposed to be)
nor simultaneous with them, since God is prior to all things by his causality (acc.
to coroll. 1, prop. 16); on the contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is
what it is. because it exists as such objectively in the intellect of God.

Conse-

quently the intellect of God, conceived as constituting the essence of God, is in
truth the cause of things, as well of their essence as of their existence; and this
appears to have been perceived by those also who maintain the intellect, will and
power of God to be one and the same thing.

If therefore the intellect of God is

the sole cause of things, that is to say, both of their essence and their existence,
he himself must necessarily differ from them both by reason of his essence and of
his existence.

For the thing caused differs from its cause precisely in that which

it has from the cause.

For example, one man is the cause of the existence of ano-

ther man, but not of his essence (which is an eternal truth); and thus in their
essence they can entirely agree, but in their existence 'they must differ; consequently if the existence of the one perishes, it does not follow that that of the
other will perish; but if the eSsence of the one can be destroyed and become false,
the essence of the other will also be destroyed.

Therefore, a thing which is the

cause ,both of the essence and existence of any effect, must cliffer from that effect
both in its essence and in its existence.

But the intellect of God is the cause

both of the essence and existence of our intellect; therefore the intellect of God,
conceived as constituting the divine essence, must cliffer from our intellect both
in its essence and in its existence, and can agree with it in nothing .but in name;
as we intended to shew.

It

is obvious that we may apply the same mode of proof to

Will.
Prop. XVIII.
Oem.

God is the immanent and not the transient cause of all things.

Whatever is, is in God, and must be conceived in relation to God (by prop.

15), and thus (acc. to coroll. 1, prop. 16) God is the cause .of thin;gs, which are
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in him.

This is the first point.

Next, besides God there can be no substance (by

prop. 14), i.e. (by def. 3) a thing which exists in itself out of God.
the second point.

This is

Therefore God is the immanent and not the transient cause of

all things; q.e.d.
Prop. XIX.
Oem.

God, or all the attributes of God, are eternal.

For God (by def. 6) is the substance which (by prop. 11)

necess~rily

exists, i.e. (by prop. 7) to the nature of which it belongs existence (or which is
the same thing), from the simple definition of which it follows that it exists;
thus (by def. 8) God is eternal.

Purther, by the attributes of God is to be un-

derstood (by def. 4) that which expresses the essence of the divine substance,
i.e. that which belongs to substance: this, I say, must be involved in the attributes.

But to the nature of substance (as I have already shewn by reference to

prop. 7) belongs eternity; therefore each of the attributes must involve eternity
and thus they are all eternal; q.e.d.
Schol.

This proposition is also clearly evident from the manner in which

(prop. 11) I have demonstrated the existence of God.

For by that demonstration it

is established, that the existence of God in common with his essence, is an eternal truth.

I'have also (princip. philos.

Cartes~i

part I. prop. 19) demonstrated

the eternity of God in another manner, which it [is] needless to repeat here.
Prop. XX .. The existence and essence of God are one and the same thing.
Oem.

God (by preced. prop.), or all his attributes, are eternal, i.e. (by def.

8), each of his attributes expresses existence.

Therefore the same attributes of

God, which (by def. 4) express his eternal essence of God, at the same.time express his eternal existence, i.e., that which constitutes the essence of God,
constitutes also his existence; and consequently his existence and his essence
are one and the same; q.e.d.
Coroll. 1.

Hence it follows, first, that the existence of God, as well as his

essence, is an eternal truth.
~~,
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Coroll. 2.
immutable.

It follows, secondly, that God, or all the attributes of God, are

For if they changed as to existence, they must also (by preced. prop.)

change as to essence, i.e. (as is self-evident) from being true they must become
false; which is absurd.
Prop. XXI.

All tllings which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of

God, must exist always and exist infinitely; in other words, in virtue of the
same attribute, they are infinite and eternal.
Dem.

Conceive, if Iyou <can>lIit be possiblel (and if indeed you deny the prop-

osition), something in one of the attributes of God which follows from the absolute nature of that attribute and which is nevertheless finite and has a determinate existence or duration; for example the idea of God in thought.

Now thought,

since, by the hypothesis it is an attribute of God, is necessarily (by prop. 11)
infinite in its nature.
finite.

But so far as it has an idea of God it is supposed to be

It cannot however (by def. 2) be conceived as finite, unless it be limit-

ed by thought itself; but not by thought itself, so far as it constitutes the
idea of God (for so far, according to the hypothesis, it is finite); therefore it
must be limited by thought so far as it does not constitute the idea of God; in
which sense however thought (by prop. 11) must necessarily exist.

There would

thus be a thought not constituting the idea of God, and consequently the idea of
God would not follow from the absolute nature of thought (for thought is conceived
both as constituting and as not constituting the idea of God); which is contrary
to the hypothesis.

Therefore, if the idea of God in thought or something (the re-

sult is the same whatever may be supposed. since the demonstration is universal)
in one of the divine attributes follows from the necessity of the absolute nature
of that attribute, it must necessarily be infinite; which was the first point to
be demonstrated.
Further, that which thus follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute, cannot have a determinate duration.

If you deny this, suppose jn one of the
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divine attributes some thing which follows from the necessity of the nature of
that attribute, for example, the idea of God in thought, and suppose that at one
time this did not exist or that it will some time cease to exist.

Now thought as

an attribute of God must necessarily and immutably exist (by prop. 11 and coroll.
2, prop. 20).

Hence beyond the limits of the duration of the idea of God (for it

is supposed that at one time litllthis ideal did not exist, or that it will some
time cease to exist) thought must exist without the idea of God; but this is contrary to the hypothesis; for it is supposed that thought being given, the idea of
God must necessarily follow.

Therefore, the idea of God in thought, or anything

which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God, cannot
have a determina,te duration but, in virtue of the same attribute, is eternal; which
was the second point to be -demonstrated.

Let it be noted, that this demonstration

applies to everything, which in any attribute of God, necessarily follows from the
absolute nature of God.
Prop. XXII.

Whatever follows from any* attribute of God, in so far as it is af-

fected by a modification which in virtue of the same attribute has a necessary
and infinite existence, must also have a necessary and infinite existence.
Oem.

The demonstration of this proposition proceeds in the same manner as that

of the preceding.
Prop. XXIII.

Every mode the existence of which is both necessary and infinite

must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of
God, or from some attribute affected by a modification, the existence of which
is necessary and infinite.
Oem.

For a mode exists in something else through which it must be conceived (by

* aUquo Paulus and Gfrorer who are followed by Bruder read aZio who renders
the prop. unintelligible. The ed. gives aZiquo.
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def. 5), i.e. (by prop. 15) it exists in God alone and can be conceived through
God alone.

If therefore a mode is conceived to exist necessarily and to be infi-

nite. this must necessarily be concluded or perceived through some attribute of
God, so far as this is conceived as expressing infinity and necessity of existence, or (what by·def. 8 is the same thing) as expressing eternity, i.e. (by def.
6 and prop. 19) so far as it is considered absolutely.

Therefore a mode, which

exists both necessarily and infinitely, must follow from the absolute nature of
some attribute of God; and this either immediately (concerning which see prop. 21)
or mediately, I.e. from some modification which follows from his absolute nature,
that is (by preced. prop.) the existence of which is necessary and infinite; q.e.d.
Prop. XXIV.
Oem.

The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.

This is evident from def. 1.

For that, the nature of which (considered

in itself) involves existence, is its own cause and exists solely by the necessity
of its nature.
Coroll.

Hence it follows, that God is not only the cause that things begin to

exist; but also, that they persevere in existing, or (to use a scholastic term)
that God is the cause of the being of things (aausam essendi rerum).

For whether

things exi$t or do not exist, we find, when we consider their essence, that it involves neither existence nor duration; and thus their essence cannot be the cause
either of their existence or of their duration, but God alone, the sole being to
whose nature existence is essential (acc. to coroll. 1, prop. 14).
Prop. XXV.

God is not only the efficient cause of the existence of things, but

also of their essence.
Oem.

If this be 'denied, then God is not the cause of their essence; and conse-

quently (by ax. 4) the essence of things can be conceived without God.
(by prop. 15) is absurd.

But this

Therefore God is also the cause of the essence of

things; q.e.d.
Schol.

This proposition is more clearly demonstrated by means of prop. 16.

25
For from this it follows, that the divine nature being given, both the essence and
existence of things must necessarily be concluded; and, to express it in one word,
in the same sense in which God is said to be his own cause, he must also be said
to be the cause of all things, which will be yet more clearly evident from the
following corollary.
Coroll.

Particular things are nothing but affections of the attributes of God,

or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a certain and determinate
manner.

The demonstration is evident from prop. 15 and def. 5.

Prop. XXVI.

A thing which is determined to any action has necessarily been so de-

termined by God; and what is not determined by God, cannot determine itself to
action.
Dem.

That by which a thing is said to be determined to any action, is neces-

sarily something positive (as is self evident); and thus God, by the necessity of
his nature, is the efficient cause both of its essence and existence (by prop. 25
and 16).

This suffices to prove the first part of our proposition.

And from

thence the second part of the proposition follows in the clearest manner.

For if

a thing which is not determined by God could determine itself, the first part of
this demonstration would be false; which is absurd, as we have shown.
Prop. XXVII. A thing which is determined to action by God cannot render itself indeterminate.
Dem.

This proposition is evident from ax. 3.

Prop. XXVIII •. Every individual thing, or any thing which is finite and has a determinate existence, cannot exist or be determined to action unless its action
and existence be determined by a cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence: and again this cause cannot exist or be determined to action,
unless its action and existence be determined by another cause which is also
finite and has a determinate existence, and so on in infinitum.
Oem.

Whatever is determined to exist and act, is thus determined by God (by
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prop. 26 and coroll., prop. 24).

But that which is finite and has a determinate

existence, cannot have been produced from the absolute nature of any attribute of
God; for whatever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by prop. 21).

It must therefore follow from God or from one

of his attributes· considered as affected by some mode; for there is nothing else
but substance and its modes (by ax. 1 and def. 3 and 5), and modes (by coroll.,
prop. 25) are nothing but the affections of the attributes of God.

Nor can a

thing which is finite follow from God or from any of his attributes in so far as
they are affected by a modification which is infinite and eternal (by prop. 22).
It must therefore follow or be determined to exist and act by God or by one of his
attributes in so far as they are modified by a modification which is finite and
has a determinate existence.

This is the first part of the proposition.

Next,

this cause again or this mode (for the same reason by which I have already demonstrated the first part of this proposition) must also be determined by another,
which is also finite and has a determinate existence, and this last again by another, and so always (for the same reason) in infinitum; q.e.d.
Schol .. Since some things must have been immediately produced by God, namely,
those which necessarily follow from his absolute nature, in virtue of those primary attributes, which yet can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it follows, 1. that God is the absolutely proximate cause of things produced immediately
from himself; and not the generic cause, as is commonly said.

For the effects of

God can neither exist nor be conceived without their cause (by prop. 15 and cor011., prop. 24).

It follows, 2. that God cannot properly be said to be the re-

mote cause of individual things, except by way of distinguishing them from those
which he produces immediately, or rather which follow from his absolute nature.
For a remote cause we understand one which is in no way conjoined with its effect.
But all things that are, are in God, and so depend on God that without him they
can neither exist nor be conceived.
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Prop. XXIX.

There is nothing contingent in nature: everything is determined by

the necessity of the divine nature to a certain mode of existence and action.
Oem.

Whatever is, is in God (by prop. 15).

contingent being.

For (by prop. 11) he exists

But God cannot be said to be a
n~cessarily

and not contingently.

Further, the modes of the divine nature also follow from it necessarily and not
contingently (by prop. 16); and this is so, whether we consider the divine nature
absolutely (by prop. 21) or as determined to activity in a certain manner.

Fur-

ther, God is not only the cause of these modes so far as they simply exist (by
corol1., prop. 24), but also (by prop. 26) so far as we consider them as determined to some form of action.

If (by the same prop.) they are not determined by

God, it is impossible, and not contingent, that they should determine themselves;
and on the contrary (by prop. 27) if they are determined by God, it is impossible,
and not contingent, that they should render themselves indeterminate.

Thus all

things are determined by the nece5sity of the divine nature, not only to exist,
but also to exist and act in a certain manner, and there is nothing contingent;
q.e.d.

Schol.

Before 1 proceed farther, I will explain to the reader, or rather re-

mind. him what I mean by natura naturans and what by natura natUPata.

For from the

foregoing propositions it is, I believe, alreaqy evident that by natum naturans
we are to understand that which is in itself and is conceived by itself, or such
attributes of substance as express an eternal and infinite essence, i.e. (by cor011. 1, prop.·14 and corol1. 2, prop. 17) God considered as a free cause.

By

natuPa natumta, on the other hand, I understand everything that follows from the
necessity of the nature of God or of any of his attributes, i.e. all the modes of
the attributes of God, considered as things which are in God and which cannot
exist or be conceived without God.
Prop. XXX.

An understanding in act, whether finite or infinite, must comprehend

the attributes and affections of God and nothing else.
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Oem.

A true idea must agree with its object (by ax. 6), i.e. (as is self-evi-

dent) that which is contained objectively in the unders'tanding must necessarily
exist in nature.

But in nature (by coroll. 1, prop. 14) there is only one sub-

stance, namely God, and there are no other affections (by prop. 15) than those
which are in God,. and which (by the same prop.) cannot exist or be conceived without God.

Therefore an understanding in act, whether finite or infinite, must com-

prehend the attributes and affections of God and nothing else; q.e.d.
Prop. XXXI.

An understanding in act, whether it·be finite or infinite, as also

will, desire. love etc. must be included under naturam naturatam, and not under

natura natm>antem.
Oem.

For by understanding (as is self-evident) we do not mean absolute thought

but merely a certain mode of thought, which mode differs from others, for example,
from. desire, love etc., and thus must be conceived through the conception of absolute thought, that is to say (by prop. 15 and def. 6), it must be conceived in relation to some attribute of God which expresses the eternal and infinite essence
of thought, in such a manner that without this attribute it can neither exist nor
be conceived.

And therefore (by schol., prop. 29) it must be referred to natura

naturans and not to natura naturata, as also must the other modes of thought;
q.e.d.
Schol.

The reason why I here speak of understanding in act, is not because I

admit that there is an understanding which is merely potential; but, as I desire
to avoid all confusion, I choose to speak only of that which is as clearly as possible perceived by us, namely, the act of understandting] or intellection itself.
For we can perceive nothing more clearly than this; since we can understand nothing which does not conduce to a more perfect knowledge of the act of understanding.
Prop. XXXII.
Oem.

The Will cannot be called a free cause; but only a necessary cause.

Will, like intellect, is only a certain mode of thought; and thus (by
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prop. 28) a volition can neither exist nor be determined to action unless it be
determined by some other cause, and this again by another and so on in infinitum.
If Will be supposed infinite, it must still be determined to exist and act by God,
not as he is the absolutely infinite substance, .but as he has an attribute which
expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought (by prop. 28).

In whatever

way it be conceived therefore, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause
by which it may be determined to exist and act; and thus (by def. 7) it cannot be
called a free cause, but only a necessary or coerced cause; q.e.d.
Coroll. 1.

Hence it follows, first, that God does not act from free will.

Coroll. 2.

Secondly, that will and understanding are related to the nature of

God in the same way as motion and rest, and absolutely all natural things, which
(by prop. 29) are determined by God to a certain mode of existence and action.
For Will, like all other things, requires a cause by which it may be determined to
existence and action.

And although from a given Will and understanding there fol-

lows an infinite of consequences, God cannot on this account be said to act from
free will, any more than because of what follows from motion and rest (for from
these also there follows an infinity of things) he can be said to act from liberty'
of motion and rest.

Hence, Will no more belongs to the nature of God than other

natural existences, but is related to it as motion and rest and all other things,
which we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine ,nature and to be
determined by it to exist and act in a certain manner.
Prop. XXXIII.

Things could not have been produced by God in any other manner or

in any other order than that in which they have been produced.
Oem.

For all things have necessarily followed from the actual nature of God

(by prop. 16) and have been determined by the necessity of the nature of God to a
certain mode of existence and action (by prop. 29).

If therefore things could

have been of another nature or could have been determined to act in another manner, so that the order of nature would have been different, it follows that the
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nature of God also could have been different from what it actually is; consequently (by prop. 11) that other nature must also exist, and thus there would be two or
more Gods; which (by prop. 14) is absurd.

Therefore things could not have been

produced in any other manner or in any other order etc.; q.e.d.
Schol. 1.

As .from what I have above stated it is clearer than midday, that

there is absolutely no quality in things on the ground of which they can be called
contingent, I wish now to explain in a few words, what is strictly to be understood by contingent; but before doing so it is desirable to define the terms nec-

essQTY and impossibZe.
essence or of its cause.

A thing is said to be necessary by reason either of its
For the existence of a thing necessarily follows either

from its essence and definition, or from a given efficient cause.

Hence a thing

is said to be impossibZe; Inamelyllon the following groundsl, either because its
essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because there is no external
cause determined to the production of such a thing.

But a thing is said to be

contingent in no other sense than in relation to the deficiency of our knowledge.
For a thing, of which we do not know that its essence involves a contradiction,
or of which we know that it involves no contradiction, and yet of whose existence
we can certainly affirm nothing, because the order of causes is hidden from us,
this cannot seem to us either necessary or impossible; and hence we call it contingent or possible.
Schol. 2.

From what precedes it clearly follows, that things have been pro-

duced by God in the highest perfection, since they have necessarily followed
from the existence of the supremely perfect nature.

And this does not argue any

imperfection in God, for it is his perfection which compels us to affirm this position.

If the contrary be maintained it will clearly follow (as I have just

shewn) that God is not perfect; since, if things had been produced in another manner, we must have attributed to God another nature, different from that which we
are compelled to attribute to him by the conception of the most perfect being.
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But I do doubt not that many will reject this opinion as absurd. and will not
deign to apply their minds to it; on no other ground than because they are accustamed to attribute to God another kind of liberty. far different from that which
is attributed to him by us (def. 7*). namely Absolute Will.

Still I am not the

less convinced that if they would meditate on the subject, they would decidedly
give up the liberty they now attribute to God, not only as trivial, but as a
great obstacle to science.

It is unnecessary for me here to repeat what has been

said in the scholiwn of proposition 17; but for the sake of those to whom I allude
I will show-that even conceding Will to belong to the essence of God, it does not
the less follow from his perfection that things could not have been created by God
in any other manner or order.

This it will be easy to prove if we consider

fi~t.

what they themselves admit, namely, that it depends solely on the decree and will
of God that each thing is what it is; for otherwise God would not be the cause of
all things; next, that all things have been ordained by God himself from all eternity; for otherwise he would be accused of imperfection and inconstancy.

But as

in eternity there is Inollneitherl when nor before· nor after. it follows solely
from the perfection of God, that He never can and never could decree otherwise; in
other words, that God did not exist before his decrees and cannot exist without
them.

But, say they, although it be supposed that God might have made another na-

ture of things, or that he might from eternity have decreed otherwise concerning
nature and its order, it would not thence follow that there is any imperfection in
God.
crees.

In making this supposition, however, they admit that God can change his deFor

i~

God had decreed concerning nature and her order otherwise than he

has decr~ed, i ~e., could have willed and conceived otherwise concerning Nature. he

* Bruder gives def. 6, and he is followed by Saisset and Auerbach, but it seems
clear to us that this is a mistake.
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would necessarily have. another intelligence than that which he actually has, and
another will than that which he actually has.

And if it be possible to attribute

to God another intelligence and another will without any change of his essence and
perfection, what reason is there why he cannot now change his decrees concerning
created things and nevertheless remain equally perfect?

For according to this

doctrine it matters little, in relation to the essence and perfection of God, what
conception of God is formed concerning created things and their order.

Moreover,

all philosophers with whom I am acquainted concede that there is in God no potential intelligence but only actual intelligence.

But since neither his intelligence

nor his will is distinguished from his essence, which again is universally admitted. it follows also that if God had a different intelligence and a different will
his essence would also be different; and therefore (as

r began by advancing) if

things were produced by God otherwise than they actually are, the intelligence and
will of God,· i.e. (as is conceded) his essence, would be different; which is absurd .. Since therefore things could have been-produced by God ·in no other manner
or order, and .since this follows from the supreme perfection of God, there is no
sound reason whatever for believing that God has not willed to create all things
which are in his thought in the same perfection which they have in his· thought.
Perhaps it will be said,-however, that in things themselves there is neither perfection nor imperfection, and that whatever-in them causes them to be pronounced
perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends on the will of God alone; so that if
God had willed it he could have caused that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection and vice versa.

But what else is this than openly to affirm

that God, who necessarily-thinks ·what he wills, can by his will effect that he
should think things in another way than that in which he actually thinks them?
And this (as I have recently shewn) is a gross absurdity.

Hence I can turn this

argument against themselves in the following manner: "All things depend on the
power of God.

In order, therefore, that things should be otherwise constituted,
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the will of God must also be otherwise constituted; but it is impossible that the
will of God should be otherwise constituted (as I have demonstrated from the perfection of God); therefore neither can things be otherwise constituted."

I confess

that this opiRion which subjects all things to the indifferent will of God and
makes all
which

thi~gs

ma~ntains

depend on his fiat, is a less departure from the truth than that

.that God produces all things according to the rule of the Good.

For the latter opinion appears to posit something outside God; and nothing more absurd than this can be advanced concerning God; for, as we have shewn, he is the
first and only cause as well of the

e~sence ~f

all things as of their existence.

Hence I need not spend time in refuting this absurdity.
Prop. XXXIV.
Oem.

The power of God is his essence itself.

For from the sole necessity of the essence of God it follows that God is

cause of himself (ace. prop. 11) and (ace. prop. 16 and its coroll.) of all things.
Therefore the power of God, by which he himself and all things exist and act, is
his essence; q.e.d.
Prop. XXXV.
Oem.

Whatever we conceive to be in the power of God is necessary.

For whatever is in the power of God must (acc. precede prop.) be so com-

prehended in his essence as necessarily to follow from it, and is therefore necessary; q.e.d.
Prop. XXXVI.
Oem.

Nothing exists from the nature of which some effect does not follow.

Whatever exists, expresses in a certain and determinate manner the nature,

and essence of God (acc. coroll., prop. 25), i.e. (acc. coroll., prop. 34) whatever
exists expresses in a certain and determinate manner the power of God, which is the
cause of all things, and therefore (ace. prop. 16) some effect must necessarily
fOllow from it; q.e.d.

Appendix

In the foregoing propositions I have explained the nature of God and his proper-
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ties: that he neaessarily exists; that he is one; that he exists and aats solely

from the neaessity of his natW'e; that he is the free aause of all things and
in what manner he is so j that all things are in God and so depend upon him that
without him they aan neither exist nor be aonaeived; and lastly, that all thinga
have been predet8rmined by God, not indeed by freedom of will or absolute arbitrement, but as a necessary consequence of the absolute nature and infinite power of
God.

Further, wherever opportunity has occurred, I have taken care to remove pre-

judices which might hinder my demonstrations from being perceived.

But as there

still remain not a few prejudices which have been and are af sufficient force to
prevent men from embracing the concatenation of things as I have presented it, I
think it worth while here to submit these prejudices to the examination of reason.
And as all the prejudices which I here undertake to indicate, depend upon this,
namely, that men commonly suppose all natural things to act, as they themselves
do, for the sake of an end, and even regard it as certain that God himself directs
everything to a particular end (for they say that God made everything for the sake
of man, and man that he might worship God); I shall begin by considering this fundamental prejudice and inquire, first, why many acquiesce in it and why all are by
nature prone to embrace it.

Seaondly, I shall shew its falsity; and lastly, in

what manner it has given rise to the prejudices concerning good and
and

sin~

praise and

blame~

order and

ing other things of like nature.

aonfusion~

evil~

merit

beauty and deformity, and concern-

But to deduce all this from the nature of the

human mind would be here out of place; it will suffice at present if I assume as
a basis what must be admitted by all, namely, that all men are born ignorant of
the causes of things, and that all have, and are conscious that they have, the
tendency to seek what is useful to them.

For from this it follows, first, that men

suppose themselves to be free because they are conscious of their volitions and
appetites, and do not even dream of the causes by which they are disposed to desire and will, because of these they are ignorant.

It follows, secondly, that men
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do all things for the sake of an end, namely the good or useful which they desire.
Hence it comes that they always seek to know only the final causes of things which
have taken place, and when they have heard these they are satisfied, not having
within themselves any cause for further doubt.

.But if they are unable to learn

these final causes from some one else, nothing remains to them but to turn in upon
themselves and to reflect on the ends by which they are themselves wont to be determined to similar actions; and thus they necessarily judge of the mind of another by
their own.

Further, as within themselves and out of themselves they discover many

means which are highly conducive to the pursuit of their own advantage, for example,
eyes to see with, teeth to masticate with, vegetables and animals for food, the sun
to give them light, the sea to nourish fish etc., so they come to consider all natural things as means for their benefit; and because they are aware that these things
have been found and not prepared by them, they have been led to believe that some
one else has adapted those means to their use.

For after considering things in the

light of means, they could not believe these things to have made themselves; but
arguing from their own practice of preparing means for their use, they must conclude,
that there is some ruler or rulers of nature endowed with human freedom, who have
provided all these things for them and have made them all for the use of men.
Moreover, since they have never heard anything of the mind of these rulers they
must necessarily judge of this mind also by their own; and henc.e they have argued
that the gods direct all things for the advantage of man in order that they may
subdue him to themselves and be held in the highest honour by him.

Hence each has

devised, according to his character, a different mode of worshipping God, in order
that God might love him more than others, and might direct all nature to the advantage of ·his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice.

Thus this prejudice has

c()l1verted itself into superstition and struck deep root into men's minds; and this
has been the cause of why men in general have eagerly striven to detect and exPlain the final causes of all things.

But while they have sought to shew that
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Nature does nothing in vain (i.e. which is not for the use of men), they seem to
us to have shewn nothing else than that Nature and the Gods are as foolish as men.
And observe, I pray you, to what a point this opinion has brought them!

Together

with the many useful things in Nature, they necessarily found not a few injurious
things, namely tempests, earthquakes, diseases etc.; these, they supposed, happened because the Gods were angry on account of offences committed against them
by men, or because of faults incurred in their worship; and although experience
every day protests, and shews by infinite examples, that benefits and injuries
happen indifferently to the pious and ungodly, they do not therefore renounce
their inveterate prejudice.

For it was easier to them to class these phenomena

among other things the use of which was unknown to them and thus retain their present and innate condition of ignorance. than to destroy all the fabric of their
belief and excogitate a new one.

Accordingly they presuppose as certain that the

wisdom of the gods far transcends the human understanding: a position which would
assuredly have sufficed eternally to hide the truth from the human race. if mathematics, which is concerned not with causes but solely with the essences and properties of figures, had not shown another law of truth to men.

Other causes, how-

ever, besides mathematics. may be assigned (though to enumerate them here is superfluous) which might incite men to call in question these common prejudices and
so lead them to the true knowledge of things.
I have thus given the explanation which I promised in the first place.

Little

is now requisite to prove that Nature has no preestablished end. and that all final
causes are nothing more than human fictions.

For I 'believe this is already suf-

ficiently evident as well from the grounds and causes whence I have shown this
prejudice to have arisen as from prop. 16 and the corollaries of prop. 32, and
also from all those propositions in which I have shown that all things have proceeded out of a certain eternal necessity and supreme perfection of nature.
Still. I will add that this doctrine concerning final causes completely reverses
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the order of nature.

For that which is in reality a cause, it considers as an ef-

fect, and viae versa; again, that which in nature is anterior it makes posterior;
and lastly," that which is supreme and perfect, it renders imperfect.

For (omit-

ting the two first points which are obvious) from prop. 21, 22 and 23 it is evident that that effect is the most perfect which is produced immediately by God,
and that in proportion as anything requires intermediate causes for its production
it is imperfect.

But if the things immediately produced by God were made in order

that God might attain a certain end which he' proposes to himself, then necessarily,
the last things, for the sake of which the first were made, would have the preeminence overall the others.

Hence this doctrine abolishes the perfection of

God; for if God acts for the sake of an end, he necessarily desires something
which is wanting to him.

And although theologians distinguish between an end of

want (finem indigentiae) and an end of assimilation (finem assimilationis) they
nevertheless admit that God produced all things for his own sake and not for the
sake of things yet to be created, because before the creation they can assign nothing besides God himself for the sake of which God could act; and thus they are
compelled to admit, that God wanted and desired those things for the sake of which.
he willed to'prepare means (as is self evident).

Nor must it be left unnoticed

that the followers of this doctrine who wish to shew their ingenuity in assigning
final causes to things,'have introduced a new kind of argument in its support,
viz. a reduatio.not ad absurdum but ad ignorantiam; an evidence that no other mode
of argument would sustain their. doctrine.

If, for example, a stone were to fall

from some height on a man's head and kill him, they would demonstrate that the
stone fell in order to kill the man.

For unless it had fallen to that end by the

will of God, how could so many circumstances (for these circumstances are often
numerous) have concurred to produce this end?

You will answer perhaps that it

happened because the wind blew and the man was passing that way.
Sist: why should the wind blow at that moment?

But they will in-

Why should the man be passing by at
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that moment?

If again you reply that the wind had then risen because on the pre-

vious day the sea, previously tranquil, had begun to be agitated, and that the man
had been invited bya friend; they will further ask, there being <na> end to this
kind of questioning: why was the sea agitated?

Why was the man invited at that

particular time? ·And so they will not cease to ask the cause of causes until you
have taken refuge in the will of God, i.e. in ignorance.

Again, when they see the

structure of the human body they are struck with astonishment and because they are
ignorant of the causes of this complex structure, they conclude that it has been
framed and so constituted that one part does not injure the other, not by natural
forces but by divine or supernatural art.

And this is the reason why anyone who

inquires into the true causes of miracles, and who seeks to understand natural
things like an instructed person, and not simply to be amazed at them like a fool,
is always held and proclaimed to be heretical and impious by those whom the vulgar
venerate as the interpreters of nature and the gods.

For they know that if igno-

rance were done away with, wonder, their only means of arguing and of enforcing
their authority, would be done away with too.

But I quit this subject and proceed

to the one which I have determined to treat'/of in the third pZace.
/

When· once men had persuaded themselves that everything which exists had been
made for their sakes; they naturally regarded what was most useful to themselves
as the main point in everything, and esteemed as most excellent all the objects
and qualities by which they were the most beneficially affected.

Hence arose the

notions by which they explain the nature of things, namely, good, eviZ, order,

confusion, heat, coZd, beauty and deformity etc.; and because they suppose themselves free, have arisen the notions of praise and bLame, sin and merit.

The lat-

ter I will consider further on, after I have treated of human nature; the former I
will briefly explain here.

Everything, then, which conduces to health and to the

service of God, they call good and what is opposed to these, bad.

And because

those who do not understand the nature of things never have for the object of their
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affirmations things as they really are but merely imagine things and take imagination for understanding, they firmly believe, in their ignorance of the nature of
things, that there is an order in things.

The fact is, that if things are so dis-

posed that when they are represented by the senses they can be easily embraced and
consequently easily remembered, we call them orderly, but when the contrary is the
case, we call them disorderly or confused.

And as those things are the most a-

greeable to us which we can easily imagine, men prefer order to confusion, as if
there were some order in nature apart from our imagination: and they say that God
created all things in order, thus unconsciously attributing imagination to God; unless indeed they would maintain that God providing for the human imagination has so
disposed all things that they may be most easily imagined; nor will it perhaps be
any difficulty to them that they find an infinity of things which far transcend
our imagination, and still more which from its weakness, confound it.
of this.

But enough

The other notions are also nothing more than modes in which the imagina-

tion is diversely affected, and yet they are considered by the ignorant as the
chief attributes of things; because, as I have already said, they believe all
things to have been made for their sake and call the nature of anything good or
bad, sound or corrupt, according as they are affected by it.

For example, if a

motion which the nerves receive from objects presented by the eyes conduces to
health, they call the objects by which that motion is caused beautiful, but if the
contrary, they call those objects ugly.

And according to the same rule, those

things which affect the sense through the nostrils they call odoriferous or foetid,
those which act thrQugh the palate sweet or bitter, savoury or insipid etc., and
those which act through the touch hard or soft, rough or smooth etc.

Lastly, im-

pressions on the hearing they call either noise, sound, or harmony, and men have
even been so absurd as to believe that God also delights in harmony.

Indeed phi-

lOsophers have not been wanting who persuade themselves that the celestial motions
compose a harmony.

All this sufficiently shews that each person judges of things
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according to the disposition of his brain, or rather accepts the affections of the
imagination as real things.

It is no wonder therefore (as we may note in passing)

that so many controversies have arisen among men, and that these controversies have
at last given birth to skepticism.

For although human bodies are alike in many

things, there are. more in which they differ, and thus what to one appears good, to
another appears evil; what to one appears order, to another appears confusion; what
to one is pleasant, to another is unpleasant; and so of the rest which I here omit
both because this is not the place to treat of them in particular, and because the
diversity of impressions has been sufficiently experienced by all.

For it is com-

monly said: So many men, so many minds; everyone to his taste; brains differ as much
as palates;--proverbs which sufficiently prove that men judge of things according to
the disposition of their brains, and imagine things rather than understand them.
For if they really understood things they would (as we see in mathematics) be at
least convinced if not attracted by them.
Thus we see that all the notions by which the vulgar are wont to explain nature
are merely modes of imagination and do not indicate the nature of anything, but
simply the constitution of the imagination; and because they have names as if they
were realities existing beyond the imagination, I call them beings not of the reason but of the imagination; so that all argurnants against us which are drawn from
such notions can be easily repulsed.

For many are wont to argue thus: If all things

have followed from the necessity of the supremely perfect nature of God, why then
have so many imperfections arisen in nature?

The corruption of things to foetid-

ness, the deformity of objects, things which excite nausea, confusion, evil, sin
etc.?

But, as I have just said, they are easily confuted.

For the perfection of

things is to be estimated solely according to their own nature and power, and hence
they are neither more nor less perfect according as they delight the senses of man-as they agree with the human nature or disagree with it.

To those who ask: why did

not God create all men so that they might be governed by their reason alone?

I have
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no other answer than this: Because he had matter enough for the creation of all
possible things from the very highest to the very lowest grades; or rather, strictly speaking, because the laws of his nature were so simple that they sufficed to
produce all things which can be conceived by an infinite intelligence, as I have
demonstrated, prop. 16.
notice.
one

o~

These are the prejudices which I have here undertaken to

If there still remain any of the same kind, they can be corrected by any
moderate reflection.

Part II
On the Nature and Origin of the Mind

Preface
I proceed now to explain that order of existences which must necessarily follow
from the essence of God, or of the eternal and infinite being: not, of course, all
of them (for it has been demonstrated, Part I, prop. 16, that there must follow
from that essence an infinity of modes,' infinitely modified). but only those which
will serve to lead us. as it were by the hand. to the knowledge of human mind and
its highest happiness.

Definitions

1.

By body I understand a mode which expresses in a certain and determinate

manner the essence of God. considered as an extended thing.

See Part I, prop. 25,

coroll.
2.

The essenae of a thing is that. the existence of which involves the eXlst-

ence of the thing. and its non-existence the non-existence of the thing; or that
without which the thing

canno~

exist or be conceived, and viae versa. which cannot

exist or be conceived without the thing.
3.

By idea I understand a conception in the mind, which the mind forms, be-

cause it is a thinking thing.
42
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Explan.

I say conception rather than perception, because the word perception

seems to indicate that the mind is passive in relation to the object while conception seems to indicate the action of the mind.
4.

By an adequate idea I understand an idea.which considered in itself, with-

out relation to the object, has all the properties and intrinsic signs of a true
idea.
Explan.

I say intrinsic, that I may exclude what is extrinsic, namely the

agreement of the idea with its object.
5.

Duration is the indefinite continuation of existence.

Explan.

I say indefinite, because it can never be determined by the nature of

the existing thing, nor by the efficient cause, which necessarily posits the existence of the thing, and does not annihilate it.
6.

By reaZity and perfection I understand the same thing.

7.

By individuaZ things I understand things which are finite and have a deter-

minate existence.

If many individuals concur in one action, so that all are at

once the cause of a single effect, I consider them all, under that point of view,
as one individual thing.

Axioms

1.

The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, i.e. from the or-

der of nature it can equally happen that this or that man should exist or that he
should not exist.
2.

Man thinks.

3.

Modes of thought, such as love, desire, or whatever else can be called an

affection of the mind, cannot exist, unless there also exist in the same individual the idea of the thing loved, desired etc.
be no other mode of thought existing.

But an idea can exist, though there
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4.

We are conscious of having a body which is diversely affected.

5.

We can neither feel nor perceive any individual things except bodies and

modes of thoughts.
For the Postulates see after proposition 13.

Propositions

Prop. I.
Oem.

Thought is an attribute of God, or, God is a thinking being.
Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which express

the nature of God in a certain and determinate manner (by coroll., prop. 25, Part
I).

Hence there must be in God (by def. 5, Part I) an attribute the conception

01

which all particular thoughts involve, and through which also they are conceived.
Theref.ore thought is one of the infinite attributes of God, which expresses the
eternal and infinite essence of God (see def. 6, Part I), or, God is a thinking
being; q.e.d.
Schol.

This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we can conceive a

thinking being as infinite.

For the more a thinking being can think, the more re-

ality or perfection we conceive it to contain.

Therefore, a being who can think

an infinity of things infinitely modified, is necessarily infinite in his power
of thinking.

Since therefore we can conceive an infinite being by considering

thought alone, thought is necessarily (by <def.> 4 and 6, Part I) one of the infinite attributes of God, as we sought to prove.
Prop. II.

Extension is an attribute of God, or, God is an extended being.

<Dem.> The demonstration of this proceeds in the same way as that of the foregoing proposition.
Prop. I II.

In God there is necessarily the idea both of his es sence and of all

things which necessarily follow from his essence.
Oem.

For God (by prop. 1, Part II) can think an infinity of things infinitely
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modified, or (what by prop. 16, Part I is the same thing) can form the idea of his
essence and of all things .which necessarily follow therefrom.
is in the power of God necessarily is (by prop. 35, Part I).

But everything which
Therefore, there is

necessarily such an idea and (by prop. 15, Part I) it can only be in God; q.e.d.
Schol.

The vulgar understand by the power of God the free will of God and the

authority he has over all things, which are therefore commonly regarded as contingent.

For, they say that God has the power of destroying all things and reducing

them to nothing, and they very often compare the power of God with the power of
kings.

But we have refuted this in coroll. 1 and 2, prop. 32, Part I; and we have

shown in prop. 16, Part I that God acts as necessarily as he comprehends himself;
i.e. just as from the necessity of the divine nature it follows that God comprehends himself (which all with one voice maintain) so from the same necessity it
follows that God produces an infinity of things infinitely modified.

Further, we

have shown, prop. 34, Part I, that the power of God is nothing else than the active
essence of God; consequently, it is as impossible to us to conceive God not acting
as to conceive him not existing.

Again, if I were free to pursue the subject, I

could further prove that the power which the vulgar attribute to God is not only
human (showing that they conceive God as a man or in the image of man) but involves weakness.

I am unwilling however to speak frequently of the same thing.

I only again and again intreat the reader- to weigh repeatedly what is said on
this subject in Part I from prop. 16 to the end.

For no one can rightly perceive

What I mean, unless he be extremely careful not to confound the power of God with
the human power or authority of kings.
Prop. IV.

The idea of God from which follows an infinity of things infinitely

modified is sole of its kind.
Oem.

The infinite intellect comprehends nothing besides the attributes of God

and his affections (by prop. 30, Part I).
I, prop. 14, Part I).

But God is sale of his kind (by coroll.

Therefore the idea of God from which follow an infinity of

40

t.hings infinitl'ly modified must be sole of its kind; q.e.d.
Prop. V.

The formal being of ideas has for its cause God so far alone as he is a

thinking being, and not so far as he is explained by any other attribute; in
other Kords, the ideas both of the attributes of God and of individual things
have not for their efficient cause the objects or things perceived, but God himself. in so far as he is a thinking being.
Dem.

This indeed is evident from prop. 3, Part II.

For we there concluded that

God can form the idea of his essence and of all things which necessarily follow
from it on this ground alone, that God is a thinking being and. not in the ground
that he is the object of his ideas.

Hence the formal being of ideas has for its

cause God so far as he is a thinking being.
demonstrated in the following manner.

But the proposition may be otherwise

The formal being of ideas is a mode of

thought (as is self-evident), i.e. (by coroll .. prop. 25, Part I) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the nature of God so far as he is a thinking being.
Therefore (acc. prop. 10, Part I) it does not involve the conception of any other
attribute of God, and consequently (by ax. 4, Part I) it is an affect of no other
attribute than thought.

And thus the formal being of ideas has for its cause God

s·o far only as he is a thinking being etc.; q.e.d.
Prop. VI.

The modes of any attribute have for their cause God, considered solely

under that attribute of which they are modes and not under any other attribute.
Dem.

For each attribute is conceived through and by itself without any other

(by prop. 10, Part I).

Hence the modes of any attribute involve the conception of

their particular attribute alone, and not that of I any Ii another I attribute; and thus
(by ax. 4, Part I) they have for their cause God considered solely under that attribute of which they are the modes, and not considered under any other attribute;
q.e.d.
Coroll.

Hence it follows that the formal being of things which are not modes of

thought, does not follow from the divine nature because God foreknows things; but
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the objects of ideas result and are conCluded from the particular attributes on
which they depend in the same manner and by the same necessity as we have shown
ideas to follow from the attribute of thought.
Prop. VII.

The order and connexion of ideas is the same as the order and connexion

of things.
Oem.

This is evident from ax. 4, Part I.

For the idea of anything caused de-

pends on the knowledge of the cause of which it is the effect.
Coroll.

Hence it follows, that God's power of thought is equal to his power of

action; i.e. whatever follows formally from the infinite nature of God, follows
from the idea of God in the same order and in the same connexion objectively in God.
Schol.

Before proceeding further it is desirable to call to remembrance what we

have shown above; namely, that whatever can be perceived by the infinite intellect
as constituting the essence of substance, belongs to the one substance alone; and
consequently, that thinking substance and extended substance is one and the same,
which is now comprehended under this, now under that attribute.

Thus, a mode of

extension and the idea of that mode is one and the same thing, but expressed in two
ways; which appears to have been cloudily perceived by certain Hebrews who maintain
that God, the intellect of God, and the things perceived by the intellect are one
and the same.

For example, a circle existing in nature, and the idea of an exist-

ing circle, which is also in God, is one and the same thing expl,ained by different
attributes.

And thus, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension,

or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we find one and
the same order or one and the same connexion of causes, i.e. the same sequence of
things.

And in saying that God is the cause of the idea of a circle, for example,

so far only as he is a thinking being and that he is the cause of a circle only so
far as he is an extended being, I say so on no other ground than this: the formal
being of the idea of a circle can be perceived only through another mode of
thought as its proximate cause, and this again through another, and so on in infi-
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nitum; so that as long as things are considered as modes of thought, we must explain the whole order of nature of the connexion of causes by the attribute of
thought alone; while so far as they are considered as modes of extension, the
whole order of nature must be explained by the attribute of extension alone, and so
of other attributes.

Hence God is in truth the cause of things as they are in

themselves so far as he consists of infinite attributes; and at present I am unable to explain this more clearly.
Prop. VIII.

The ideas of individual things, or of modes not existing, must be com-

prehended in the infinite idea of God, in the same way that the formal essences
of individual things or of modes are contained in the attributes of God.
Oem.

This proposition is evident from the preceding scholium.

Coroll.

Hence it follows that as long as individual things do not exist, ex-

cept in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of God their objective
essence, or the ideas of them do not exist except in so far as the infinite idea of
God exists; and when individual things are said to exist, not only as comprehended
in the attributes of God, but also as having duration, the ideas of these things
also involve an existence which has duration.
Schol.

If, for the sake of fuller elucidation an example is desired, I am real-

ly unable to give any which adequately explains the present subject, since it is unique; nevertheless I will try to illustrate it as far as may be.

A circle is of

such a nature that if two of its chords cut each other, the right angle contained
by the segments of the one is equal to the right angle contained by the segments of
the other; consequently a circle contains an infinity of right angles.;* but none of
them can

be

said to exist except in so far as the circle exists, nor can the idea

of anyone of these rectangles be said to exist in so far as it is compre-

* See Euclid's Elements, B. III, prop. 35.

49

hended in the idea of a circle.

Now let it be supposed that out of the infinite

number of equal right angles, only two, namely, E and D exist.

In this case, the

ideas of the angles E and 0 do not merely exist so
far as they are comprehended in the idea of a circle;
but also so far as they involve in
E

themselve~

the

existence of those right angles, and hence they are
distinguished from the ideas of the other right angles contained in the circle.

Prop. IX.

The idea of an individual thing existing in actuality has for its cause

God, considered not as infinite, but as affected by the idea of another individual thing existing in actuality, of which again God is the cause as affected
by a third, and so on in infinitum.
Oem.

The idea of an individual thing existing in actuality is a particular

mode of thought distinguished from the ideas of things not existent in actuality
(by coroll. and schol., prop. 8, Part II); and therefore (acc. to prop. 6, Part
II) it has for its cause God considered as a thinking being.

Not, however (by

prop. 28, Part I considered as an absolutely thinking being, but as affected by
another mode of thought, and of this again he is the cause so far as he is affected by a third, and so on

~n

infinitum.

But the order and connexion of ideas

(by prop. 7, Part II) is the same as the order and connexion of causes.

Therefore

every individual idea has for its cause another idea, i.e. God, in so far as he is
considered as affected by another idea, and so on in infinitum; q.e.d.
Coroll.

Whatever occurs in the object of any simple idea, the knowledge of

this exists in God, in so far alone as he has the idea of that object.
Oem.

Whatever occurs in the object of any idea, the idea of this exists in God

(by prop. 3, Part II), not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual thing (by preced. prop.), but (ace. to
prop. 7, Part II) the order and connexion of ideas is the same as the order and
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connexion of things.
pens

~n

Consequently, there is in God a knowledge of·that which

hap~

any simple object, in so far only as he has the idea of that obj ect·; q.e .d.

Prop. X.

The being of substance does not belong with the essence of man. or.

substance does not constitute the form (or, i.e. essence) of man.
Oem.
I).

For the being of substance involves necessary existence (by prop. 7, Part

If therefore the being of substance belonged to the essence of man, the exist_

ence of substance being given. the existence of man would necessarily follow (by
def. 2. Part II) and consequently man would necessarily exist, which (acc. to ax.
1, Part II) is absurd.
Schol.

Therefore etc. q.e.d.

This proposition is also demonstrable by prop. 5, Part I, namely, that

there are not two substances of the same nature.

For as many men exist, therefore

that which constitutes the form or essence of man is not the being of substance.
This proposition is also evident from the other properties of substance, namely,
that substance is infinite in its nature, immutable, indivisible etc., as every
one may easily perceive.
Coroll.

Hence it follows that the essence of man is constituted by certain

modifications of the attributes of God.
[Oem.]

For the being of substance (by preced. prop.) does not belong to the

essence of man.

This essence is therefore (by prop. 15, Part I) something which

is in God and which can neither exist nor be conceived without God, or (by coroll.,
prop. 25, Part I) it is an affection or mode which expresses in a certain and determinate manner the nature of God.
Schol.

All must concede, that nothing can be or can be conceived without God.

For it is universally admitted that God is the sole cause of all things, as well
of their essence as of their existence, i.e. God is not only the cause that things
come into existence (seaundum fieri) but he is the cause that they are what they
are

~eaundum

esse).

Meanwhile many hold that to belong to the essence of a thing

without which the thing can neither exist nor be conceived; and accordingly, either
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they believe that the nature of God belongs to the essence of created things, or
they believe that created things can be, and can be conceived without God, or,
what is more certain, they are not consistent with themselves.

And the cause of

this is, in my opinion, that they have not adhered to the philosophic order of
ideas.

For the divine nature, which they ought to contemplate before everything

else because it is both in nature and in the order of cognition the first, they
have made the last, and they believe the things which are called objects of the
senses to be prior to all others in the order of cognition.

For this reason, when

they contemplate natural things nothing is less in their thoughts than the divine
nature, and when afterwards they summon their minds to the contemplation of the
divine nature, nothing is less in their thoughts than their own figments out of
which they have built up their knowledge of natural things, since these could give
no aid towards the knowledge of the divine nature; hence it is no wonder that they
have been throughout in contradiction with themselves.

I do not dwell on this,

however, for my intention was simply to render a reason why I have not said that

that belongs to the essence of a thing without which it can neither exist nor be
conceived, namely, because individual things can neither be, nor be conceived,
without God, and nevertheless, God does not belong to their essence.

But I have

declared that to constitute the essence of a thing which being posited the thing
also is posited, and which being negatived the thing also is negatived, or that,
without which the thing and viae versa that which without the thing, can neither
exist nor be conceived.
Prop. XI.

Compo def. 2.

IThe foundation II That which primarily I constitutes the actual being of

the human mind is nothing else than the idea of some individual thing actually
existing.
Oem.

The essence of man (by coroll. of preced. prop.) is constituted by certain

modes of the attributes of God; namely (by ax. 2, Part II) by certain modes of
thought, amongst which (by ax. 3 of this part) an idea is Drior in nature to all
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others, and this being given, the other modes (to which the idea is prior in nature)
must also exist in the same individual (acc. ax. 3, Part 11).*

And thus an idea is

that which fundamentally constitutes the being of the human mind.

But not the idea

of a thing which does not exist; for then (by coroll., prop. 8. Part II) the idea
itself cannot be said to exist.
existing.

It will therefore be the idea of a thing actually

Not the idea of an infinite thing; for an infinite thing (by prop. 21·

and 23, Part I) must always necessarily exist, and thus that the human mind should
be fundamentally constituted by the idea of an infinite thing is (by ax. I, Part II)
absurd.

Therefore that which constitutes the actual being of the human mind is the

idea of an individual thing actually existing; q.e.d.
Coroll.
of God.

Hence it follows that the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect

And accordingly, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we

say nothing else than that God not in so far as he is infinite but in so far as he
is manifested by the human mind or as he constitutes the essence of the human mind,
has this or that idea; and when we say that God has this or that idea not only in so
far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind but in so far as together with
the human mind he has the idea of another thing also, then we say that the human
mind perceives a thing in part or inadequately.
Schol.

Here, doubtless, readers will hesitate, and will urge many objections;

and for this reason I beg of them to proceed with me by slow steps, and not to pronounce a judgment on this point until they have read the whole.
Prop. XII.

Whatever happens in the object of the idea which constitutes the human

mind, must be perceived by the human mind, or, th~ human mind will necessarily
have cognizance of it: that is to say, if the object of the idea which constitutes the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that body which is

* The reference to ax. 4 which stands in Bruder's ed. and is followed by the
translators must be a mistake.
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not perceived by the mind.
Oem.

For whatever happens in the object of any idea, the knowledge of it nec-

essarily exists in God (by coroll., prop. 9, Part II) in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the object, i.e. (by prop. II, Part II) in so far
as he constitutes the mind of any being.

Therefore whatever happens in the object

of the idea which constitutes the human mind, the cognition of it must necessarily
exist in God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, i.e. (by
coroll., prop. II, Part II) the cognition of it will necessarily be in the mind,
in other words, the mind will perceive it; q.e.d.
SchoI.

This proposition is also evident and is more clearly understood from

schol., prop. 7, Part II.
Prop. XIII.

The object of the idea which constitutes the human mind is the body,

or a certain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else.
Oem.

For if the body were not the object of the human mind, the ideas of the

affections of the body would not be in God (by coroll., prop. 9, Part II) so far
as he constitutes our mind, but so far as he constitutes the mind of some other
being, i.e. (by corolI., prop. 11, Part II) the ideas of the affections of the
body would not be in the human mind.
affections of the body.

But (by ax. 4, Part II) we have ideas of the

Therefore the object of the idea which constitutes the

human mind is the body, and (by prop. 11, Part II) the body actually existing.

If

beSides the body something else also were the object of the mind, as (by prop. 36,
Part I) nothing exists from which some effect does not follow, there must necessarily (by prop. 11, Part II) be some effect from this object in our mind.
ax. 5, Part II) we have no idea of such an object.

But (by

Therefore the object of our

mind is the actually existing body and nothing else; q.e.d.
Coroll.

Hence it follows that man consists of mind and body, and that the hu-

man body, such as we feel it, exists.
Sch~l.

From what precedes we not only understand that the human mind is unit-
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ed to the body, but also what is to be understood by the union of the mind and the
body.

But no one can adequately or distinctly understand this, unless he first

have an adequate knowledge of the nature of our body.

For what we have hitherto

predicated is general and does not apply to men more than to other individuals,
which though in different degrees, are all animated.

For the idea of every thing

necessarily exists in God and he is the cause of that idea in the same way as he
is the cause of t.he idea of the human body; and therefore whatever we have said of

the idea of the human body is necessarily to be said of the idea of every other
thing.

But we cannot deny that ideas differ among themselves as their objects

differ, according as the object of the one is superior to the object of the other,
and contains more reality; and consequently, in order to determine what is the
rank of the human mind amongst the rest and in what it is superior to the rest, it
is necessary for us, as we have laid, to know the nature of the human body.

But

this I cannot explain here, nor is it necessary to the demonstration I have in
view.

I will only say, in general, that in proportion as any body is

more~capable

than others of acting and suffering many things simultaneously, in the same proportion is its mind more capable than others of perceiving many things simultaneously; and in proportion as the actions of a body depend on itself, and the less
other bodies concur with it in producing its action, the more capable is its mind
f

of distinct understanding.

And by this we may know the superiority of one mind

over othersj moreover, we may perceive the cause why we have only a somewhat confused knowledge of the human body, and many other things, which as I proceed I
shall deduc$ from the pOSitions above stated. Hence I have thought it worth while
more accurately to explain and demonstrate these positions, in order to do which
it is necessary to premise a few data concerning the nature of bodiee.
Ax. 1. All bodies are either in motion or at rest.
Ax. 2.
Lemma 1.

Every body moves sometimes more slowly, sometimes more quickly.
Bodies are distinguished from each other by motion and rest, velocity
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and retardation, and not by substance.
Oem.

The first part of this proposition I suppose to be self-evident.

And that

bodies are not distinguished by substance is evident both from prop. 5 and from
prop. 8, Part I; but more clearly from what has been said in the scholium to prop.
15,_ Part I.
Lemma 2.
Oem.

All bodies have something in common.

For all bodies have this in common, namely, that they all involve the con-

ception of one and same attribute (by def. 1, Part II), that they can move sometimes more slowly, sometimes more quickly. and, speaking absolutely, can sometimes
be in motion, sometimes at rest.
Lemma 3.

A body in motion or at rest must have been determined to motion or

rest by another body, which also was determined to motion or rest by another body,
which also was determined to motion or rest by another body, and this again by another and so on in infinitum.
Oem.

Bodies (by def. I of this part) are individual things, which (by lemma 1)

are distinguished among each other by motion and rest; and therefore (by prop. 28,
Part I) each must necessarily be determined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely (by prop. 6, Part II) by another body, which (by ax. 1, Part II)
is also either in motion or at rest.

And this again (for the same reason) could

not be in motion or at rest unless it had been determined to motion or at rest by
another, and this again (for the same reason) by another, and so on in infinitum;
q.e.d.
Coroll.

Hence it follows, that a body in motion will continue to move so long

as it is not determined by another body to rest; and a body at rest will continue
to rest so long as it is not determined by another body to motion.
eVident.

This is self-

For when I suppose a body, e.g. A to be at rest, and do not attend to any

other body which is in motion. I can say nothing of the body A but that it is at
rest.

If afterwards it happens that the body A is moved. this could certainly not
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result from the fact that it was at rest, for from this nothing else could follow
than that the body A should be at rest.

If on the contrary, A be supposed to move,

as often as we attend to A alone, we can affirm nothing concerning it but that it
moves.

If afterwards it happens that A is at rest, this certainly could not arise

from the motion which it had; for from the motion nothing could arise but that A
should move.

Hence it arose from something which was not in A, namely from an ex-

ternal cause, by which it was determined to rest.
Ax. 1.

All modes in which anyone body is affected by another body, result at

once from the nature of the body affected and from the nature of the body affecting; so that one and the same body is differently moved according to the difference of the nature of the moving bodies, and conversely, different bodies are
moved differently by one and the same body.
Ax. 2.

When a body i!l motion impinges on another body which is at rest and

which it is unable to move, its motion is reflected; and the angle which the line
described by the reflected motion forms with the plane of the body at rest, on
which the moving body impinges, will be equal to the angle which the line of the
motion of incidence forms with the same plane.

This applies to the simplest bo-

_/_----'-"7
dies, those, namely, which are distinguished from each other by motion and rest,
by velocity and retardation.
Def.

We can now proceed to oomplex bodies.

When several bodies of the same or of different magnitude are so com-

pressed by others that they lie upon each other. or if they are moved with the
same or different degrees of velocity so that they communicate their motions to
each other in a certain ratio, we say that those bodies are united and that they
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together form one body or individual, which is distinguished from others by this
union of bodies.

Ax. 3,

In proportion as the parts of an individual or of a compound body lie

upon each other with greater or smaller superficies, the more difficult or easy it
is to force them to change their place, and consequently the more difficult or
easy it is for the same individual to assume another figure.

Hence I shall call

bodies hard when their parts lie upon each other with large superficies; soft
when those superficies are small; fluid when their parts move freely amongst each
other.
Lemma 4.

If from a body, or an individual which is composed of several bodies,

certain bodies be separated, and if at the same time their place is taken by an
equal number of parts from another body of the same nature, the individual will retain its nature as before, without any change of form.
Oem.

For bodies (by lemma 1) are not distinguished from each other in relation

to substance.

But that which constitutes the form of the individual, consists in

the union of bodies (by preced. def.).

And this (by hypothesis) will be retained,

although there be a continual change of bodies.

Therefore the individual will re-

tain both in relation to substance and its modes the same nature as before; q.e.d.
Lemma 5.

If the parts whether greater or smaller composing an individual, es-

cape, but in such a proportion that they all preserve the same·relative rate of
motion and rest as before, this individual will retain its nature as before without any change of form.
[Oem.]

The demonstration of this lemma is the same as that of the preceding.

Lemma [6.]

If the bodies composing an individual are compelled to change the

direction of their motion, but so that they can continue their motion, and communicate it to each other in the same ratio as before; this individual will retain
its nature without any change of form.
Oem.

This is self-evident.

For it is supposed to retain all which in the defi-
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nition of it we have stated to constitute its form.
Lemma 7.

This individual so composed will further retain its nature whether it

be moved as a whole, or be at rest as a whole, or whether it be moved in one direc_
tion or in another, provided that each part retains its motion, and communicates it
to the rest as be£ore.
Oem.

This is evident from the definition of it, lemma 4.

Schol.

Hence we see why a compound individual can be affected in many modes and

nevertheless preserve its nature.

Hitherto however we have conceived an individual

which is composed only of bodies distinguished from each other solely by motion and
rest, velocity and retardation, i.e. of the simplest bodies.

If we now conceive

another, composed of many different individuals, we find that it also can be affected in many modes and nevertheless preserve its nature.

For since each of its

parts is composed of many bodies; it follows (by preced. lemma) that each part can,
without any change in its nature, be moved now more slowly, now more quickly, and
consequently communicate its motions more quickly or more slowly to the rest.

If

further we conceive a third class of individuals, composed of the second class, we
find that this also can be affected in many ways without any change in its form.
And if we proceed thus in infinitum, we shall easily conceive all nature as one individual, the parts of which, i.e. all bodies whatever, vary in infinite modes without any change in the whole individual.

All this I should be bound to explain and

demonstrate at greater length if I intended to treat ex profe88o of the body.

But

I have already said that such is not my intention, and I have stated the foregoing
positions for no other reason than that I can easily deduce from them. what I propose to demonstrate.

Postulates

1.

The human body is composed of many individuals (different in nature), each
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of which is compound.
Of the individuals which compose the human body, some are fluid, some 80ft

2.

and some hard.
3.

The individuals composing the human body, and consequentlY the human body

itself, is affected by external bodies in a variety of modes.
4.

The human body requires for its preservation many other bodies by which it

is continually as it were regenerated.
S.

When the fluid part 'of the human body is determined by an external body, so

that it often impinges on another soft part, it changes the surfaces of the latter,
and impresses on it as it were traces of the impelling external body.
6.

The human body can move external bodies and dispose them in various ways.

Prop. XIV.

The human mind is capable of perceiving many things, and the more capa-

ble in proportion as its body can be disposed in a greater variety of \Vays.
Oem.

For the human body (by post. 3 and 6) is affected in many ways by external

bodies, and is disposed to affect external bodies in many ways.

But all things

which happen to the human body (by prop. 12, Part II) must be perceived by the human mind.

Therefore the human mind is capable of perceiving many things, and is

the more capable etc.; q.e.d.
Prop. XV.

The idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not

simple, but composed of many ideas.
Oem.

The idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is the idea

of the body (by prop. 13, Part II) which (by post. 1) is composed of individuals
themselves highly compound.

The idea of every individual composing the body nec-

essarily exists in God (by coroll., prop. 8, Part II).

Therefore (by prop. 7) the

idea of the human body is composed of all the ideas of the parts composing that
b9dy; q.e.d.
Prop. XVI.

The idea of every mode in which the human body is affected by external

bodies, must involve at once the nature of the human body and the nature of the
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external body.
Oem.

For all modes in which any body is affected follow from the nature of the

body itself and also from the nature of the affecting external body (by ax. 1 af_
ter coroll., lemma 3). Hence the idea of those modes (by ax. 4, Part I) necessarily
involves the nature of both bodies.

And therefore the idea of every mode in which

the human body is affected by an external body involves the nature of the human
body and of the external body; q.e.d.
Coro11. 1.

Hence it follows, first, that the human mind perceives the nature

of many bodies together with the nature of its own body.
Coro1l. 2.

It follows, seaondly, that the ideas which we have of external bod-

ies, indicate more of the constitution of our own bodies than of the nature of
external bodies.
Prop. XVII.

If the human body be affected by a modification which involves the

nature of any external body. the human mind will contemplate that external body
as actually existing or as present to it, until the human body be affected by a
modification· which excludes the existence or presence of the external body.
Oem.

This is evident.

For as long as the human body is so

affec~ed,

so long

the human mind (by prop. 12, Part II) will contemplate this affection of the body,
i.e. (by preced. prop.) it will have the idea of a modification actually existing
which involves the nature of an external body, i.e. an idea which does not exclude
the existence or presence of the nature of an external body, but posits it.

And

thus the mind (by coro11. of preced. prop.) will contemplate an external body as
actually existing or as present until it be affected etc.; q.e.d.
Coro11.

The mind is able to contemplate external bodies by which the human body

has once been affected, as if they were present, although they do not exist and are
not present.
Oem.

When external bodies so determine the fluid parts of the human body that

they often impinge on the softer parts, they change the surfaces of these bodies
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(by post. 5).

Whence it comes (see ax. 2 after coroll., lemma 3) that the motion

of the fluids is reflected in another manner than it was before wont to be, and
also that afterwards, when falling by their spontaneous motion on these new surfaces, they are reflected in the same way as when they were impelled by external
bodies toward those surfaces; and that consequently, while their motion continues
to be thus reflected, they affect the human body in the same manner.

This affec-

tion of the body the human mind ( by prop. 12, Part II) will again perceive, i.e.
(by prop. 17, Part II), the mind will again contemplate the external body as present; and this as many times as the fluid parts of the human body by their spontaneous motion strike on the same plane.

Therefore although the external bodies, by

which the human body has been once affected, do not exist, the mind will nevertheless contemplate them as present so often as this action of the body is repeated;
q.e.d.
Schol.

We thus see why we frequently contemplate things which do not exist as

if they were present.

It is possible indeed that this may happen from other caus-

es; but it suffices for me here to have shown one, by which I can explain the subject as well as if I had exhibited its real cause.

I do not however believe that

I have erred greatly, since all the postulates I have assumed scarcely contain anything which is not established by experience, of which it is impossible for us to
doubt, after we have shown that the human body, such as we are' conscious of it, exists (see coroll. after prop. 13, Part II).

Besides (from preced. coroll. and

coroll. 2, prop. 16, Part II), we clearly understand what is the difference between
the idea, e.g. of Peter which constitutes the essence of the mind of Peter himself,
and the idea of Peter which is in another man, suppose in Paul.

For the former

directly explains the essence of the body of Peter himself, and involves existence
only so long as Peter exists; but the latter rather indicates the constitution of
Paul than the nature of Peter, and therefore while that constitution of the body of
Paul lasts, the mind of Paul will contemplate Peter as present to it although Peter
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does not exist.

Further, that we may retain customary terms, the affections· of the

human body, the ideas of which represent external bodies as if they were present,
we shall call the images of things, although they do not convey the figures of
things: and when the mind contemplates bodies in this way we shall say that it ima-

gines.

And here,. that I may begin to indicate what error is, I wish it to be noted

J

that the imaginations of the mind considered in themselves contain no error, or,
that the mind does not err because it imagines; but only in that it wants an idea
which excludes the existence of those things which it imagines as present to itself.
For if the mind when it imagines things not existing as present to it, at the same
time knows ·that those things do not in fact exist, this power of imagining is as.
suredly to be attributed to a virtue of its nature, not to a vice; especially if
this faculty depends on its nature alone, i.e. (by def. 7, Part I) if this faculty
which the mind has of imagining were free.
Prop. XVIII.

If the human body be affected by two or more bodies at once, when the

mind afterward imagines one of them, it will always remember the others.
Oem.

The mind (by preced. coroll.) imagines anyone body, because the human

body is affected and disposed by the permanent effects or traces of an external
body in the same way as it is affected when certain of its parts are impelled by
that external body.

But (by the hypothesis) the body was then so

the mind could imagine two bodies at once.

di~posed

that

Therefore two bodies will now again be

imagined, and the mind, when it imagines one, will remember the other.
Schol.

From this we clearly understand what memory is.

It is nothing else than

a certain concatenation of ideas, which involve the nature of things external to
the human body, and this concatenation of ideas arises out of the order and concatenation of the affections of the human body.

I say, first, that it is a concate-

nation of those ideas alone, which involve the nature of things that are external
to the human body; but not of the ideas which explain the nature of those things.
For there are in fact (by prop. 16. Part II) ideas of the affections of the human
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body which involve the nature of that body itself as well as the nature of external bodies.

I say, seaondZy, that this concatenation is formed according to the

order and concatenation of the affections of the human body, that I may distinguish it from the concatenation of ideas which is formed according to the order of
the intellect, which is the same in all men, and by which things are perceived in
their first causes.

And hence we further clearly understand why the mind passes

instantaneously from the idea of one thing to that of another which has no resemblance to the former; as, for example, on thinking of the word pamum a Roman immediately thought of a fruit, which has no resemblance to that articulate sound, nor
anything in common with it, except that the body of the same man was often simultaneously affected by these two things, i.e.,

~hat

the same man often heard the

word pamum when he saw the fruit; and thus each man passes from one thought to another, according to the order which habit has given to the images of things in his
body.

A soldier, for example, on seeing the footsteps of a horse in the sand, will

always pass from the thought of a horse to that of a rider and from thence to the
thought of war etc.

But a rustic will pass from the thought of a horse to that of

a plough, of a field etc.; and so each person, according as he is accustomed to
join and link together the images of things in this or that manner, will have this
or that succession of ideas.
Prop. XIX.

The human mind does not know the human body, or know it to exist, ex-

cept by the ideas of the affections which the body experiences.
Oem.
Part II).

The human mind is the idea or knowledge of the human body (by prop. 13,
Now the idea of the human body (by prop. 9 of this part) is in God, so

far as he is considered as affected by another idea of an individual thing: in
other words, because (by post. 4) the human body requires many bodies by which it
is as it were regenerated, and the order and connexion of ideas is the same (by
prop. 7, Part II) as the order and connexion of causes, this idea will be in God,
Considered as affected by the ideas of many individual things.

God, therefore,
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has the idea of the human body. or knows the human body, in so far as he is affected by many other ideas, and not in so far as he constitutes the nature of the
human mind, i.e. (by coroll., prop.ll, Part II) the human mind does not know the
human body.

But the ideas of the affections of the body are in God, in so far as

he constitutes the nature of the human mind, i.e., the human mind perceives thole
affection's (by prop_ 12, Part II), and consequently (by prop. 16, Part II) the human body itself, and perceives it (by prop. 17, Part II) as actually existing.
Therefore the human mind perceives the human body
Prop.

XX~
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far alone etc.; q.e.d.

There is also in God the idea or knowledge of the human mind, which fOl-

lows in' God and is related to God in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of
the human body.
Oem.

Thought is an attribute of God (by prop. 1, Part II); and thus (by prop.

3, Part II) theTe is necessarily in God the idea of thought and of all its affections, and consequently (by prop. 11, Part II) of the human mind also.

Further,

this idea or cognition of the human mind does not follow in God so far as he is
infinite; but so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual thing (by
prop. 9, Part II).

But the order and coJinexion of ideas is the same, as the order

and connexion of causes (by prop. 7, Part II).

Therefore this idea or cognition

of the mind follows in God, and.is related to God in the same manner as the idea or
cognition of the body; q.e.d.
Prop. XXI.

This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same manner as the

mind itself is united to the body.
Oem.

I have shown the mind to be united to the body from this, namely, that the

body is the object of the mind (see prop. 12 and 13, Part II): and thus, for the
same reason, the idea of the mind must be united with its object, i.e. with the
mind itself, in the same way as the mind is united with the body; q.e.d.
Schol.

This proposition is far more clearly understood from what has been said

in schol., prop. 7, Part II.

For we have there shown the idea of the body and the
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and the body, i.e. (by prop. 13, Part II), the mind and body, to be one and the
same individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under
the attribute of extension.

Hence the idea of the mind and the mind itself is one

and the same thing which is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely,
that of thought.

The 'idea of the mind, I say, and the mind itself are in God by

the same necessity and result from the same power of thought.

For in fact the

idea of the mind, i.e. the idea of an idea, is nothing else than the form of an
idea in so far as it is considered as a mode of thought, apart from any relation
to its object.

For in the moment when anyone knows a thing, he knows that he

knows it and at the same time he knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on

in infinitum.

But of this further on.
The human mind perceives not only the affections of the body, but

Prop. XXII.

also the ideas of these affections.
Oem.

The ideas of the ideas of affections follow in God and are related to God

in the same manner as the immediate ideas of affections; which is demonstrable in
the same way as prop. 20, Part II.

But the ideas of the affections of the body

are in the human mind (by prop. 12, Part II), i.e. (by prop. 11, Part II), in God,
so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind.

Consequently, the ideas

of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the cognition or idea of the
human-mind,

i.e~

(by prop. 21, Part II) in the human mind itself, which therefore

perceives not only the affections of the body. but also the ideas of those affections; q.e.d.
Prop. XXIII.

The mind knows itself only in so far as it perceives the ideas of

the affections of the body.
Oem.

The idea or cognition of the mind (by prop. 20, Part II) follows in God

and is related to God in the same way as the idea or cognition of the body.

Now

since (by prop. 19, Part II) the human mind does not know the human body itself,
i.e. (by coroll., prop. 11, Part II) since the cognition of the human body is not
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in God considered as constituting the essence of the human mind; therefore neither
is the cognition of the mind in God, considered [as] constituting the essence of
the human mind; and thus, so far (acc. to same coroll., prop. 11) the human mind
does not know itself.

Further, the ideas of the affections which the body experi-

ences, involve the nature of the human body (by prop. 16, Part II), i.e. (by prop.
13, Part II) agree with the nature of the hwnan mind.

Hence the cognition of

these ideas necessarily involves the cognition of the mind.
the cognition of these ideas is in the human mind itself.

But (by precede prop.)
Therefore the human

mind knows itself only so far etc.; q.e.d.
Prop. XXIV.

The human mind does not embrace an adequate knowledge of the parts

composing the human body.
Oem.

The parts composing the human body do not belong to the essence of that

body, except so far as they communicate their motions to each other in a certain
manner (see def. after coroll., lemma 3), and not so far as they can be considered
as individuals apart from any relation to the human body.

For the parts of the hu-

man body (by post. 1) are highly comp.lex.individuals, the parts of which (by lemma
4) can be separated from the human body, this body still preserving its nature and
form, and can then communicate their motions (see ax. 2 after lemma 3) to other
bodies in another ratio.

Thus (by prop. 3, Part II) the idea or cognition of each

part wi 11 be in God, and (by prop. 9, Part II) it will be in him so far as he is
considered as affected by another idea of an individual thing, which individual
thing is in the order of nature prior to that part (by prop. 7, Part II).
same may be said of every part of the individual composing the human body.

The
Ac-

cordingly, the cognition of each part composing the human body is in God, so far
as he is affected by the ideas of many things, and not so far as he has the idea
of the human body alone, i.e. (by prop. 13, Part II) the idea which constitutes
the nature of the human mind.

Therefore (by coroll., prop. 11, Part II) the human

mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human bodY;
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q.e.d.
Prop. XXV.

The idea of each affection of the human body does not involve an ade-

quate cognition of the external body which produces the affection.
Oem.

We have shown that the idea of an

affe~tion

of the human body involves

the nature of the external body (see prop. 16, Part II), so far as the external
body determined the human body in a certain manner.

But so far as the external

body is an individual, which is not related to the human body. the idea or cognition of that. external body is in God (by prop. 9, Part II) so far as God is affected by the idea of another thing, which (by prop. 7, Part II) is prior in nature to

the external body.

Therefore the adequate cognition of the external body is not in

God so far as he has the idea of an affection of the human body, i.e., the idea of
an affection of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body producing the affection; q.e.d.
Prop. XXVI.

The human mind perceives no external body as actually existing exist-

ing except through ideas of the affections of its own body.
Oem.

If the human body is in no way affected by any external body; then (by

prop. ·7, Part II) neither is the idea of the human body, i.e. (ace. to prop. 13)
the human mind in any way affected by the idea of the existence of that external
body, nor in any way perceives it.

But so far as the human body is in any way

affected by any external body, so far (by prop. 16, Part II with coroll.) the human mind perceives the external body; q.e.d.
Coroll.

So far as the human mind imagines an external body, it has not an ade-

qUate cognition of that body.
Dem.

When the human mind contemplates

exter~al

bodies through ideas of the af-

fections of its own body, we say that it imagines (see schol., prop. 17, Part II);
nor can the mind in any other way (by preced. prop.) imagine external bodies as
actually existing.

And thus (by prop. 25, Part II) so far as the mind imagines

external bodies, it has not an adequate cognition of them; q.e.d.
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Prop. XXVII.

The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve an ade_

quate cognition of the human body itself.
Oem.

The idea of any affection of the human body involves the nature of the hu-

man body so far as it is affected in a particular manner (see prop. 16, Part II).
But so far as the· human body is an individual, which can be affected in many other
ways, the idea of it etc.
Prop. XXVIII.

See dem., prop. 25, Part II.

The ideas of the affections of the human body, so far as they belong

to the human mind alone, are not clear and distinct, but confused.
Oem.

For the ideas of the affections of the human body involve the nature both

of external

bodie~

and of the human body itself (by prop. 16, Part II); and they

must involve the nature not only of the human body but also of its parts.

For af-

fections are modes (by post. 3) in which the parts of the human body and consequently the whole body is affected.

But (by prop. 24 and 25, Part II) the adequate cog-

nition of external bodies, as also of the parts composing the human body, is not in
God so far as he is affected by the human mind, but so far as he is affected by
other ideas.

Therefore these ideas of affections, so far as they belong to the hu-

man mind alone, are, as it were, consequences without premisses. i.e. (as is selfevident) confused ideas; q.e.d.
Schol.

The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind. is in the same

way demonstrated not to be, in itself, clear and distinct; as also the idea of the
human mind and the ideas of ideas of affections of the human body, so far as they
belong to the mind alone; which everyone can easily. see.
Prop. XXIX .. The idea of the idea of any affection of the human body does not involve an adequate cognition of the human mind.
Oem.

For the idea of an affection of the human body (by prop. 27, Part II)

does not involve an adequate cognition of the body itself, or, does not adequately
express its nature, i.e. (by prop. 13, Part II) does not adequately agree with the
nature of the mind.

Therefore (by.ax. 6, Part I) the idea of this idea does not
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adequately express the nature of the human mind, i.e. does not involve the cognition of it; q.e.d.
Coroll.

Hence it follows, that the human mind, as often as it perceives a

thing in the common order of nature, has not an adequate cognition either of itself
or of its body, or of external bodies, but only a confused and mutilated cognition.
For the mind does not know itself except so far as it perceives ideas of the affections of the body (by prop. 23, Part II).

Again it does not perceive its body (by

prop. 19, Part II) except by those ideas of affections; and, further, it is by
them alone (by prop. 26, Part II) that it perceives external bodies.

Therefore, in

having those ideas of corporeal affections, it has not an adequate cognition either
of itself (by prop. 29, Part II) or of its body (by prop. 27, Part II) or of external bodies (by prop. 25, Part II); but it has only (by prop. 28, Part II with
schol.) a mutilated and confused cognition; q.e.d.
Schol.

I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate, but only a confused

cognition of itself, of its body and of external bodies, as often as it perceives
a thing in the common order of nature, i e. as often as it is detemined to the
contemplation of this or that externally, i.e. by the fortuitous concourse of
things, and not as often as it is determined internally, that is to say, by the
fact that it contemplates several things at once, to the understanding of their agreement, differences and oppositions.

For as often as i t is internally disposed

in this or any other manner, it then contemplates the thing clearly and distinctly,
as I shall show hereafter.
Prop. XXX.

We can, have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our

body.
Oem.

The duration of our body does not depend on its essence (by ax. I, Part

II) nor on the absolute nature of God (by prop. 21, Part I); but (by prop. 28,
Part I) it is determined to exist arid act by causes, which are also determined to
eXist and act in a certain and deteminate manner, and these again by others and
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so on in infinitum.

Hence the duration of our body depends on the common order of

nature and constitution of things. But the adequate idea or knowledge of the way
in which things are constituted is in God, in so far as he has the ideas of all
these things and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body alone (by
coroll., prop.9, Part II).

Therefore the knowledge of the duration of our body

is very inadequate in God so far as he is considered as constituting the nature of
the human mind, i.e. (by coroll., prop. II, Part II) this knowledge is very inadequate in our mind; q.e.d.
Prop. XXXI.

/

We can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of indi-

vidual things, which are external to us.
Oem.

For each individual thing, as well as the human body, must be determined

to exist and act in a certain manner by another individual thing; this again by another~ and so on

in infinitum

(by prep. 28. Part I).

But as in the preeeding prop-

osition we 'have demonstrated from this common property of individual things, that
we have only very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our own body; the same
conclusion must be drawn concerning the duration of individual things which are external to us, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge of it;

q.e.d.
Coroll.' Hence it follows, that all individual things are contingent and perish ..
able.

For we can have no adequate idea of their duration (by preced. ,prop.), and

this is what we are to understand by the contingency of things and the possibility
of their perishing.

See scho1. 1, prop. 33, Part I.

For (by prop. 29, Part I) in

any other sense nothing is contingent.
Prop. XXXII.
Oem.

All ideas, so far as they belong to God, are true.

For all ideas which are in God, entirely agree with their object (by cor-

011., prop. 7, Part II); and'therefore (by ax. 6, Part'I) all aretruej q.e.d.
Prop. XXXIII.

There is nothing positive in ideas on account of which they can be

called false.
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Dem.

If you deny this, conceive, if it be possible, a positive mode of thought,

which constitutes the form of error or falsity.

This mode of thought cannot be in

God (by preced. prop.); but it can neither exist nor be conceived out of God (by
prop. 15, Part I).

And thus there can be nothing positive in ideas on account of

which they are called false; q.e.d.
Prop. XXXIV.
Oem.

Every idea in us which is absolute, or adequate and perfect, is true.

When we say that there is in us an adequate and perfect idea, we say no-

thing else (by coroll., prop. 11, Part II) than that there is an adequate and perfect idea in God so far as he constitutes the essence of our mind, and consequently
(by prop. 32, Part II) we say nothing else than that this idea is true; q.e.d.
Prop. XXXV.

Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge which is involved in

inadequate or mutilated and confused ideas.
Dem.

There is nothing positive in ideas which constitute the form or essence

of falsity (by prop. 33, Part II).

But falsity cannot consist in absolute priva-

tion (for we say that minds err, and are mistaken, not bodies), nor in absolute
ignorance; for ignorance and error are different things.

Therefore it consists in

the privation of knowledge which is involved in the inadequate cognition of the nature of things or inadequate and confused ideas; q.e.d.
Schol.

I have explained in the scholium to prop. 17, Part II in what manner er-

ror consists in the privation of knowledge.
Subject I will give an example.

But for the fuller'explanation of this

Men err in supposing themselves free; which opin-

ion is based solely on this, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant
of the causes by which those actions are determined. -Thus their idea of liberty
is, that they do not know any cause of their actions.

For what they say of human

actions depending on the will, is mere words to which they attach no idea.

What

the will is, and in what way it moves the body, all are ignorant; and they who
boast otherwise and imagine seats and habitations of the soul, excite either
laughter or disgust.

So when we look at the sun, we imagine it to stand about 200
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feet distant from us; an error which does not consist in this imagination solely,
but also in the fact that when we so imagine it we are ignorant of its true distance and of the cause of this imagination.

For although we afterwards know, that

it is more than 600 diameters of the earth distant from us, we shall not the less
imagine it to be near; for we do not imagine the sun to be thus near to us, because
we are ignorant of its true' distance, but because the affection of our body involves the essence of the sun, only in so far as that body is affected by it.
Prop. XXXVI.

Inadequate and confused ideas follow each other by the same necessity

as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.
Dem.

All ideas are in God (by prop. 15, Part I), and so far as they are related

to God, they are true (by prop. 3.2, Part II) and (by coroll. ,prop. 7, Part II)
adequate; and therefore none are inadequate or confused, except so far as they belong to an individual mind.

On which subject see prop. 24 and 28. And thus all i-

deas whether adequate or inadequate fOllow each other (bycoroll., prop. 6, Part
II) by the same necessity; q.e.d.
Prop. XXXVII.

That which is common to all (on this see lemma 2) and which is

equally in a part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any individual thing.
Dem.

If you deny this, conceive, if it be possible, that it constitutes the es-

sence of some individual thing, namely the essence B.
II) it can neither exist, nor be conceived, without B.
hypothesis.

Therefore (by def. 2, Part
But this. is contrary to the

Therefore it does not belong to the essence B, nor does it constitute

the essence of any other individual thing; q.e.d.
Prop. [XXXVIII.]

Those things which are common to all and which are equally in a

part and in the whole, cannot be conceived otherwise than adequately.
Dem.

Let A be something, which is common to all bodies, and which is equally

in a part of any body and in the whole.
wise than adequately.

I say that A cannot be conceived other-

For the idea of it (by coroll., prop. 7, Part II) will be
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necessarily adequate in God, both in so far as he has the idea of the human body,
and as he has the ideas of its affections, which (by prop. 16, 25, and 27, Part
II) involve in part the nature of the human body, and in part that of external
bodies, i.e. (by prop. 12 and 13, Part II) this .idea will necessarily be adequate
in God in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind or in so far as he
has the ideas which are in the human mind.

Therefore the mind (bycoroll., prop.

11, Part II) necessarily perceives A adequately, and it does so whether it perceives itself or its own body or any external body; nor can A be conceived in any
other manner; q.e.d.
Coroll.

Hence it follows that there are ideas or notions common to all men.

For (by lemma 2) all bodies agree in certain things, which (by preced. prop.) must
be adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.
Prop. XXXIX.

Of that which is common to the human body and certain external bod-

ies whereby the human body is wont to be affected, and which is equally present
in all their parts and in the whole, the idea which the mind has will also be
adequate.
Oem.

Let A be that which is common to the human body and to certain external

bodies, and which is equally in the human body and in those external bodies, and
which lastly is equally present in a part of any external body and in the whole.
There will be in God an adequate idea of A (by coroll., prop. 7, Part'II) both in
so far as he has the idea of the human body, and in so far as he has the ideas of
the supposed external bodies.

Let it now be supposed that the human body is affect-

ed by an external body through that which they have in common, i.e. through A.
idea of this affection involves the property A (by prop. 16

The

Part II); and thus (by

coroll., prop. 7, Part II) the idea of this affection so far as it involves the
property A, will be adequate in God, in so far as he is affected by the idea of the
human body, i.e. (by prop. 13, Part II) in so far as he constitutes the nature of
the human mind.

Therefore (by coroll., prop. 11, Part II) this idea is also ade-
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quate in the human mind; q.e.d.
Coroll.

Hence it follows, the more properties the human body has in cornmon with

other bodies, the more things is the mind capable of perceiving adequately.
Prop. XL.

Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas which are adequate in it,

are also adequate.
Oem.

This is evident.

For when we

say~

that an idea follows in the human mind

from ideas which are in themselves adequate, we say nothing else (by coroll., prop.
II, Part II) than that in the divine intellect itself there is an idea of which God
is the cause, not in so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by
the ideas of many individual things; but in so far as he constitutes the essence of
the human mind alone.
Schol. 1.

By the foregoing propositions I have explained the cause of the no-

tions which are called common and which form the basis of our reasoning.

But

there are other causes of certain axioms or notions which it would be advantageous
to explain according to our method.

For it would thus be evident what notions are

more useful than others, and what scarcely of any use; further, what notions are
common and what clear and distinct to those only who do not labour under prejudices;
and lastly what notions are ill-founded.

It would also appear whence those notions

which are called secondary and consequently the axioms which are founded on them,
have derived their origin, and other things which I have sometimes meditated on in
relation to these subjects.

But having destined these considerations for another

treatise, and fearing also lest I should weary the reader by tooo great prolixity,
I have determined to omit them in this place.

Nevertheless, that I may not omit

anything which is necessary to be known, I will briefly add the causes whence the
te~s

called transcendentaZ as being (ens), thing (res), something (aZiquid) have

had their origin.

They have arisen, namely, thus: the human body being limited, is

capable of distinctly forming in itself only a certain number of images at once
(what an image is I have explained in schol., prop. 17, Part II); if it exceeds
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this number, the images begin to be confused, and if the number of images which the
body is capable of distinctly forming in itself simultaneously be far exceeded, the
confusion is total.

Since this is the case, it is evident from coroll., prop. 17

and 18, Part II that the human mind can distinctly imagine as many bodies at once
as there can be images formed in its own body.

But where the images in the body

are altogether confused, the mind also will imagine all bodies confusedly without
any distinction and will comprehend them under one attribute, namely under the attribute

beir~,

thing etc.

These notions may also be derived from the fact that the

images are not always equally strong, and from other analogous causes which it is
unnecess.ary to explain here; since for our purpose it suffices to consider one
cause only.

For all explanations resolve themselves into this, that these terms

signify ideas in the highest degree confused.

Again, from similar causes have a-

risen those notions which are called universal, as man, horse, dog etc.

So many

images of men, for example, are formed in the human body at once as that they surpass the power of imagining, not indeed greatly, but so far that the mind is unable to imagine the small differences of individuals (namely the colour, magnitude
etc. of each or their precise number) and distinctly imagines that alone in which
all, so far as the body is affected by them, agree; and this by which it was principally affected in each individual it expresses by the word man, and predicates
this of any infinite number of individuals.

For, as we have said, it is unable to

imagine a determinate number of individuals.

But it is to be observed that these

notions are not formed by all in the same manner, but vary in each according to the
object by which the body has been oftenest affected, and which consequently the mind
easily imagines or records.

For example, those who have more frequently contempla-

ted with admiration the stature of men,

unde~stand

under the name of man an animal

of erect stature; but those who are accustomed to contemplate some other characteristic will form another common image of men, namely, that man is a laughing animal, a biped without feathers, a rational animal; and so of the rest: each will
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form universal images of things according to Ithellhisl physical constitution.
Hence it is not wonderful that so many controversies have arisen among philosophers
who have sought to explain natural things solely by the images which we form of
them.
Schol. 2.

From all that has been said above, it clearly appears, that we per-

ceive many things and form universal notions 1. from individual things presented
by the senses to the intellect in a mutilated, confused, unorderly manner (see
coroll., prop. 29, Part II): and such perceptions I call cognition fpam vague

pepience.

2. From signs, e.g. in hearing or reading certain words we remember

things and fonn .ideas of th.em similar _to those ·which the
produced in us.

See schol., prop. 18, Part II.

thing~ ·themselv~s

3.

opinion~

or imagina-

From adequate· common notions and ideas which we possess of the proper-

ties of things.
II.

first

Both these modes of contemplating

things I shall, in future, call cognition of the fipst kind,

tion.

e~

See coroll., prop. 38 and 39 with its coroll., and prop. 40, Part

And this I shall call peas on or cognition of the second kind.

Besides these

two kinds of cognition there is as I shall show in what follows, a third, which I
shall call intuitive cognition.

This mode of cognition proceeds from an adequate

idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to an adequate cognition of
the essence of things.
gle example.

All these three kinds of cognition I will explain by a sin-

Let there be given three numbers in order to obtain a fourth, which

shall be to the third what the second is to the first.

Merchants are in no doubt

as to the neceSSity of multiplying the second by the third and dividing the product
by the first, because they have not yet forgotten what they have heard from their
tutor without any demonstration or because they have often tried the same process
with the simplest numbers, or on the ground of the demonstration of prop. 19, BOOK
7 of Euclid, that is to say, on the ground of a common property of proportionals.
But in the simplest numbers there is no need of this demonstration.

For example,

given the numbers 1, 2, 3, no one fails to see, that the fourth proportional num-
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ber is 6, and this kind of cognition is much clearer than the others, because from
the ratio which we intuitively see the first to have to the

s~cond,

we conclude

the fourth.
Prop. XLI.

Cognition of the first kind is the sole cnuse of falsity. but the second

and third are necessarily true.
Oem.

In the preceding scholium we have classed as helonging to the first kind

of cognition all those ideas which are inadequate and confused; and therefore (by
prop. 35, Part II) this kind of cognition is the cause of falsity.

Further, we

class as belonging to the second and third kind of cognition those ideas \·'hich are
adequate; and therefore (by prop. 34, Part II) cognition of these kinds is necessarily true;

q~e.d.

Prop. XLII.

Cognition of the second and third kind, and not that of the first kind,

teaches us to· distinguish the true from the false.
Oem.

This proposition is self-evident.

For he who knows how to distinguish the

true from the false, must have an adequate idea of the true and the false, i.e. (by
scho!. 2, .prop. 40, Part II) must know the true and false according to the second
or third kind of cognition.
Prop. XLII.!.

He who has a true idea at the same time knows himself to have a true

idea, and cannot doubt of.its truth.
Oem.

A true idea in us is that which is adequate in God, in so far as he is

manifested by the nature of the human mind (by corol!., prop. 11, Part II).

Let

us therefore suppose that there is in God, so far as he is manifested by the nature
of the human mind, an adequate idea A.

There must be also in God the idea of this

idea, which is related to God in the same way as idea A (ace. to prop. 20, the demonstration of which is universal).

But the idea A is supposed to belong to God in

So far as he is explained by the human mind; therefore also the idea of that idea
must belong to God in the same way, i.e. (ace. to same coroll., prop. 11) this adeqUate idea of the idea A will be in the same mind which has the adequate idea A;
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and thus he who has an adequate idea or (by prop. 34, Part II) who truly knows a
thing, must at the same time have an adequate idea or true cognition of his cogni_
tion, i.e. (as is self-evident) he must at the same time have certitude; q.e.d.
Schol.
of an idea.

In scholium, prop. 21 of this part I have explained, what is the idea
But it is to be noted, that the preceding proposition is sufficiently

evident by itself.

For no one who has a true idea is ignorant that a true idea in-

volves the highest certitude.

To have a true idea signifies nothing else than to

know a" thing perfectly; nor indeed can anyone doubt this unless he supposes an
idea to be a mute image like a picture and not a mode of thought.

And I ask, who

can know that he understands a thing unless he first understand it? i.e. who can

know that he is certain of a thing unless he be first certain of it? Further, what
can be clearer and more certain than a true idea, so as to be a criterion of its
truth?

As light manifests itself and darkness, so truth is the criterion of it-

self and of falsehood.

And hereby I believe myself to have answered the following

objections: namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false one, only in so
far as it is said to agree with its object, a true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false one (since they are distinguished solely by an extrinsic mark)
and consequently, the man who has true ideas will have no more of reality or perfection than he who has false ones.
ideas?

Further, whence comes it that men have false

And lastly, whence can anyone certainly know, that he has ideas which a-

gree with their objects?
answered.

These questions, I say, I believe myself to have already

For as to the difference between a true and a false idea it is evident

from prop. 35, Part II that the former is to the latter as being to non-being; and
the causes of falsity I have shown in the clearest manner from prop. 19 to prop. 3S
with its scholium.

From whence also it is apparent, what is the difference between

a man who has true ideas and a man who has only false ones.

As to the last point,

namely, whence a man can know that he has an idea which agrees with its object, I
have just now sufficiently shown that it arises simply from this, that he has an
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idea which agrees with its object, or, that truth is its own criterion.

Add to

this, that our mind, in so far as it truly perceives things is a part of the infinite intellect of God (by coroll., prop. 11, Part II), and thus it is as necessary
that the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are true, as the ideas of God.
Prop. XLIV.

It is of the nature of reason to contemplate things as necessary, and

not as contingent.
Dem.

It is of the nature of reason to perceive things truly (by prop. 41, Part

II), i.e. (by ax. 6, Part I) as they are in themselves, i.e. (by prop. 29, Part I),
not as contingent, but as necessary; q.e.d.
Coroll. 1.

Hence it follows, that it is owing to the imagination alone that we

contemplate things as contingent, whether in relation to the past or to the future.
Schol.

In what way this takes place, I will explain in a few words.

We have

shown above (prop. 17, Part II with its coroll.) that the mind always imagines
things as present to it even though they do not exist, unless causes occur which
exclude their present existence.

Again, we have shown (prop. 18, Part II) that if

the human body has been affected by two external bodies at once, when the mind afterwards imagines either of them it will always remember the other, i.e. it will contemplate both as present to it, unless causes occur which exclude their present existence.

Further, no one doubts that our conception of time arises from our imag-

ining one body to move more slowly or more quickly than another, or with the same
degree of quickness.

Let us then suppose that a boy, yesterday early in the morn-

ing saw Peter, in the middle of the day Paul, in the evening Simeon; and that today he again saw Peter early in the morning.

From prop. 18, Part II it appears

that when he sees the morning light he will imagine the sun pursuing its course
through the same part of the heavens, as on the preceding day, that is, he will imagine the whole day, and together with the early morning he will imagine Peter,
With the middle of the day Paul and with the evening Simeon, i.e. he will imagine
the existence of Paul and Simeon in relation to future time.

On the contrary, if
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he has seen Simeon in the evening he will refer Paul and Peter to the past, imag_
ining them in conjunetion with past periods of time; and he will do this the more
constantly, the oftener he has seen them in this order.

If it happens some eve-

ning, that he sees James instead of Simeon, then on the following day he will imag_
ine sometimes Simeon, sometimes James, but not both together.

For he is supposed

to have seen one or other of them only, and not both together, in the evening.
Hence his imagination will fluctuate, and in connection with future evenings he will
imagine first the one and then the other, i.e. neither with certainty; he will contemplate them both as contingent in the future. This fluctuation will equally exist
with regard to things which we contemplate under a similar relation to the past or
the

present~

and consequently we shall imagine things in relation.to the past and

present no less than to the future, as contingent.
Coroll.

It is of the nature of reason to perceive things under the form or cat-

egory of eternity.
Oem.

For it is of the nature of reason to contemplate things as necessary and

not as contingent (by preced. prop.).

And it perceives this necessity of things

(by prop. 41, Part II) truly, i.e. (by ax. 6, Part I) as it is in itself.

But (by

prop. 16, Part I) this necessity of things is the necessity of the eternal nature
of God.

Therefore it is of the nature of reason to contemplate things under the

form or category of eternity.

Add to this, that the foundations of reason are no-

tions (by prop. 38, Part II) which explain those properties that are common to all
things, and which (by prop. 37, Part II) do not explain the essence of any individual thing.

These notions must therefore be conceived without any relation to time

and under the form or category of eternity; q.e.d.
Prop. XLV.

Every idea of a body, or of an individual thing actually existing, nec-

essarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.
Oem.

The idea of an individual thing actually existing necessarily involves both

the essence and existence of that thing (by coroll., prop. 8, Part II).

Now indi-
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vidual things (by prop. IS, Part I) cannot be conceived without God; and since (by
prop. 6, Part II) they have God for their cause, in so far as he is considered under an attribute of which they are the modes, the ideas of these things must necessarily (by ax. 4, Part I) involve the conception of the attribute to which they belong, i.e. (by def. 6, Part I) they must involve the eternal and infinite essence
of God; q.e.d.
Schol.

By existence I do not here understand duration, i.e. existence conceived

abstractly and as a certain form of quantity.

I speak of the very nature of exis-

tence, which belongs to individual things because there follows from the eternal
necessity of the nature of God an infinity of modes themselves infinitely modified.
See prop. 16, Part I.
as they are in God.

I speak, I say, of the existence of individual things so far
For although each is determined by another thing to a certain

mode of existence; yet the force by which each perseveres in existing follows from
the eternal necessity of the nature of God.

On which subject see coroll., prop. 24,

Part I.
Prop. XLVI.

The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which each

idea involves, is adequate and perfect.
Oem.

The demonstration of the preceding proposition is universal, and whether

a thing be considered as a part or as a whole, whether the idea of it be of the
whole or of a part (by preced. prop.) it will involve the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Wherefore that which gives the cognition of the eternal and infinite

essence of God is common to all things and is equally in a part and in the whole,
and therefore (by prop. 38, Part II) it will be an adequate cognition; q.e.d.
Prop. XLVII.

The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite

essence of God.
Oem.

The human mind has ideas (by prop. 22, Part II) from which (by prop. 23,

Part II) it perceives itself and its body (by prop. 19, Part II) and (by coroll.,
prop. 16 and by prop. 17, Part II) external bodies as actually existing; and thus
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(by prop. 45 and 46, Part II) it has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infi_
nite essence of God; q.e.d.
Schol.
to all.

Hence we see that the infinite essence of God and his eternity are knoWn
Now as all things are in God and are conceived through God, it follows

that from this knowledge of the divine nature we can deduce many other adequate ideas, and thus form that third kind of cognition of which we spoke in schol. 2,
prop. 40 the pre eminence and utility of which it will be our task to speak of in
the Fifth Part.

That however men have not so clear a knowledge of God as they have

of common notions, arises from this, that they are unable to imagine God as they do
bodies, and that they have united the name God to images of things they are accustomed to see; which men can scarcely avoid, because they are continually affected
bv external bodies.

And in truth, most errors consist simply in our not correctly

applying the names of things.

For when anyone says that the lines which are drawn

from the centre of a circle to its circumference are unequal, he assuredly understands by a circle something different from what mathematicians understand by it.
So when men err in calculation they have other numbers in their mind than those
which they have on their paper.

Hence if you look at their mind alone, they do

not err; but they appear to err because we suppose them to have the same numbers
in their mind as on their paper.

If it were not for this supposition, we should

not believe them to be in error; just as I did not believe a man to be in error
whom I lately heard explaining that his house had flown into his neighbouI"s fowl;
because his meaning was clear enough to me.

And many controversies have arisen,

simply from this, namely, that men do not correctly explain their own meaning, or
that they interpret incorrectly the meaning of another.

For in fact. when they

most contradict each other, they either understand the same thing under different
words, or a different thing under the same words so that those ideas which they
suppose to be mistakes and absurdities in others, do not exist.
Prop. XLVIII.

There is no absolute or free will in the mind, but it is determined
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to will this or that by a cause which is also determined bv another cause, and
this again by another, and so on in infinitum.
Oem.

The mind is a certain and determinate mode of thought (by prop. II, Part

II) and therefore (by coroll. 2, prop. 17, Part .1) cannot be the free cause of its
actions, i.e. cannot have an absolute power of willing and not willing; but must be
determined to will this or that (by prop. 28, Part I) by a cause, which also is determined by another and this again by another etc. q.e.d.
Schol.

In the same way it may be demonstrated that the mind has no absolute

faculty of understanding, desiring, loving etc.

Whence it follows that these and

similar faculties are either altogether fictitious or are nothing but metaphysical
or universal entities which we are wont to form by abstraction from particular
things; and thus intellect and will are related to this and that idea to this and
that volition in the same way as the quality of being a stone is related to this or
that stone or as the word man is related to Peter and Paul.
selves free I have explained in the appendix to Part I.

Why men suppose them-

But before I proceed fur-

ther, let it be noted here that by will I understand the power of affirming and
denying and not desire; I understand, I say, the faculty by which the mind affirms
or denies what is true and what is false, and not the sentiment of desire or aversion.

Having then demonstrated that these faculties are universal notions, with no

existence distinct from the particulars whence we derive them, we have now to inquire whether volitions are anything else than the ideas of things.

We have to in-

qUire, I say, whether there be in the mind any other affirmation and negation beSides that which the idea in so far as it is an idea involves; concerning which
see the following proposition as also definition 3, Part II that thought may not be
supposed to consist in pictures of things.

For by ideas I do not understand the

images which are formed at the back of the eye or, if you will, in the centre of
the brain, but the conceptions of thought.
Prop. XLIX.

There is in the mind no volition, i.e

affirmation and negation, be-
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sides that which the idea, so far as it is an idea, involves.
Oem.

In the mind (by preced. prop.) there is no absolute faculty of willing

and not willing, but single volitions only, namely, this or that affirmation, this
or that negation.

Let us conceive therefore any single volition, for example, the

mode of thought by which the mind affirms that the three angles of a triangle are
equal to two right angles.

This affirmation involves the conception or idea of a

triangle, i.e. without the idea of a triangle i t cannot be conceived.

For it is

the same thing whether I say that A must involve the conception B or whether I say
that A cannot be conceived without B.

This affirmation then (by ax. 3, Part

cannot exist without the conception of a triangle.

II)~

Therefore this affirmation can

neither be nor be conceived without the idea of a triangle.

Further, the idea of

a triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that three of its angles are
equal to two right angles.

Hence, viae vepsa also, the idea of a triangle can nei-

ther be nor be conceived without this affirmation; and thus (by def. 2, Part II)
this affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and can be nothing else than that essence.

And what we have said of this volition (since we have

taken i t indifferently) is also to be said of any volition whatever. namely. that
it is nothing else than the idea itself; q.e.d.
Coroll.
Oem.

Will and intellect are one and the same.

Will and intellect are nothing but particular volitions and ideas (by

prop. 48, Part II and its schol.).

But a particular volition and a particular i-

dea are (by preced. prop.) one and the same.

Therefore will and intellect are one

and the same; q.e.d.
Schol.

By the preceding propositions we have refuted the common supposition as

to the cause of error.

I have shown above that falsity consists in the privation

which mutilated and confused ideas involve.
false, does not involve certitude.

Hence a false idea, in so far as it is

When therefore we say that a man acquiesces in

false ideas, and does not doubt them, we do not mean to imply that he is certain of
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them, but only that he does not doubt concerning them, or that he acquiesces in
the false ideas, because there are no reasons existing to make his imagination
fluctuate.

On this subject see scholium, prop. 44, Part II.

However strongly

therefore a man may be supposed to adhere to false ideas, we never say that he is
certain.

For by certitude we understand something positive (see prop. 43, Part II

and schol.) and not merely the privation of doubt; whereas by falsity we understand
the privation of certitude.

But for the fuller explanation of the preceding prop-

osition, some points yet remain to be noted.
which can be urged to this doctrine.

I have also to answer the objections

And lastly, that I may remove all scruple, I

think it desirable to indicate some uses of this doctrine.

I say, some; for the

principal uses will be better understood from what we have to state in the Fifth
Part.
To begin with the explanatory observations: I warn my readers accurately to
distinguish between an idea or conception of the mind, and the images of things,
formed by our imagination.

Again, it is necessary that they distinguish between

ideas and the words by which we signify things.

For because these three things,

namely, images, words and ideas, are by many either altogether confounded or not
accurately or cautiously enough distinguished, they are entirely ignorant that
this doctrine concerning will is eminently necessary to be known for the wise conduct both of speculation and of life.

Those indeed who suppose ideas to consist

in images, which are formed in us by the concurrence of bodies, persuade themselves that those ideas of things of which we can form no corresponding image are
not ideas but only fictions, which we form by virtue of free will; hence they regard ideas as mute pictures, and preoccupied with this prejudice they do not see
that an idea in so far as it is an idea involves affirmation or negation.

Further,

they who confound words with an idea, or with the affirmation which the idea inVOlVes, suppose that they can will the contrary of what they feeZ; when they merely affirm or deny in words alone, in opposition to what they feel.

But to cast off
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this prejudice is easy to anyone whO attends to the nature of thought, which does
not in the least involve the conception of extension.

He will clearly understand

that an idea, since it is a mode of thought, consists neither in the image of anything nor in words.

For the essence of words and images is constituted by corpo-

real motions which do not in the least involve the conception of thought.
few admonitory observations will suffice.
before spoken of.

These

I pass on therefore to the objections

First, our opponents regard it as decided that the will extends

itself more widely than the intellect; and therefore differs from it.

And the rea-

son they allege for thinking that the will extends itself more widely than the intellect is, the experience that they do not want a greater faculty of assenting or
of affirming and denying that we already' have; but that they do want a greater
ulty of understanding.

fac~

Therefore will is distinguished from intellect on the

ground that·the latter is finite and the former infinite.

Secondly. it can be ob-

jected to us that experience seems to teach nothirig more clearly than that we can
suspend our judgment, so as not to assent to things which we perceive; which is
also confirmed by this, that no one is said to be deceived in so far as he perceives something but only in so far as he assents or dissents.

For example, he

who imagines a winged horse, does not therefore admit that a.winged horse exists,
I

.I.
'

i.e. is not therefore deceived, unless he at the same time admits that there is
such a thing as a winged horse.

Thus experience seems to teach nothing more

clear~

1y than that Will or the faculty of assenting is free and distinct from the faculty
of understanding.

Thirdly, it may be objected, that one affirmation does not ap-

pear to contain more reality than another, i.e. we do not appear to want a greater
power in order to affirm that what is true, is true, than to affirm that what is
true is false.

But we perceive one idea to have more reality or perfection than

another; for by how much some objects are superior to others, by so much the ideas
of them are more perfect than the ideas of others.
seems to be a difference between will and intellect.

Hence on this ground also there

Fourthly, it can be objected:
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if a man does not act from free will, what will he do if he is in equilibrium,
like the ass of Buridanus?

Will he perish of hunger and thirst?

If I admitted

this, I should appear to conceive an ass or the statue of a man and not a man;
while if I denied it, it would follow that man determines himself and consequently
that he has the power of doing what he pleases.

Other objections may perhaps be

made besides these; but as I am not bound to confute what everyone may happen to
dream on this subject, I shall confine myself to these objections alone, and shall
answer them as briefly as possible.

In reply to the first I admit that the Will

extends itself more widely than intellect, if by intellect is understood only
clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the Will extends itself more widely than
perceptions or the faculty of conceiving.

Nor in truth do I see why the faculty

of willing should be called infinite any more than the faculty of feeling; for
just as we can affirm an infinity of things (in succession; for we cannot affirm
an infinity of things at once) with the same faculty of willing, so also we can
feel or perceive an infinity of bodies (one after the other) with the same faculty
of feeling.

If it be said that there is an infinity of things which we cannot

perceive, I reply, that as we cannot reach these by any thought, we consequently
cannot reach them by any faculty of volition.

But, it is urged, if God wished

that we should perceive these also, he must indeed give us a greater faculty of
perception but not a greater faculty of willing than he has given us; which is
the same as saying: if God wished that we should understand an infinity of other
beings, it would be necessary that he should give us a greater intellect in order
to embrace that infinity of beings, but not a more universal idea of being than he
has given us.

For we have shown that Will is a universal term or an idea by which

we explain all single volitions, i.e. what is common to all of them.

Since, then,

Our opponents believe this common or universal idea of all volitions to be a facUlty, it is not surprizing, if they say that this faculty extends itself beyond
the limits of the intellect in infinitum.

For the universal is predicated equally
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of one or of many or of an infinite number of individuals.

To the second objec-

tion I reply by denying that we have the free power of suspending our judgment.
For when we say that anyone suspends his judgment we say nothing else than that
he is aware he does not adequately perceive the thing.
therefore, in

fa~t,

a perception, and not free will.

A suspension of judgment is
That this may be clearly un-

derstood, let us conceive a boy imagining a horse and not perceiving anything else.
Since this imagination of a horse involves existence (by coroll., prop. 17, Part
II) and the boy perceives nothing which excludes the existence of the horse (he
will necessarily contemplate the horse as present), neither will he be able to
doubt of its existence, though he will not be certain of it.

Something of this

we experience every day in our dreams, nor do I suppose that there is anyone who
thinks that when he dreams he has the free power of suspending his judgment concerning the things of which he dreams, and of causing that he should not dream of
them; and nevertheless it sometimes happens that in our dreams also we suspend our
judgment, namely, when we dream that we dream.

Further, I admit that no one is de-

ceived in so far as he perceives, i.e. I admit that the imaginations of the mind
considered in themselves involve no error (see schol., prop. 17, Part II); but I
deny that man affirms nothing in so far as he perceives.

For what else is it to

perceive a winged horse, than to affirm that a horse has wings?

If a man per-

ceivednothing besides the winged horse, he would contemplate it as present, nor
would he have any cause to doubt of its existence, nor any power of dissenting, unless the imagination of a winged horse were united with an idea which excluded the
existence of the said horse, namely, the perception 'that the idea which he had of
a winged horse was inadequate, in consequence of which he will necessarily either
deny or doubt the existence of the horse.

And hereby I believe myself to have an-

swered the thipd objection also; for I have said, that the Will is a universal term,
which is predicated of all ideas and which signifies that alone which is common to
all ideas, namely an affirmation.

Conceived thus abstractly, therefore, the ade-
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quate essence of the will must be in every idea, and must be the same in all; but
it is otherwise when we consider the will as constituting the essence of a particu-

lar idea, for in that point of view single affirmations differ among themselves as
much as ideas.

For example, the affirmation

co~tained

in the idea of a circle dif-

fers from that contained in the idea of a triangle as much as the idea of a circle
differs from the idea of a triangle.

Further, I absolutely deny, that we want an

equal power of thought in order to affirm that to be true \vhich is true, and to
affirm that to be true which is false.

For these two affirmations, if you regard

the mind, are related to each other as being and not being; there being nothing
positive in ideas which constitutes the form of falsity.
with its scholium; also schol., prop. 47, Part II.

See prop. 35, Part II

And it is here especially to

be observed, how easily we are deceived when we confound universals with individuals, and abstractions with realities.

As to the fourth objection, I entirely con-

cede, that a man placed in such an equilibrium (namely. who is conscious of nothing
else than hunger and thirst, a certain food and a certain beverage, which are equally distant fram him) would perish from hunger and thirst.

If they ask me whether

such a man is not rather to be esteemed an ass than a man, I answer that I do not
know, any. more than I know how we are to esteem one who hangs himself, and how we
are to esteem boys, fools, madmen etc.
It remains to indicate how much the knowledge of this doctrine contributes to
the right conduct of life; which we may easily gather from the following considerations.

First, it teaches us that we act solely from the will of God, that we are

participators of the divine nature, and that the more perfect are our actions the
more we understand of God.

Hence this doctrine. besides that it renders the mind

thoroughly calm, has this merit also, that it teaches us in what consists our
highest felicity or blessedness, namely, in the knowledge of God alone, and thus
induces us to do those things only which are in harmony with piety and love.
Hence we clearly understand how far those are removed from the true estimate of
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virtue who expect to be decorated by God with the highest rewards for their virtue
and good actions, as for the highest service, as if virtue and the service of God
"".

were not in themselves felicity and the highest liberty.

Secondly, it teaches us

how to conduct ourselves with regard to the gifts of fortune, or things which are
not in our own power, i.e. with regard to things which do not proceed from our own
nature; namely, to expect and bear both aspects of fortune with an equal mind: because all follow from the eternal decree of God, by the same necessity as from the
essence of a triangle-it follows that three of its angles are equal to two right
angles.

Thirdly: this doctrine is not a little conducive to social well being.

since it teaches us not to hate, despise or ridicule others, to be angry with no
one, to envy no one.

Further, it teaches that each should be content with his own

and should help his neighbour; not out of wananish pity, partiality or superstition,
but under the sole guidance of reason, according as time and circumstance demand,
as I shall show in the Third Part.

Fourthly.

This doctrine contributes not a

little to the welfare of the commonwealth, inasmuch as it teaches how the citizens
should be governed and led, namely, not as in servitude, but as freely doing those
things which are best.

I have now completed what I had determined to advance in

this scholium, and have thus corne to the end of the Second Part, in which I think
I·

'I,

'. '
U

I have explained with sufficient clearness the nature of the human mind and its
properties, and have advanced things from which many very important, useful and

.i.."
I, ..
I!":

.;,:

necessary conclusions may be drawn, as will partly appear from what follows •

Part III
On the Origin and Nature of the Emotions

Preface

Many have written on the emotions and actions of men as if they were not treating of natural things which follow the common laws of nature, but of things which
lie beyond the domain of nature; they appear, indeed, to regard man in nature as an

imperium in imperio--a state within a state.

For they believe that man rather dis-

turbs than fOllows the order of nature, that he has absolute power over his actions,
and that he is determined by nothing besides himself.

They refer the cause of hu-

man weakness and inconstancy not to the common forces of universal nature, but to
I know not what vice in human nature, which they therefore bewail, deride, despise,
or, more frequently, detest; and he who is especially eloquent and acute in his invectives against the impotence of the human mind, is regarded as. divinely wise.
Nevertheless there have not been wanting eminent men (to whose labours and industry
we confess ourselves much indebted), who have written excellent things on the right
conduct of life and have given men advice full of wisdom; but no one, so far as I
am aware, has defined the nature and powers of the emotions, and what the mind can
do towards governing them.

I know indeed, that the illustrious Descartes, although

he believed that the mind has absolute power over its actions, has endeavoured to
explain human emotions by their first causes, and at the same time to show the way
in which the mind may attain absolute power over the emotions; but he has, at least
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in my opinion, shown nothing more than the acumen of his great intellect, as I
shall prove in the fitting place.

At present I return to those who prefer detest_

ing or ridiculing human emotions and actions to understanding them.

To such it

will doubtless appear strange that I should undertake to treat of human vices and
follies after the· geometrical method, and that I should seek to demonstrate by a
rigorous process of reasoning what they exclaim against as repugnant to reason,
as vain, absurd and horrible.

But I have chosen this method on the following

ground: There is nothing in existence which can be attributed to a vice in nature;
for nature is always the same and is everywhere one; her virtue and power are
everywhere the same; that is, the laws of nature according to which all things come
into existence and pass from one form to another, are everywhere and always the
same, and therefore the means of understanding the nature of all things must be one
and the same, namely, by the universal laws and rules of nature.

Hence passions

such as hatred, anger, and the like, considered in themselves, follow fran the same
necessity and power of nature as other phenomena; and consequently they have determinate causes whereby they may be understood, and determinate qualities, which are
as well worth our study as the properties of any other object on which we are
pleased to destine our exclusive attention.

I shall therefore treat of the nature

and powers of the Emotions and the power of the mind over them according to the
same method as I have used in the preceding books in treating of God and of the
Mind. and I shall consider human actions and appetites as if the subject were lines,
surfaces, or solids.

Definitions

1.

I call that an adequate cause by means of which the effect can be clearly

and distinctly perceived.

I call that an inadequate or partial cause which will

not suffice to explain the effect.
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2.

I say that we are active when something takes place within us or out of us,

of which we are the adequate cause, i.e. (by preced. def.) when from our nature
something follows either within us or out of us, which can be clearly understood
by means of that nature alone.

On the other hand I say that weare passive when

something takes place in us or follows from our nature, of which we are only the
partial cause.
3. I understand by emotions those affections of the body by which its power of
acting is increased or diminished, is assisted or restrained, and also the ideas of
those affections.
Explan.

If therefore we can be the adequate cause of anyone of these affec-

tions, I understand by emotion an action; in every other case, a passion.

Postulates

1.

The human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of action is

increased or diminished, and also in other ways which do not either increase or
diminish its power of action.
This postulate or axiom rests on postulate 1 and lemmat. 5 and 7, which see after prop. 13, Part II.
2.

The human body can undergo many changes and nevertheless, retain the impres-

sions or vestiges of objects (on which see post. 5, Part II), and consequently the
same images of things (for the def. of which see schol., prop. 17, Part II).

Propositions

Prop. I.

Our mind is both active and passive; so far, namely, as it has adequate

ideas, it is necessarily active, and so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is
necessarily passive.
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Oem.

Of the ideas which the human mind has, some are adequate, others mutilated

and confused (by schol., prop. 40, Part II).

But ideas which are adequate in any

mind are adequate in God so far as he constitutes the essence of that mind (by
coroll., prop. 11, Part II), and ideas which are inadequate in any mind are (by
the same coroll.).also adequate in God, not so far as he contains in himself the
essence of that mind only, but so far as he at the same time contains in himself
the minds of all other beings.

Now, fran any given idea sane effect must necessar-

ily follow (by prop. 36, Part I) , of which effect God is the adequate cause (see
def. I, Part III) not so far as he is infinite, but so far as he is affected by
that idea (see prop. 9, Part II).

But of this same effect, of which God is the

cause in so far as he is affected by an idea which is adequate in any mind, that
mind itself is the adequate cause (by coroll., prop. 11, Part II).

Therefore our

mind (by def. 2, Part III) so far as it has adequate ideas, is necessarily active,
which was the first point.

Further, whatever necessarily follows from an idea

which is adequate in God not so far as he contains in himself the mind of one man
alone, but so far as he contains in himself together with the mind of that particular man the minds of all other beings also. of this (by the same coroll., prop. 11,
Part II) the mind of a particular man is not the adequate but the partial cause.
And consequently (by def. 2, Part.III) the mind, in so far as it has inadequate
ideas, is necessarily passive; which was the second point.

Therefore our mind

etc. q.e.d.
Coroll.

Hence it fOllows that the more inadequate ideas the mind has, the more

liable it is to passions, and on the other hand, the'more adequate id.eas the mind
has, the more capable it is of action.
Prop. II.

The body cannot determine the mind to think. nor can the mind determine

the body to motion, or to rest, or to anything else (if there be anything else)·
Oem.

All modes of thought have for their cause God so far as he is a thinking

being and not so far as he is explained by any other attribute (by prop. 6, Part
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II).

Hence that which determines the mind to think is a mode of thought and not a

mode of extension, i.e. (by def. 1, Part II) is not a body; which was the first
point to be proved.

Next, the motion and rest of a body must arise from some other

body, which 'was also determined to motion and

r~st

by another, and, generally, what-

ever takes place in a body must originate in God considered as affected by some mode
of extension and not by any mode of thought (by prop. 6, Part II), i.e. cannot arise
from the mind which (by prop. 11, Part II) is a mode of thought; and this was the
second point to be proved.
Schol.

Therefore etc. q.e.d.

These propositions are more clearly understood from what has been said

in the scholium of prop. 7, Part II, namely, that the mind and body are one and the
same thing, conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute
of extension.

Hence it comes, that the order or concatenation of things is one,

whether nature be conceived under the one or the other attribute; consequently that
the order of the actions and passions of I the II our I body is simultaneous in nature
with the order of the actions and passions of the 'mind.
the demonstration of

prop~

12, Part II.

This is also evident from

But though the proofs are such that there

remains no ground of doubt in this respect, I can scarcely believe that, unless I
corroborate the position by experience, I can induce men to weigh it calmly; so
firmly are they persuaded that it is by the decree of the mind alone that the body
at one time moves, at another time is at rest, and that all its various actions depend solely on the mind's will and mode of thinking.

Yet no one has hitherto de-

termined what the body is capable of; i.e., experience has hitherto taught no one
What the body can do solely from the laws of nature considered as corporeal only,
and what it cannot do unless it be determined by the mind.

For no one has hither-

to known the body so accurately as to be able to explain all its functions; not to
mention that many things may be observed in brutes which far transcend human sagacity, and that somnambules do many things in sleep which they would not venture on
awake;-a sufficient proof that the body itself, from the laws of its nature alone,
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can do many things at which the mind is astonished.

Further, no one knows in what

manner or by what means the mind moves the body, nor how many degrees of motion it
can communicate to the body, nor with what amount of velocity it is capable of
ing the body.

mov~

Hence when men say this or that action of the body arises from the

mind, which has an empire over the body, they do not know what they are saying, and
merely confess in specious words that they are ignorant of the true cause of that
action.
the body,

But, say they, whether we know or do not know by what means the mind moves
experie~ce

nevertheless proves that unless the human mind were capable of

thought t-he body would be iriert.

Again, experience proves that in the mind alone

resides the power of speech and silence as well as of many other things,_ and consequently we believe them to depend on the decree of the mind alone.

But as regards

the first point, I ask them-. whether experience has not also taught, on the other
hand, that if the body be

inert~

the mind is at the -same time incapable of-thought?

For when the body reposes in sleep the mind sleeps with it, and has not the power
of thinking which it possesses when awake.

Moreover, I suppose every ORe has ex-

perienced that the mind is not always equally capable of thinking on the same subject; but that the more- capable the body is of receiving the image of an object
the more capable is the mind of contemplating that object.

But, say they, it is

impossible to deduce from.the laws of corporeal nature merely. the causes of edifices, pictures and things of that kind, which are made solely by hUman art: the
human body, unless it were determined and led by the mind, could never build a
temple.

I have already shown, however, that they know not what the body can do,

nor what can be deduced simply from the contemplation of its nature, .and that according to their own experience many things can ensue solely from the laws of its
nature, which they would never have believed possible except through the direction
of the mind, for example, the things done by somnabules in sleep, which they themselves are-amazed at when awake.

I add that the mechanism of the human body far

surpasses in art and complexity everything that has been constructed by human art;
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not to insist here on what I have demonstrated above, namely, that from nature,
under whatever attribute it be considered, there follows an infinity of modes.

As

to the second point, I admit that human affairs would proceed much more happily if
it were equally in the power of man to be silent or to speak.

But experience more

than sufficiently teaches that nothing is less under the control of men than the
tongue,· and that what they are least able to do is to govern their appetites.
Hence many believe that we are free only with regard to those things which we desire feebly, because the appetite for these things can be easily repressed by the
remembrance of some other thing, which our memory frequently recalls; but that we
are not free with regard to those things for which we feel a violent desire not to
be allayed by the recollection of some other object.

If, however, they had not ex-

perienced that we do many things of which we afterwards repent, and that when we
struggle with contrary desires, we often see the better and follow the worse,··
nothing would prevent them from believing that weare altogether free.

So the in-

fant believes that it freely seeks the breast, the angry boy that he wills to take
vengeance, the timid one that he wills to run away.

So the intoxicated man believes

that he says by the free determination of his mind things which afterwards when he
is sober he would like not to have said.

So the delirious, the loquacious, children

and many others of the same sort, are convinced that they speak by the free decision
of their minds, while nevertheless they are unable to repress the impulse to speak.
Thus experience, no less than reason, teaches that men believe themselves free solely because they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which
they are determined; and moreover that the decisions of the mind are nothing else
than the appetites themselves which vary with the constitution of the body_

* Compo James III, 8.
** Ovid. Metam. 7.90 sq.

'~ideo

meliora proboque, deteriora sequor."

For
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everyone acts in all things lunder the <governance o£>lIaccording tol his strongest passion; those who are struggling with contrary passions know not what they
will, while those who have no passion are easily driven hither and thither.

All

this clearly proves that the decision of the mind and appetite or the determination
of the body are naturally simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which
when it is considered under the attribute of thought and explained by it, we call
a decree or decision, and when it is considered under the attribute of extension
and is deduced from the laws of motion and rest, we call an appetite or a detcrminatio~

of the body; which will appear yet more distinctly from what is to follow.

At present there is another point which I wish to be especially noted, namely, that
we can do nothing according to a decree of our minds, unless we remember that decree.

For example, we cannot utter words unless we remember them; and it does not

depend on our free will whether we remember anything or forget it.· Hence all that
can be supposed to lie in the power of the mind is, whether we should speak or be
be silent concerning the thing we remember.

But when we dream that we speak, we

believe that we speak from the free decree of our mind, whereas we do not speak at
. all, or if we speak, we do so from the spontaneous motion of the body.

Again, we

dream that we conceal something from men, and that we do so in obedience to the
same mental decree by which when waking we are silent concerning what we know.
Lastly. we dream that we do many things according to a decree of our minds, which,
when we are awake, we dare not do.

Are there, then) in the mind two kinds of de-

crees, one fantastic and the other free?

Unless the absurdity be carried thus far,

it must necessarily be conceded that this decree of the mind which is believed to
be free, is not to be distinguished from imagination or memory, and is nothing else
than that affirmation which an idea, as such, necessarily involves.
Part II.

See prop. 49,

And thus these decrees arise in the mind by the same necessity as the i-

deas of things actually existing, so that those who believe that they speak or are
silent, or do anything else by free will, dream with their eyes open.
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Prop. III.

The actions of the mind arise only from adequate ideas; its passions

only from inadequate ideas.
Oem.

That which primarily constitutes the essence of the mind is nothing else

than the idea of a body actually existing (by prop. 11 and 13, Part II), which (by
prop. 15, Part II) is composed of many other ideas, some (by coroll., prop. 38,
Part II) adequate and some inadequate (by coroll., prop. 29, Part II).

Whatever

therefore follows from the nature of the mind, and of which the mind is the proximate cause, through which it must be understood, must necessarily follow either
from an adequate or an [inJadequate idea.

But so far as the mind (by prop. I,

Part III) has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive.

Therefore the actions

of the mind follow from adequate ideas alone, and the mind is passive only because
it has inadequate ideas: q.e.d.
Schol.

We see therefore that passions belong to the mind only so far as it has

something which involves negation, or, so far as it is considered a part of nature
which, taken by itself and independently of other things, cannot be clearly and
distinctly perceived; and on this ground I could shew that passions are related to
particular things in the same way as to the mind, and that they cannot be conceived
in any other manner.
Prop. IV.
Oem.

But it is my purpose to treat of the human mind only.

Nothing can be destroyed but by an external cause.
This proposition is self evident.

For the definition ,of any thing in-

volves the affirmation and not the negation of the essence it defines; in other
words, it posits the essence and does not annihilate it.

When therefore we attend

to the thing alone and not to external causes, we can find nothing in it which can
destroy it; q.e.d.
Prop. V.

Things are contrary in their nature, i.e. cannot exist in the same sub-

ject, when one can destroy the other.
Oem.

For if they could meet or exist simultaneously in the same subject, it

Would follow that there could be something in a subject who could destroy it; which

100

(bypreced. prop.) is absurd.
Prop. VI.
Oem.

Therefore etc.; q.e.d.

Every thing, as far as in it lies, strives to persevere in its existence,
For particular things are modes by which the attributes of God are ex-

pressed in a certain and determinate manner (by coroll., prop. 25, Part I), i.e.
(by prop. 34, Par·t I) things who express in a certain and determinate manner the
power of God, whereby God exists and acts.

And no being has anything in itself by

which it can be destroyed or which can annihilate its existence (by prop. 4, Part
III); on the contrary, it is opposed to every thing which can do away with its
existence (by preced. prop.).

Therefore·, as far as in it lies, it strives to per ..

severe in its existence; q.e.d.
Prop. VII.

The effort by which every thing strives to persevere in existing, is

nothing but the actual· essence of that thing.
Oem.

From the given essence of any thing certain consequences necessarily fol-

low (by prop. 36, Part I), and things can be nothing else than what necessarily
follows from their determinate nature (by prop. 29, Part I),

Therefore the power

or effort of any thing by which either alone or together with other things, it does
or strives to do something, i.e. (by prop. 6, Part III) the power or effort by which
it strives to persevere in existing, is nothing else than the given or actual essence of that thing; q.e.d
Prop. VIII.

The effort by which each thing strives to persevere in existing, in-

volves no finite time, but an indefinite time.
Oem.

For if it involved a limited time, which .would determine the duration of

.

the thing, then it would follow, solely from the power by which the thing exists,
that after that limited time it would not exist, but must be destroyed.
(by prop. 4, Part III) is absurd.

But this

Therefore the effort by which a thing exists in-

volves no definite time; but on the contrary, since (by the same prop. 4, Part III)
if it be not destroyed by any external cause it always continues to exist by the
same power whereby it already exists, this effort involves an indefinite time; q.e. d .
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prop. IX.

The mind both so far as it has clear and distinct ideas and so far as it

has confused ideas, strives to persevere in its existence for an indefinite
period, and is conscious of this effort.
Oem.

The essence of the mind is constituted ,of adequate and inadequate ideas

(as we have shown in prop. 3, Part III) and therefore (by prop. 7, Part III) strives
to persevere in its existence
other; and, it

d~s

b~th

so far as it has the one and so far as it has the

so (by prop. 8, Part III) for an indefinite period.

But since

the mind (by prop. 23, Part II) through the ideas of the affections of the body is
necessarily conscious of itself, it is therefore (by prop. 7, Part III) conscious
of this its effort; q.e.d.
Schol.

This effort, when it is referred to the mind alone, is called

lu~ZZ;

when it is referred at once to the mind and the body it is called appetite.

but

Hence

appetite is nothing else than the essence of man, from which the actions that tend
to its preservation necessarily follow; so that man is determined to those actions.
And there is no difference between appetite and desire save that deSire generally
applies to men considered as conscious of their appetites; and it may therefore be
defined in this way: de8ire i8 an appetite attended with consciousnes8.

It results

from all this, that a thing is not the object of our effort, will, appetite and desire because we have judged it to be good; but that, on the contrary, we judge a
thing to be good because it is the object of our effort, volition, appetite and
desire.
Prop. X.

An

idea, which excludes our existence cannot be present in our mind, but

is contrary to it.
Oem.

Whatever can destroy our body cannot exist in it (by prop. S, Part III).

Consequently the idea of it cannot exist in God so far as he has the idea of our
body (bycoroll., prop. 9, Part II), i.e. (by prop. 11 and 13, Part II) the idea
of that thing cannot exist in our mind; on the contrary, since (by prop. 11 and 13,
Part II) that which primarily constitutes the essence'of the mind is the idea of a
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hody actually existing, the first and chief tendency of our mind (by prop. 7, Part
II I) is, to affirm the existence of our body.

Therefore an idea, which negad ves

the existence of our body, is contrary to our mind etc.; q.e.d.
Prop. XI.

If a thing increases or diminishes, aids or restrains the power of action

possessed by the body, the idea of this thing increases or diminishes, aids or
restrains the power of thinking possessed by the mind.
Dem.

This proposition is evident from prop. 7, Part II or from prop. 14, Part

II.
Schol.

We see therefore that the mind can undergo great changes, and pass at

one time to a higher at another to a lower degree of perfection; and these vicissitudes or passions explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain.

By pleasure

I shall understand in the following pages passion whereby the mind passes to a
higher degree of perfection; by pain, a passion whereby the mind passes to a lower
degree of perfection.

Further, when the emotion of pleasure is· related at once to

the mind and-the body I call it titilLation or hilarity; the emotion of pain in the
same case, bodily suffering or melancholy.

But let it be observed that the terms

titillation and bodily suffering apply to man when one part of him is more affected
than the rest; hilarity and melancholy when all parts.are affected.

What desire

is I have explained in the scholium to prop. 9, Part III, and besides these three
I recognize no primary emotion; for I shall shew in the sequel that from these
three all others are derived.

But before I proceed further, it is desirable here

more fully to explain proposition 10, Part III, that it may be more clearly understood in what way one idea is contrary to another.

In the scholium o·f prop. 17,

Part II I have shown that the idea which constitutes the essence of the human mind
involves the existence of the body so long as the body exists.

Next, from what haS

been demonstrated in coroll., prop. 8, Part II and schol. it follows that the present existence of our mind depends on this alone, namely that the mind involves the
actual existence of the body.

Lastly, we have shown (see prop. 17 and 18, Part II
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with schol.) that the power of the mind, whereby it imagines and remembers them,
also depend[s] on its involving the actual existence of the body.

Whence it fol-

loWS that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining are done

away with so soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body.
But the cause why the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body cannot be
the mind itself (by prop. 4, Part III); nor can it be the fact that the body ceases to be, for (by prop. 6, Part II) the cause why the mind affirms the existence
of the body is not that the body begins to exist; and for the same reason the mind
does not cease to affirm the existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist; but (by prop. 8, Part II) the true cause is an idea which excludes the present
existence of our body and consequently of our mind, and is therefore contrary to an
idea which constitutes the essence of our .mind.
Prop. XII.

The mind strives, as far as it can, to imagine those things which in-

crease or subserve the power of action of the body.
Dem.

As long as the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature

of some external body, so long the human mind will contemplate that body as present
(by prop. 17, Part II); and consequently (by prop. 7, Part II) as long as the human
mind contemplates, i.e. (by schol. of that prop.) imagines some external body as
present, so long the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature
of that external body.

Thus as long as the mind imagines those things which in-

crease or subserve the power of action which our body possesses, so long is the
body affected in ways which increase or subserve its power of action (see post. 1,
Part III); and consequently (by prop. 11) so long is the mind's power of thought
increased or subserved.

And therefore (by prop. 6 or 9, Part III) the mind, as

far as it can, strives to imagine such objects; q.e.d.
Prop. XIII.

When the mind imagines those things which diminish or restrain the

power of action of the body, it strives, as far as it can, to recall things
which exclude the existence of the former.
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Dem.

As long as the mind imagines things which diminish or restrain the power

of action of the body, so long is the power 6f the mind and body diminished and
restrained (as we have demonstrated in the preceding proposition), and nevertheless it will imagine such things until it imagines other objects which exclude the
present existence of the former (by prop. 17, Part II), i.e. (as I have just shown)
the power of the mind and of the body will be diminished and restrained tmtil it
has imagined new objects, and therefore the mind (by prop. 9, Part III) will strive,
as far as it can, to imagine or recall such objects; q.e.d.
Coroll.

Hence it follows, that the mind is averse to imagine things which di-

minish or restrain its own and the body's power of action.
Schol.

From this we clearly tmderstand what love and hatred are.

Love, namely.

is nothing else than joy accompanying the idea of an external cause; and hatred is
nothing else than sadness accompanying the idea of an external cause.

We see fur-

ther, that he who loves necessarily strives to have and keep present with him the
thing he loves; and on the contrary, he who hates strives to remove and destroy
the thing he hates.
Prop. XIV.

But on this subject more will be said in the sequel.

If the mind has once been affected by two emotions simultaneously, when

it is afterwards affected by either of them, it will be affected by the other
also.
Dem.

I f the human body has once been affected by two bodies simultaneously,

when the mind afterwards imagines either of them, it will always remember the other
also (by prop. 18, Part II).

But the imaginations of the mind indicate more of the

affections of our own body than of the nature of external bodies (by coroll. 2,
prop. 16, Part II).

Therefore if the body and

consequently the mind (see def. 3,

Part III) has been affected by two emotions simultaneously, when afterwards it is
affected by the one, it will be affected by the other also.
Prop. XV.
sire.

Any thing whatever can by accident be the cause of joy, sadness or de-
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Dem.

Let it be supposed that the mind is affected by two emotions at once.

namely, by one which neither increases nor diminishes its power of action and by
another which either increases or diminishes it (see post. 1. Part III).
preceding proposition it is evident, that when

t~e

From the

mind is subsequently affected

with the former emotion by its true cause, which (by the hypothesis) in itself
neither increases nor diminishes its power of action, it will always be affected
wi th the other also which either increases or diminishes its power of action, that·
is (by schol.. prop. 11, Part III) it will be affected by pleasure or pain; and
thus the former object. not in itself, but by accident, will be a cause of joy or
sadness.

And in the same way it can easily be shown that the same object may by

accident be the cause of deSire; q.e.d.
Coroll.

Merely on this ground, namely, that we have contemplated any object

with the emotion of pleasure or pain, although the object itself is not the effi. cient cause of that emotion, we can feel love or hatred towards it.
Dem.

For merely from this it arises (by prop. 14, Part III) that the mind in

afterwards imagining that object is affected by pleasure or pain, i.e. (by schol.,
prop. 11. Part III) that the power of action of body and mind is increased or diminishedetc.; and consequently (by prop. 12, Part III) that the mind desires or
(by coroll.. prop. 13, Part III) is averse to imagine it, i.e. (by schol., prop.
13, Part III) loves it or hates it; q.e.d.
Schol.

Hence we understand how it can come to pass that we love or hate certain

things without any cause known to us; merely, as it is said, out of sympathy or

antipathy.

And to this category are also to be referred those objects which affect

us wi th pleasure or pain solely because they have some likeness to ob jects which
are wont to affect us in that manner, as I shall shew in the succeeding proposition.
I know indeed that the authors who first introduced these terms sympathy and antipathy meant to signify by them certain occult qualities in things; nevertheless I
think it admissible also to denote by them certain known or manifest qualities.
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Prop. XVI.

Merely from the fact that we imagine a thing to have some likeness to

an object which is wont to affect the mind wi th pleasure or pain, although that
in which it is like the object be not the efficient cause of these emotions, we
shall nevertheless love or hate that thing.
Oem.

That which is like the object, we have (by the hypothesis) contemplated in

the object i tsel f wi th the emotion of pleasure or pain; and therefore (by prop. 14,
Part III) when the mind is affected by the image of this, it will also be affected
by

L~e

one or the other emotion, and consequently the thing which we perceive to

have this quality will be (by prop. 15, Part III) accidentally the cause of pleasure or pain.

And therefore (by precede corol1.). although that which in the given

thing is similar to the object which has caused pleasure or pain be not the efficient cause of those emotions, we shall nevertheless love or hate the thing; q.e.d.
Prop. XVII.

If we imagine a thing which is wont to affect us with pain to have

some likeness to another whi ch is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall at once hate and love that thing.
Oem.

For (by the hypothesis) this thing is in itself the cause of pain. and

(by schol., prop. 13, Part III) so far as we contemplate it with this emotion, we
shall hate it; and so far as we imagine it to be like another thing which is wont
to affect us wi th an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall love it in a
corresponding degree (by precede prop.).

And therefore we shall at once hate and

love it; q.e.d.
Schol.

This constitution of the mind, which arises from two contrary passions,

is called fluctuation; it is to passion what doubt is to the imagination (see
schol., prop. 44, Part II); indeed fluctuation and doubt differ from each other only as greater and less.

But it is to be observed, that in the preceding proposi-

tion I have deduced these fluctuations from causes which in themselves are the
cause of one emotion and by accident of another.

I have done so, however. simply

in order to facili tate their deduction from the foregoing propositions, and not be-
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cause I deny that fluctuations often arise from an object which is the efficient
cause of both emotions.

For the human body (by post. I, Part II) is composed of

many different individuals of different nature, and therefore (by ax. 1 after lemma 3, see after prop. 13, Part II) it can be affected by one and the s.ame body in
many different ways; and on the other hand, hecause one and the same thing can be
affected in many ways, it can also affect in many ways one and the same part of
the body.

Whence we may easi 1y conceive, that one and the same object can be the

cause of many contrary passions.
Prop. XVIII.

Man is affected by the idea of a past or future thing with the same

emotions of pleasure and pain as by the image of a present thing.
Dem.

As long as a man is affected by the image of anything, he will contemplate

it as present although it may not exist (by prop. 17, Part II with its coroll.),
nor does he imagine it as past or future except in so far as its image is united
with the image of past or future time (see schol., prop. 44, Part II).

Hence the

image of the thing considered in i tse1 f is the same whether it refer to future,
past or present time, i.e. (by coroll. 2, prop. 16, Part II) the constitution or
affection of the body is the same whether the image be that of a past, future or
present thing.

And thus the emotion of pleasure and pain is the same whether the

image be that of a thing past, future or present; q.e.d.
Schol. 1.

I here call a thing past or future according as we have been or shall

be affected by it, e.g. according as we have seen it or shall see it, as it has refreshed us or will refresh us, as it has hurt us or will hurt us.

For in imagining

it, we affirm its existence, that is, the body is affected by no emotion which excludes the existence of the thing; and thus (by prop. 17, Part II) the body is affected by the image of the thing in the same way as if the very thing i tse1 f were
present.

But as it usually happens that those who have had much experience fluc-

tuate when they contemplate a thing as future or past, and are very doubtful as to
What will occur (see schol., prop. 44, Part II), the consequence is, that the emo-
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tions which arise from images of this kind are not constant. but are perturbed by
images of other things until men are certain of the issue.
Schol. 2.

From what has just been said we understand the nature of hope. fear.

confidence, despair, joy and remorse.

Hope is nothing else than an intermittent

pleasure arising from the image of a past or future thing, concerning the issue of
which we are doubtful; fear, on the contrary, is an intermittent pain also arising
from the image of a dubious event.

If the doubt connected with these emotions be

removed, hope becomes confidence and fear becomes despair; that is to say, joy or

...

sadness arising from the image of a thing which we have feared or hoped.

Joy is

pleasure arising from the image of a· past event, concerning the occurrence of which
we had doubted.
Prop. XIX.

Lastly, remorse is the grief opposed to joy.

He who imagines the thing he loves destroyed, feels pain; but if he

imagines i i preserved he feels pleasure.
Oem.

The mind, so far as it can, strives to imagine those things which augment

or assist the power of action of the body (by prop. 12, Part III), Le. (by schol.,
prop. 13, Part III) the things which it loves.

Now the imagination is assisted by

those things which posit the existence of a thing, and on the other hand, it is restrained by those which exclude the existence of a thing (by prop. 17, Part II).
Therefore the images of things. which posit the existence of the thing loved assist
the effort of the mind by which it strives to imagine the thing loved. i.e. (by
schol., prop. 11, Part III) they affect the mind pleasurably; and on the other hand,
those things which exclude the existence of the thing loved restrain that effort of
the mind, L e. (by the s arne s chol.) affe ct the mind painfully.

There fore, he who

imagines the thing he loves destroyed. feels pain etc.; q.e.d.
Prop. XX.
Oem.

He who imagines the thing he hates destroyed. feels pleasure.
The mind (by prop. 13. Part III) strives to imagine those objects which

exclude the existence of things whereby the body's power of action is diminished or
restrained; Le. (by scho!. of same prop.) it strives to imagine those objects
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whi ch exclude the exis tence of what it hates.

And thus the image of the ob ject

which excludes the existence of that which the mind hates assists this effort of
the mind, i.e. (by schol., prop. 11, Part III) affects the mind pleasurably.
Therefore he who imagines what he hates destroyed, feels pleasure; q.e.d.
Prop. XXI.

He who imagines the object of his love affected with pleasure or pain,

is also affected wi th pleasure or pain; and each of these emotions will be
greater or less in the being who loves, according as either of them is greater
or less in the being loved.
Dem.

The images of things (as we have demonstrated in prop. 19, Part III)

which posit the existence of the object loved, assist the effort of the mind by
which it strives to imagine that beloved object.

Now pleasure posits the exis-

tence of the being that experiences it, and that in proportion as the sense of
pleasure is greater; for (by schol., prop. 11, Part III) it is a transi tion to
greater perfection.

Therefore the image of pleasure in the beloved being assists

the effort of the mind of him who loves, i.e. (by schol., prop. 11, Part III) i t
affects the being who loves with pleasure, and the more in proportion as the pleasure is great in the being loved.

This was the fi rst point.

Next, in so far as any

being is affected painfully it is negatived or annihilated, and this in proportion
as the pain is great (by same schol., prop. 11, Part III); and therefore he who
imagines the object he loves to be affected wi th pain, is also affected wi th pain,
and that in proportion as the pain is great in the beloved object; q.e.d.
Prop. XXII.

If we imagine a person as causing pleasure to the being we love, we

shall love this person.

I f, on the contrary, we imagine him as causing pain to

the beloved being, we hate him.
Oem.

He who affects the being we love wi th pleasure or pain, affects us also

wi th pleasure or pain, if we bring before our minds the image of the pleasure or
pain with which the beloved object is affected (by preced. prop.).

But this pleas-

ure or pain in us is thus supposed to be accompanied by the idea of an external
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cause.

Therefore (by schol., prop. 13, Part III) if we imagine a person as caUSing

pleasure or pain to the being we love, we shall love or hate this person; q.e.d.
Schol.

Proposition 21 explains to us what is commiseration, which we may define

as pain arising from another's suffering, but by what name we should call the pleas_
ure arising from another's benefit, I know not.

The love which we feel towards him

who benefi ts others I shall call approbation, and on the other hand the hatred we
feel towards him who injures another, I shall call indignation.

It is to be ob-

served also that we not only pi ty the being we love (as I have shewn in prop. 21)
but also one towards whom we have previously felt no emotion, provided we believe
him to resemble ourselves (as I shall shew further on); and therefore, we shall
also feel approbation towards one who does good to his fellOW, and on the contrary
indignation towards one who does him harm.
Prop. XXIII.

He who imagines what he hates affected with pain, feels <pleasure>;

if on the contrary he imagines the same object affected wi th pleasure. he feels
pain, and either of these emotions will be greater or less according as the
contrary emotion is greater or less in the being he hates.
Dem.

So far as the hated object is affected painfully, it is annihilated, and

that in proportion as the pain is great (by schol., prop. 11, Part III).

He there-

fore (by prop. 20, Part III) who imagines the thing he hates to be affected painfully will on the contrary feel pleasure, and all the greater in proportion as the
pain of the hated object is greater.

This was the first point.

Next. pleasure af-

firms the existence of the being experiencing it (by same scho!., prop. 11, Part
III), and the more in proportion as the pleasure is greater.

If anyone imagines

the being he hates as feeling pleasure, this imagination (by prop. 13. Part III)
will restrain the effort of his mind, Le. (by schol., prop. 11, Part III) he who
hates wi 11 be affected painfully etc.; q.e. d.
Schol.

This pleasure can hardly be solid and wi thout any conflict of mind.

For (as I shall presently shew in prop. 27) so far as our mind imagines a being
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similar to itself to be affected with pain, so far it must suffer pain itself;
and the contrary, if it imagines the same being affected with pleasure.

But here

we are considering hatred only.
Prop. XXIV.

I f we imagine any person as the cause of pleasure to a being we hate,

we shall hate that person also.

If on the contrary we imagine him as the cause

of pain to the same being, we shall love him.
Oem.

This proposition is demonstrated in the same way as prop. 22, Part III.
These and similar emotions of hatred are referred to envy, which there-

Schol.

fore is nothing else than hatred, considered as disposing man to rejoi ce in the
evil that befals another and to be sorry for the good that befals another.
Prop. XXV.

We strive to affirm of ourselves or of the being we love what we imag-

ine as affecting us or the beloved being wi th pleasure; and on the contrary we
strive to deny that which we imagine as affecting us or the being we love wi th
pain.
Oem.

When we imagine the being we love affected with pleasure or pain, we our-

selves feel pleasure or pain (by prop. 21, Part III).

But the mind (by prop. 12,

Part III) strives as far as it can to imagine things which affect it pleasurably,
i.e. (by prop. 17, Part III and its coroll.) strives to contemplate them as present; and on the contrary (by prop. 13, Part III) it strives to exclude the existence of those things which affect it painfully.

Therefore, we strive to affirm

of ourselves and of the being we love every thing that we imagine as affecting us
or the beloved being pleasurably, and vice versa; q.e.d.
Prop. XXVI.

Of the object we hate we strive to affirm every thing that we imagine

as causing him pain, and on the contrary, we strive to deny that which we imagine as causing him pleasure.
Oem.

This proposition follows from prop. 23, as the preceding one follows from

prop. 21, Part III.
Schol.

From the foregoing proposi tions we see how it may easi ly happen that a

112
man thinks more highly of himself than is just, and, on the other hand, less highly
than is just of the being he hates.

This hallucination, in reference to the man

who thinks too highly of himself, is called pPide and is a species of insani ty, in
which a man dreams with his eyes open that he is capable of everything which his
imagination figures to itself, and he therefore contemplates these imaginary capaI

bili ties as reali ties, and exults in them, so long as he is free from the perceptions which exclude their existence and determine the extent of his power of action.
Hence pride is the pleasure a man feels from thinking more highly of himself than
is just.

The pleasure a man feels from thinking more highly than is just of anoth-

er I call esteem.

Lastly, the pleasure which arises from thinking less highly than

is just of another I call contempt.
Prop. XXVII.

From the fact that we imagine a being similar to ourselves and to-

wards whom we have hitherto felt nothing, to be affected wi th some emotion, we
shall be affected with a like emotion.
Dem.

The images of things are affections of the human body, the ideas of which

represent external bodies as present to us (by schol., prop. 17, Part II), i.e.
(by prop. 16, Part II) the ideas of which involve both the nature of our body and
the present nature of the external body.

I f therefore the nature of the external

body be similar to the nature of our own body, then the idea of the external body
which we imagine, involves an affection of our body similar to the affection of
the external body; and consequently, if we imagine a being similar to ourselves to
be affected wi th any emotion. this imagination expresses an affection of our body
similar to that emotion.

Therefore, from the fact that we imagine a being similar

to ourselves to be affected with any emotion, we are affected with a like emotion.
But if we hate the being similar to ourselves. so far (by prop. 23, Part III) we
shall be affected with a contrary emotion, not a similar one; q.e.d.
Schol. 1.

This imitation of emotions, in reference to painful ones, is called

corruniser>ation (concerning which see schol., prop. 22, Part III) but in reference
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Dem.

Whatever we regard as conducive to pleasure, we strive, as far as we can,

to imagine (by prop. 12, Part III), i.e. (by prop. 17, Part II) we strive, as far
as we can, to contemplate it as present or

as

actually existing.

Now the effort

or power of the mind in thOUght is equal, and simultaneous in nature with the effort of the body in action (as clearly follows from corolI., prop. 7 and corolI.,
prop. 11, Part II).

Therefore, it is our absolute endeavour that those objects

may exist or (what by schol., prop. 9 is the same thing) we desire and seek their
production; which was the first point to be demonstrated.

Next, if we imagine

that which we believe to be the cause of pain, i.e. (by schol., prop. 13, Part III)
that which we hate, to be destroyed, we feel pleasure (by prop. 20, Part III).
And therefore (by the first part of this dem.) we strive to destroy it or (by
prop. 13, Part III) to remove it from us, that we may not contemplate it as present; which was the second point to be demonstrated.
Prop. XXIX.

Therefore etc. q.e.d.

We try to do that which we imagine men* will look at with pleasure,

and on the contrary, we are averse to do that for which we imagine they will
dislike.
Oem.

From this alone, that we imagine men to love or hate something, we shall

also love it or hate it (by prop. 28, Part III), i.e. (by schol., prop. 13, Part
III) the presence of that thing will cause us pleasure or pain; and therefore (by
precede prop.) we strive to do what we imagine men will look at with pleasure etc.;
q.e.d.
Schol.

This effort to do or to omit something, solely in order that we may

please men, is ambition, especially when we so strive to please the thoughtless
vulgar that we do or omit something to our own injury or that of another; in other
cases it is hwnanity.

Further, the pleasure with which we imagine the action

* Here and in the succeeding propositions must be understood, men towards whom
we have hitherto felt no emotion. [Sp. note]
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whereby another has striven to please us, I shall call praise; and the pain produced in us by the actions towards which we have an aversion, I shall call blame.
Prop. XXX.

I f a person I does IIhas done I something whi ch he imagines wi 11 affect

others pleasurably, he will feel pleasure in .connection with the idea of himself as a cause; in other words he will contemplate himself with pleasure.
If, on the contrary, he has done something which he imagines will give pain to
others he will contemplate himself wi th pain.
Dem.

He who imagines othe'rs to be affected wi th pleasure or pain will (by prop.

I',,
\

27, Part,III), simply on that ground, himself feel pleasure or pain.
(by prop. 19 and 23, Part II) man is

cons~ious

But since

of himself through the affections

or impressions by which he is determined to action; it follows, that he who has
done something which he imagines will affect others pleasurably will be affected
with pleasure in connection with the consciousness of himself as a cause,. or, in
other words, will contemplate himself with pleasure; q.e.d.
Schol.

Since love (by schol., prop. 13, Part III) is pleasure accompanying the

idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain also uni ted wi th the idea of an external cause; it follows that the pleasure and pain indicated in the foregoing
proposition are species of love and hatred.

But as love and hatred relate to ex-

ternal objects, we shall designate the emotions in question by other names: When
the pleasure or pain arises from the fact that a man believes hi,msel f to be praised
or blamed, I I shall calli the pleasure accompanying the idea of an external cause
Iwe shall calli glory, and the corresponding pain I shall call shame.

Otherwise,

I shall call the pleasure accompanying the idea of an external cause, self-aontent-

ment, and the corresponding pain

~pentanae.

Since however (by coroll., prop. 17,

Part II) the pleasure with which anyone imagines others to be affected may be
only imaginary, and (by prop. 25, Part III) each strives to imagine of himself
everything which is likely to give him pleasure; it may easily happen, that the man
who is eager for glory is proud, and imagines himself agreeable to others when in
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fact he is odious.
Prop. XXXI.

If we imagine anyone either to love, desire, or hate something which

we ourselves love, desire or hate, we shall for that reason love, desire or
hate it wi th more cons tancy.

But if we imagine that whi ch we love to be repug-

nant to another, we shall fluctuate.
Dem.

On the ground merely that we imagine another to love something, we also

shall love it (by prop. 27, Part III).
we both love the same thing.

But apart from this, let us suppose that'

Love thus receives a new. impulse by which it is in-

tensified; and thus what we love, we shall love with more constancy.

Further, on

the ground that we imagine another to have an aversion towards some object,we
also feel aversion towards it (by the same prop.).

But if we suppose that at the

same time we ourselves love that object, we shall both love and hate it or (see
schol., prop. 17, Part III) our feelings will fluctuate; q.e.d.
Coroll.

From this and from prop. 28, Part III it follows, that each strives,

as far as he can, that every one else should love what he himself loves, and hate
what he himself hates; whence that saying of the poet:
Speremus pari ter, pari ter metuamus aman tes.
Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat.*
Scho!.

This effort that every one may agree with us in loving or hating what

we ourselves love or hate, is in fact ambition (see sebol., prop. 29, Part III);
and thus as we see, each man by nature desires that the rest should live according
to his 'mind.

Since, then, all men equally desire thjs, they are all equally in

each other's way, and while all are wishing to be praised or loved by all, they
become hateful to each other.
Prop. XXXII.

If we imagine anyone to delight in the possession of something

* Ovidii. amor. II. eleg. 19. v. 4, 5.
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from posse ssing it.
which can belon g only to one, we endea vour to preve nt him
<in> the posse ssion
Oem. Merely from this, that we imagine anyon e to delig ht
love that objec t, and
of an objec t (by prop. 27, Part III with corol 1.), we shall
imagi ne it to be opdesire to posse ss it ourse lves. But (by the hypot hesis) we
posse ssion of the
posed to this pleas ure, that the other shoul d rejoic e in the
that he may not posse ss
objec t. There fore (by prop. 28, Part III) we Shall strive
it; q.e.d .

ituted
We see there fore that the natur e of men is gener ally so const
enjoy , and (by prece d.
that while they pity those who suffe r, they envy those who
love the thing whi ch
prop. ) they do this with the great er hatre d, the ~re they
that the same prope rty
they imagi ne to be posse ssed by anoth er. We see furth er,
rs them eJ'lvious and
of human natur e which rende rs men comp assion ate, also rende
it teach es the same
ambit ious. And if we consu lt our exper ience , we find that
For we observ e that
concl usion s; espec ially if we attend to our earli er years .
brium , laugh and weep
boys, becau se their body is conti nuall y as it were in equili
else they see other s
solely becau se they see other s laugh and weep, and whate ver
elves every thing in which
do, they always wish to imita te, and they desir e for thems
s, as we have said, are
they imagi ne other s to delig ht; becau se the images of thing
human body is affec ted
the affec tions of the human body, or the modes in which the
Schol .

.
by exter nal cause s, and is dispo sed to this or that action
we strive as far as we
Prop. XXXIII. When we love a being simil ar to ourse lves,
can that it may love us in return .
Dem.
others

prefe rence to
The being we love we striv e as far as we can to imagine in
lves, we shall
(by prop. 12, Part III). If there fore the being is like ourse

Part III), in other
strive to give pleas ure to him pre-em inentl y (by prop. 29,
belov ed being may feel
Words, we shall striv e as far as we can to cause that the
schol ., prop. 13, Part
pleas ure in conne ction with the idea of ourse lves, i.e. (by
III) that he may love US; q.e.d .
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Prop. XXXIV.

The stronger the emotion which we imagine the being we love to feel

towards us, the more we shall glory in ourselves.
Oem.

We strive (by precede prop.) as far as we can, that the being we love may

love us in return, i.e. (by schol., prop. 13, Part III) that the being we love may
feel pleasure in

~onnection

with the idea of ourselves.

Hence the greater the

pleasure which we imagine the beloved being to have by means of us, the more is
that effort assisted, i.e. (by prop. 11, Part III with scho1.) the greater is the
pleasure we experience.

But when we rejoice because we give pleasure to a being

similar to ourselves, we contemplate ourselves with pleasure (by prop. 30, Part
III).

Therefore the stronger the emotion which we imagine the being we love to

feel towards us, the greater will be our pleasure in contemplating ourselves, i.e.
(hy schol., prop. 30, Part III) the more we shall glory in ourselves; q.e.d.

Prop. XXXV.

If we imagine the being we love united to another with the same or a

stronger bond of friendship than that which hitherto attached him exclusively
to us, we shall feel hatred towards the beloved being and envy towards our
rival.
Dem.

The greater the emotion which we imagine the being we love to feel to-

wards us, the more we shall glory in ourselves (by precede prop.), i.e. (by schol.,
prop. 30, Part III) the greater will be our pleasure; and hence (by prop. 28. Part
III) we shall strive. as far as we can, to imagine the beloved being united to us
by the strongest possible bond and this effort or desire is intensified if we
imagine that another has the same desire (ace. to prop. 31, Part III).

But this

effort or desire is here supposed to be frustrated by the image of the beloved object itself accompanied as i t is by that of the person to whom the beloved object
is tini ted.

Therefore (by schol., prop. 11, Part III) we shall feel pain in connec-

tion wi th the idea of the beloved object as a cause. and at the same time in connection with the image of another, i.e. (by scho!.

J

prop. 13, Part III) we shall

feel hatred towards the beloved object and at the same time towards the other who
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is our rival (by coroll., prop. 15, Part III) whom (by prop. 23, Part III), because
he possesses the beloved being, we shall envy;q.e.d.
This hatred towards the beloved being, united with envy, is jealousy,

Schol.

which consequently is nothing else than a fluctuation of feeling arising from the
simul taneous experience of love and hatred conjoined wi th the idea of a thi rd person who is envied.

Further, this hatred towards a beloved being will be greater

in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous subject was wont to feel in the
reciprocation of his love, and also in proportion to the emotion which he had felt

ill

towards the person with whom he imagines the beloved object to be united.

''I

III
ill

For if

he had previously hated him (by prop. 24, Part III), he will feel hatred towards
the beloved being because he imagines him as giving pleasure to one whom he hates;
and also (by coroll., prop. 15, Part III) because he is compelled to unite the
image of this hated object with that of the beloved being, a source of hatred
which occurs most frequently in love towards woman.

For he who imagines the wo-

man he loves, as giving herself to another not only feels pain because his own desire is frustrated, but also, because being obliged to connect the image of the
being he loves in the most intimate way with that of another, he feels disgust towards her.

Add to this, that the jealous man is not received by the beloved object

wi th the same mien as formerly; another source of pain, as I shall now show.
Prop. XXXVI.

He who remembers a thing which he once rejoiced to possess, desires

to possess it again under the same circumstances as when he first possessed it.
Dem.

Whatever a man has once seen associated wi th a thing which delighted him

will (by prop. 15, Part III) be accidentally a cause of pleasure; and thus (by
prop. 28, Part III) he will desire to possess it together with the thing he loved,
in other words, he will desire to possess this thing together with all the circumstances under which he first possessed it; q.e.d.
Coroll.
feel pain.

I f therefore anyone of these circumstances be absent, the lover will

ill
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Oem.

For so far as any circumstance is absent, so far he imagines something

which excludes the existence of that circumstance.

But since (by preced. prop.)

his love makes him desire that thing or circumstance, therefore (by prop. 19, Part
III) so far as this is absent, he will feel pain; q.e.d.
Schol.

This pain, arising from the absence of what we love is called regret.

Prop. XXXVII.

The desire which arises from pain or pleasure, from love or hatred

is strong in proportion as the originating passion is strong.
Oem.

Pain diminishes or restrains man's power of action (by schol., prop. 11,

Part III). i.e. (by prop. 7, Part III) diminishes or restrains the effort by which
man perseveres in his existence; thus (by prop. S. Part III) it is contrary to
this effort; and all the endeavour of a man who experiences pain is to remove that
pain.

Now (by the def. of pain) the greater the pain, the greater must be the pow-

er of action which man opposes to it.

Therefore, the greater the pain the greater

is the power of action with which man will strive to remove it, i.e. (by schol.,
prop. 9, Part III) the greater the desire or appetite with which he will strive to
banish pain.

Further, since pleasure (by the same schol., prop. 11, Part III) aug-

ments or assists man's power of action, it is easy to demonstrate in the same way
that the man who feels pleasure desires nothing else than to preserve it, and desires this the more strongly, the greater the pleasure.

Lastly, since love and

hatred are themselves impressions of pleasure or pain, it follows by the same mode
of deduction, that the effort. appetite or desire which arises from love and hatred
will be greater in proportion to the strength of these emotions.
Prop. XXXVIII.

If anyone has begun to hate the being he once loved.to the degree

of entirely extinguishing his love, his hatred will be greater than if he had
never loved this being, and it will be greater in proportion to his former love.
Oem.

If anyone begins to hate the being he loves, more of his desires will be

counteracted than if he had never loved this being.
Part III) is a pleasure which man, as far as possible

For love (by schol.. prop. 13,
(by prop. 28, Part III),
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conte mplat ing the belov ed
strive s to prese rve; namel y (by the same schol .), by
him pleas ure as far as posbeing as prese nt, and (by prop. 21, Part III) by giving
in propo rtion as the love is
sible; and this effor t (by prece d. prop. ) is great er
to love him in return
great er, as also is the effor t to cause the belov ed being
(see prop. 33, Part III).

ds
But these effor ts would be restra ined by hatre d towar

Part III).
the belov ed objec t (by corol l., prop. 13 and prop. 23,

There fore this

t him who has loved painf ully,
hatre d (ace. to scho! ., prop. II, Part III) will affec
er, i.e. to this pain which
and the more so, in propo rtion as the love had been great
g from the fact that he once
was the cause of hatre d will be added the pain arisin
with great er pain, i.e. (by
loved; and conse quent ly, he will contem plate the being
d towar ds him than if he had
schol ., prop. 13, Part III) he will feel great er hatre
to the forme r love; q.e.d .
never loved him, and the hatre d will be in propo rtion
Prop. XXXIX.

s he be withHe who hates any perso n, will try to injure him, unles

himse l f; and, on the other
held by the fear of a great er injury from him toward s
accor ding to the same rule.
hand, he who loves any perso n will try to do him good
to imagin e him as a
Oem. To hate anyon e is (by schol ., prop. 13, Part III)
hates anyon e, will try to
cause of pain; and thus (by prop. 28, Part III) he who
remove or destro y him.

same
But if he fears somet hing more painf ul or (what is the

attem pt, and thinks he can
thing) a great er evil to himse lf in conseq uence of this
ds the perso n he hates , he
avoid it by not inflic ting the injury he medit ated towar
n from inflic ting the injury ;
will (by the same prop. 28, Part III) desire to refrai
be stron ger than that by
and (by prop. 37, Part III) the motiv e to refra in will
there fore preva il, as we wishe d
which he is impel led to infli ct the injur y, and will
prop. pro~eds in the same
to prove . The demo nstrat ion of the secon d part of the
way.

There fore he who hates anyon e etc.; q.e.d .

whate ver condu ces to
By good I here under stand every kind of pleas ure and
of desir e. By evil I under it; princ ipally howev er that which satis fies any sort
ates desir e. For it has
Stand every kind of pain and princ ipally that which frustr
Schol .

nothin g becau se we have
been shewn (in schol ., prop. 9, Part III) that we desire
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judged it to be good, but, on the contrary, we call that good which we desire; and
consequently, that which we dislike we call evil.

Hence each judges or estimates

what is good or evil, better or worse, and best or worst according to his passions.
Thus, the miser thinks wealth the best thing, and poverty the worst.

The ambitious

man desires nothing so much as glory, and dreads nothing so much as shame.

To the

envious man nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing more
insupportable than another's happiness; and so every one, according to his ruling
passions judges anything to be good or bad, useful or useless.

Further, the passion

which disposes a man not to wish what he wishes, or to wish what he does not wish,
is tirrridity, which is nothing else than the passion that disposes a man to avoid a
greater evil which he foresees in the future by enduring a smaller evil.
28, Part III.

See prop.

Lastly, if the desire of avoiding a future evil be coerced by the

fear of another still greater, so that a man knows not what he would rather choose,
then fear becomes aonsternation, especially if one of the evils he fears be extremely great.
Prop. XL.

He who imagines that he is hated by another, and does not believe him-

self to have given any cause for this hatred, will feel hatred in return.
Dem.

He who imagines a person animated by hatred, will thereby be incited also

to feel hatred (by prop. 28, Part III), Le. (by schol., prop. 13, Part III) pain
associated with an external cause.

But (by the hypothesis) he imagines no other

cause of this pain than the person who hates him.

Therefore for the reason solely

that he imagines himself to be hated by another he will feel pain associated wi th
the idea of the person who hates him, or (by the sa~ schol.) he will· feel hatred
in return; q.e.d.
Schol.

If he imagines himself to have given just cause of hatred, then (by

prop. 30 and s chol., P art II I) he wi 11 fee 1 shame.
III) rarely occurs.

But this (by prop. 2S, Part

It may be added that this reciprocation of hatred can also

arise from the fact that hatred is followed by the effort to injure its object (by
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prop. 39, Part III).

He therefore who imagines himself hated by any person will

imagine that person as a cause of evil or pain to himself; and hence he will feel
pain or fear in connection wi th the idea of him by whom he is hated, i.e. he will
feel hatred in return, as we have said.
Coroll. [1.]

He who imagines himself hated by a being whom he loves, will ex-

perience a conflict of hatred and love.

For so far as he imagines himself to be

hated by the beloved being, he is determined (by preced. prop.) to the reciprocation of hatred.

But (by the hypothesis) he nevertheless loves that being.

There-

fore he will experience a conflict of hatred and love.
Coroll. 2.

If anyone imagines that a person towards whom he has previously

felt no kind of emotion, has been impelled by hatred to do him an injury, he will
immediately try to return that injury.

'I

"

Oem.

He who imagines any person to feel hatred towards him, will (by preced.

prop.) feel hatred in return and (by prop. 26, Part III) will try to remember and
(by prop. 39, Part III) to direct against this person, everything that can cause
him pain.

But (by the hypothesis) the first thing of this kind that he will imag-

ine is the injury inflicted on himself.

Therefore he will immediately try to re-

turn it.
Schol. 2.

The effort to injure one whom we hate is called anger; the effort to

return an injury is called revenge.
Prop. XLI.

If anyone imagines that he is loved by another, and does not believe

himself to have given any cause for this love (which by corol1., prop. 15 and
prop. 16, Part III may happen), [he] will feel love in return.
Oem.

This proposition is demonstrated in the same way as the preceding.

Schol. 1.

If he believes himself to have given just cause of love, he will glo-

ry (by prop. 30, P art I II with s cho1.); and indeed (by prop. 25, P art I II) this of-

ten happens.

We have shown (s chol. to preced. prop.) that the contrary occurs when

any onel imagines himself to be hated.

This reciprocal love, and the effort thence
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resulting (by prop. 39, Part III) to benefit one who loves us and who (by the same
prop. 39) has striven to benefit us, is called gratituds; and thus we see that men
are far more disposed to revenge themselves on others than to return their benefits.
Coroll.

He who believes himself loved by one whom he hates will experience a

conflict of love and hatred.

This is demonstrated in the same way as coroll. 1 of

preced. prop.
Schol. [2.]

If hatred prevail, he will try to inflict harm on the being by whom

he is loved; a state of emotion which is called orueZty, especially if he believes
that the person who loves him has given him no cause of hatred.
Prop. XLII.

He who, impelled by love or by the hope of glory confers a benefit on

another, feels pain if he sees that his benefit is received without gratitude.
Dem.

He who loves any being similar to himself, strives, as far as he can, to

cause that he may be loved in return (by prop. 33, Part III).

He therefore who

confers a benefit on another from love, does so from the desire that he may be
loved in return, i.e. (by prop. 34, Part III) from the hope of glory or (by sebo1.,
prop. 30, Part III) of pleasure; and thus (by prop. 12, Part III) he strives as far
as possible to imagine this cause of glory or to contemplate it as actually existing.

But (by the hypothesis) he is compelled to imagine something else, which ex-

eludes the existence of the above cause of glory.

There fore (by prop. 19, Part

III) he feels pain in consequence; q.e.d.
Prop. XLIII.

Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, but can be destroyed by

love.
Oem.

He who imagines that the person he hates, also feels hatred .towards him
\

will on that ground (by prop. 40, Part III) feel new hatred, the former (by hypothesis) remaining as before.

But if, on the contrary, he imagines that this person

loves him, he will (by prop. 30, Part III) so far as he imagines this, contemplate
himself wi th pleasure, and so far (by prop. 29, Part III) he will try to please
this person, i.e. (by prop. 40, Part III) he will try not to hate him or to cause
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be great er or less in prohim any pain; which effor t (by prop. 37, Part III) will
fore if it is great er than
portio n to the emoti on from whence it arise s. And there
prop. 26, Part III) to cause
that which arises from hatre d and which impel s him (by
will be exting uishe d by
pain to the being he hates , it will preva il, and hatre d
love; q.e.d .
Prop. XLIV.

utes itsel f inThe hatre d which is thorou ghly conqu ered by love transm

prece ded it.
to love; and the love is great er than if hatre d had not
of prop. 38, Part III.
Oem. The demo nstrat ion proce eds in the same way as that
pain, begin s to love,
For he who was wont to contem plate the being he hated with
pleas ure, and to this
and simpl y from this cause , viz. that he loves , he feels
., prop. 13, Part III) is
pleas ure which love involv es (see def. of love in schol
banis h the pain which haadded that which arises from the fact that the effor t to
is aided , the idea of him
tred involv es (as we have shown in prop. 37, Part III)
whom he hated accom panyin g this pleas ure as its cause .
cause him pain
Notw ithsta nding this J no one tries to hate any being or
ure; i.e. no one desire s to
for the sake of subse quent ly enjoy ing the great er pleas
for the sake of gettin g
incur a loss for the sake of recov ering it, or to be ill
endea vours , as far as he
well. For every one tries to prese rve his existe nce and
Schol .

can, alway s to avert pain.

If it were possi ble to conce ive that a man could desire

love towar ds him, it
to hate anoth er that he might afterw ard feel the great er
the great er the hatre d,
would follow that he would alway s desire to hate him; for
desire that hatre d might
the great er would be the love, and thus he would alway s
increa se more and more.

Accor ding to this rule a man would try to grow more and

ure from the resto ration
more ill that he might afterw ards enjoy the great er pleas
(by prop. 6, Part III) is
of healt h, and thus he would alway s try to be ill, which
absur d.
Prop. XLV.

ne him to hate
We shall feel hatre d towar ds a fellow being if we imagi

anoth er fellow being whom we love.

II
"
"

"

"
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Oem.
III).

For the being we love hates the one who hates him (by prop. 40, Part
And thus if we imagine anyone to hate the being we love; we from that

cause (by schol., prop. 13, Part III) imagine this beloved being to experience
pain and consequently (by prop. 21, Part III) we also experience pain, and this
painful impression will be associated wi th the idea of him who hates the beloved
being, as its cause, i.e. (by schol., prop. 13, Part III) we shall hate him; q.e.d.
Prop. XLVI.

If we have received pleasure or pain from any person belonging to a

class or nation different from our own, and if the idea of this person, tmder
the general name of his class or nation is associated wi th this pain or pleasure
as its cause, we shall love or hate not only the person himself but all other
persons of the same class or nation.
Oem.

The demo of this prop. is evident from prop. 16.

Prop. XLVII.

The pleasure which arises from imagining the being we hate is de-

stroyed or visited with any other evil, cannot exist without a degree of mental
pain.
Oem.

This is evident from prop. 27.

For so far as we imagine a being like our-

sel vesaffected painfully J so far we suffer pain.
Schol.

This proposition can also be demonstrated from the corollary of proposi-

tion 17, Part II.

For as often as we remember a thing, even though it does not

actually exist, we contemplate it as present, and the body is affected in the same
manner as if that thing were present.

Hence so far as man remembers the being he

hates, so far he is determined to the contemplation of an object which gives him
pain, and the image of the thing remaining, this det'ermination is indeed restrained
but not annihilated by the memory of other things which exclude the existence of
the former.

Thus man is happy only so far as this determination is restrained; and

hence it comes that this pleasure ariSing from the evil that befalls the being we
hate is repeated as often as we remember that being.

For, as we have said, when

the image of this being is .j::alled up, inasmuch as this image involves the exis tence
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it with the same pain as
of the being , it determ ines man to the conte mplat ion of
anoth er is tmi ted, which exwhen it existe d. But since to the image of this being
to pain is alway s restra ined,
cludes the existe nce of the forme r, this determ inatio n
as the image is repea ted.
and pleas ure is reviv ed; and this takes place as often
bering any past ill, and that they
It is from a like cause that men rejoic e in remem
For as long as they imagdelig ht to narra te peril s from which they are deliv ered.
arise s, but this is cotmt erine any peril , they contem plate it as future and fear
with this peril ever
acted by the idea of delive rance which has been assoc iated
to the sense of secur ity;
since they were rescu ed from it, and which resto res them
and thus they again re j oi ce •
Prop. XLVII I.

pain which
Love or hatre d, e.g., towar ds Peter is destro yed, if the

is 1Dlite d to the idea of
the latte r and the pleas ure which the forme r involv es
Peter is imagi ned not to
anoth er cause ; and eithe r will be dimin ished so far as
be the sole cause of eithe r.
Dem.

d, which see in
This is evide nt from the mere defin ition of love and hatre

schol ., prop. 13, Part III.

For pleas ure is called love towar ds Peter and pain

consi dered as the cause of
hatre d towar ds him, purel y on the gro1Dld that Peter is
r wholl y or in part remov ed,
this or that effec t. This gro1Dld there fore being eithe
annih ilated ; q.e.d .
the emoti on towar ds Peter will also be wholl y or in part
Prop. XLIX.

be great er,
Love or hatre d towar ds a being we imagi ne to be free must

whom we imagi ne to be
in both cases from the same cause , than towar ds a being
neces sary.
Oem.

I) be perce ived
The thing we imagi ne to be free, must (by def. 7, Part

throug h itsel f alone apart from other s.

I f there fore we imagi ne it to be the

13, Part III) for this reason
cause of pleas ure or pain, we shall (by schol ., prop.
d will be the highe st that
love or hate it, and (by preced e prop. ) our love or hatre
being who is the ca[u] se
can arise from the given emoti on. But if we imagi ne the
7, Part I) we shall imagi ne
of this emoti on to be neces sary, then (by the sarne def.
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it not as the sale cause of the same effect but as conjoined wi th others; and
therefore (by preced. prop.) the love and hatred towards it will be less; q.e.d.
Schol.

Hence it follows that men, believing themselves to be free, feel great-

er love or hatred towards eaCh other than towards other beings; and to this may be
added the imitation of emotions, concerning which see prop. 27, 34, 40 and 43,
Part III.
Prop. L.
Oem.

Any thing whatever can become by accident the cause of hope or fear.
This proposition is demonstrated in the same way as prop. 15, Part III,

which see together with schol., prop. 18, Part III.
SChol.

Things whiCh by accident are the causes of hope or fear, are called
<t,

good or evil omens.

In so far as these omens are the cause of hope or fear, they

are (by def. of hope and fear, sChol. 2, prop. 18) the cause of pleasure or pain,
and consequently (by coroll., prop. 15, Part III) we so far love or hate them, and
(by prop. 28, Part III) we strive either to employ them as means towards what we
hope for, or to remove them as obstacles and causes of fear.

Further from prop. 25,

Part III it follows that according to the constitution of human nature we easily
believe what we hope, and wi th difficulty believe what we fear and that our expectations in these cases are either more or less than is just.
superstitions by whiCh men are everywhere agitated.

Hence have arisen the

For the rest, I do not think

it worth while to explain here the fluctuations of the mind whiCh arise from hope
and fear, since from the mere definition of these emotions it follows that there is
no hope without fear and no fear wi thout hope (as I shall explain more at length in
the proper place); moreover since, so far as we hope or fear anything, we love or
hate it, it fOllows that whatever we have said of love and hatred, can be easily
applied to hope and fear.
Prop. Ll.

Different men can be affected in different ways by one and the same ob-

ject, and one and the same man can be differently affected by one and the same
object at different time&..
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Dem.

nal bodie s in
The human body (by post. 3, Part II) is affec ted by exter

many ways.

rently ; and
There fore two men can at the same time be affec ted diffe

Part II) can be diffe rently
thus (by ax. 1 after lemma 3, which see after prop. 13.
) the human body can be afaffec ted by the same objec t. Furth er (by the same post.
ly (by the same ax.) it can be
fected now in one way. now in anoth er; and conse quent
; q.e.d .
diffe rently affec ted by the same body at diffe rent times
Schol .

er Imayl hates ;
Thus we see how it may happe n that what one loves , anoth

and the same man may now
that what one fears . anoth er may not fear; and that one
forme rly feared . Again .
iove what he forme rly hated , and may now defy what he
what is good and what bad.
since every man judge s accor ding to his own emoti ons
Part III), it follow s that men
What is bette r and what worse (see schol .• prop. 39.
hence it comes that, when we
may vary in their judgm ents as in their emoti ons;* and
guish them merel y by the differ ence of their
co~are one man with anoth er, we distin
on. For examp le, I call him
emoti ons and call one man brave , anoth er timid , and so
and if besid es I obser ve
brave who despi ses an evil which I am accust omed to fear;
it those he loves is not imthat his desire to injure those he hates and to benef
ined I call him darin g.
peded by the fear of an evil by which I am usual ly restra
appea rs to me timid , and if
Again he who fears an evil which I am wont to despi se,
by the fear of an evil which canno t
I moreo ver observ e that his desir es are imped ed
forms his judgm ents accor ddeter me, I say that he is pusill animo us; and every one
of man and the variab lenes s of .
ing to the same rule. Since then such is the natur e
from his passio ns and the
his judgm ents; since man often judge s of thing s solely
and which there fore (by prop.
things which he believ es will cause pleas ure or pain
are often merel y imagi nary, -28, Part III) he endea vours to promo te or to remov e,
the uncer tainty of thing s,-not to speak of what I have shewn in Part II conce rning

of the divine intel li* That this can happe n althou gh the human mind is a part
gence , we have shown in prop. 17, Part II. [Sp. note]
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. we may easily conceive that man can often be the cause both of pain and pleasure
to himself, in other words may feel both pain and pleasure in connection with the
idea of himself as a cause.

And hence we may easily understand, what repentance

and self-contentment intrinsically are: namely, repentance is pain accompanying the
idea of oneself as a cause, and self-contentment is pleasure accompanying the idea
of oneself as a cause; and these emotions are extremely vehement, because men believe themselves to be free.
Prop. LII.

See prop. 49, Part III.

An object which we have previously seen at the same time with others,

or which we imagine to have nothing but what is common to many, will not be contemplated by us so long as one which we imagine to have something peculiar.
Oem.

When we imagine an object which we have seen together with other objects,

we immediately remember the latter also (by prop. 18, Part II.

See also schol.)

and thus we pass immediately from the contemplation of the one to the contemplation
of the other.

And the same rule applies to an object which we imagine to have

nothing but what is common to many.

For in this case we suppose that we contem-

plate nothing in it which we have not before seen in others.

But when we suppose

ourselves to imagine in an object something which we have never seen before, we imply that the mind, while it contemplates that object, has nothing within the sphere
of its memory into the contemplation of which it would necessarily pass from the
contemplation of the former.
of this peculiar property.
Schol.

And thus it is determined solely to the contemplation
Therefore, if we etc.; q.e.d.

This mental impression or imagination of something singular, so far as

it belongs to the mind alone, is called admiration or wonder; and if this is excited by an object we fear, it is calHed] consternation, because wonder at an evil
holds a man so suspended in the contemplation of the evil exclusively. so that he
is unable to think of other things by which he might avoid it.

But if that at

which we wonder be a man's prudence, industry or anything else of that kind, then
since we regard the said man as far surpassing us by his possession of this qualitY,
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a man's anger , envy etc. the
wonde r is called vener ation; where as if we wonde r at
prude nce, indus try etc. of
emotio n is called hot't'o t'. Furth er, if we wonde r at the
Part III) become great er,
a man whom we love, our love will thence (by prop. 12,
ion. In the same way we
and this love united to wonde r or vener ation we call devot
emoti ons united to admir ation;
can also conce ive hatre d, hope, confid ence and other
than are includ ed in the reand thus we could deduc e a great er varie ty of emoti ons
cei ved vocab ulary.

been deIt is evide nt indee d that the names of emoti ons have

sis.
ri ved rathe r from vulga r usage than from an accur ate analy
in the follow ing manTo admir ation is oppos ed contempt, which gener ally arises
by any perso n, or when at
nero When we see anyth ing admir ed, loved , feared etc.
thing which we admir e I atl ,
the first glanc e somet hing appea rs to be simil ar to a
.•
and prop. 27, Part III) this
love fear etc. (by prop. 15, Part III with its corol l.

.

also.
perce ption determ ines us to admir e, love, or fear it

But if on the presen ce

oblige d to deny of it every or more accur ate conte mplat ion of this objec t we are
then the mind by this
thing that can be a cause of admir ation, love, fear etc.,
consi derati on of those
presen ce of the objec t remai ns determ ined rathe r to the
where as, in the contr ary
quali ties whi ch it has not than of those whi ch it has;
princ ipally to think of the
case, the prese nce of the objec t determ ines the mind
ion spring s from the admir aquali ties which the objec t has. Furth er, just as devot
for what we hate or fear;
tion of what we love; so derisi on arises from contem pt
from wonde r at prude nce.
and scorn spring s from contem pt for folly , as vener ation
Prop. LIII.

, it exper iWhen the mind conte mplat es itsel f and its power of action

rtion as it imagi nes
ences pleas ure; and this pleas ure is the great er in propo
s.
itsel f and its power of action with great er distin ctnes
Oem.

body and the ideas
Man knows himse lf only throug h the affec tions of his

of these affec tions (by prop. 19 and 23, Part II).

When there fore the mind can

a highe r degre e of perfe ccontem plate itsel f, it is thereb y suppo sed to pass to
ure, and the more, in protion, i.e. (by scho1 ., prop. 11, Part III) to feel pleas
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portion as it can imagine itself and its power of action with distinctness; q.e.d.
Coroll.

This pleasure is more and more enhanced the more man imagines himself

praised by others.

For the more he imagines himself praised by others, the more

pleasure he imagines others as experiencing through himself as a cause (by schol.,
prop. 29, Part Ill) and thus (by prop. 27, Part III) he will experience the more
pleasure in association with the idea of himself; q.e.d.
Prop. LIV.

The mind strives to imagine those things alone which posit or affirm

its power of action.
Oem.

The effort or power of the mind is the essence of the mind (by prop. 7,

Part III).

But the essence of the mind affirms that alone who the mind is, and can

do; and not that whi ch the mind is not and cannot do.

And there fore its tri ves to

imagine that alone which affirms or posits its power of action; q.e.d.
Prop. LV.
Oem.

When the mind imagines its own impotence it feels pain.
The essence of the mind affirms that alone which the mind is. and can do,

in other words, it is the nature of the mind to imagine only those things which
posit its power of action (by precede prop.).

When therefore we say that the mind,

in contemplating itself, contemplates its impotence, we say nothing else than that
while the mind strives to imagine something which affirms its power of action, this
effort is impeded, or (by schol., prop. 11, Part III) the mind experiences pain;
q. e. d.

Coroll. 1.

This pain is enhanced if we imagine ourselves blamed by others;

which is demonstrated in the same way as coroll., prop. 53, Part III.
Schol.

This pain accompanying the idea of our imbecility is called humi Ii ty;

and the pleasure arising from the contemplation of ourselves is called self-love
or sel,f-aontentment.

This pleasure is repeated as often as man contemplates his

own virtues or his power of action, and hence it is that every one delights to narrate his own performances and to exhibit the powers both of his body and mind; a
,

tendency which makes men disagreeable to each other.

And from this again it fol-

133
24, and schol ., prop. 32.
lOWS, that men are by natur e envio us (see schol ., prop.
men, and are annoy ed by
Part III), or rejoic e in the iJI"ec ili ty of their fellow
their abili ty.

pleas ure
For as often as each iJllagi nes his own actio ns. he feels

the action s expre ss great er
(by prop. 53. Part III), and the IIOre, in propo rtion as
s, i.e. (acco rding to
perfe ction and as he iJllagi nes the. with great er distin ctnes
more he can conte mplat e them
what has been said in schol . I, prop. 40, Part II) the
iar~ Hence each rejoic es
as distin guish ed froll the action s of other s and as pecul
ing in himse lf which he demost in the conte mplat ion of himse lf when he sees anyth
gs to the lDlive rsal idea of
.nies of other s. But if what he affirm s of himse lf belon
and he will feel pain if he
a Dian or an anima l, his pleas ure will not be so great ;
men.
imagi nes that his action s are infer ior to those of other

This pain (by prop.

reting unfav ourab ly the
28, Part III) he will endea vour to reJlOve, eithe r by interp
ble his own. It appea rs,
action s of his fellow men, or by adorn ing as far as possi
envy, and their educa tion
there fore, that men are by natur e inclin ed to hatre d and
encou rages this tende ncy.

For it is the pract ice of paren ts to excit e their chil-

dren to virtu e solel y by the stimu lus of vani ty and envy.

But pel'ba ps it will be

the action s of other men.
objec ted, that we not infreq uentl y admir e and vener ate
ing corol lary.
In answe r to this objec tion, there fore. I add the follow
be not his equal .
Corol l. No one envie s the vi rtue of anoth er, if that other
schol ., prop. 13,
Envy is hatre d (see schol ., prop. 24, Part III) or (by
passio n by which man's power
Part III) pain, i.e. (by schol .. prop. 11. Part III) a
prop. 9, Part III) strive s
of action or his effor t is imped ed. But man (by schol ..
Dem.

actua l natur e. There fore
and desire s to do nothi ng excep t what can follow from his
or (what is the same thing )
man desir es to predi cate nothi ng of his power of action
alien to his own. And
his virtu e. which is prope r to the natur e of anoth er and
11, Part III) he canno t
thus his desir e canno t be thwar ted. i.e. (by scho! .. prop.
lf. and conse quent ly he canbe paine d by that which he obser ves in one lDllik e himse
not envy such a perso n.

But the case is di ffere nt wi th his equal , who is suppo sed
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to be of the same nature as himself; q.e.d.
Schol.

With reference therefore to what we have said in scholium, prop. 52,

Part III, namely that we venerate a man because we admire his prudence, forti tude
etc., it is to be tmderstood (as is evident from that proposition) that we imagine
those virtues as belonging peculiarly to him and not as common to our nature; and
thus we no more envy him for them. than we envy trees their height or the lion his
strength.
Prop. LVI.

There are as many species of pleasure, pain and desire, and consequent-

ly of every emotion which is composed of these (e.g. fluctuation of mind), or
which is derived from them (e.g. love, hate, hope, fear etc.) as there are species of objects by which we are affected.
Dem.

Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions which are composed of

them or derived from them, are passions (by schol., prop. 11, Part III); and (by
prop. 1, Part III) we necessarily experience them so far as we have inadequate
ideas, and (by prop. 3, Part III) only so far as we have such ideas; i.e. (see
schol. 1, prop. 40, Part II) we necessarily suffer so far only as we imagine, i.e.
(see prop. 17, Part II with its schol.) so far as we are affected with an emotion
which involves the nature of our own body and the nature of an external body.
Hence the nature of each passion must necessarily be so explained that it may express the nature of the object by which we are affected.

For example, the pleasure

which arises from A involves the nature of its object A, and the pleasure which arises from B involves the nature of its object B; consequently these two emotions
of pleasure are different in their nature, because they arise from different causes.
So also the emotion of pain which arises from one object is different in its nature
from the pain which arises from another cause; and the same is to be understood
concerning love, hatred, hope , fear, fluctuation of mind etc.

Thus there are nec-

essarily as many species of pleasure, pain, love, hatred etc. as there are species
of objects by which we are affected.
\

Again, desire is the essence or nature of
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every man, so far as we conceive him determined to any action by the given constitution of his nature.

(See scho1., prop. 9, Part III.)

Therefore, according as

every one is affected, from external causes, with this or that species of pleasure,
pain, love, hatred etc., Le., according as his nature is constituted in this or
that manner, so his desire must necessarily be of this or that character and the
nature of one desire must differ from that of another as much as the emotions di ffer from which those desires have arisen.

Therefore there are as many species of

desire, as there are species of pleasure, pain, love etc., and consequently (according to what has been already shown), as there are species of objects by which
we are affected; q. e. d.
Schol.

Among the species of passions, which (by precede prop.) are necessarily

very numerous, the most noted are luxury, drunkenness, libertinism, avarice and
anbi tion, which are nothing but forms of love or desire modified according to the
nature of their objects.

For by luxury, drunkenness, libertinism, avarice and am-

bition we lDlderstand nothing else than the immoderate love or desire of feasts,
drinks, women, riches and glory.

These passions, so far as we distinguish them

from others solely by the object to which they refer, have no contraries.

For tem":

peran ce, sobriety and chastity, which we are accustomed to oppose to gluttony,
drunkenness and libertinism, are not passions; they simply indicate the power of
the mind which patrols the passions.

For the rest, I cannot here explain the other

species of emotions (which are as multitudinous as the species of objects) nor, if
I could, is there any necessity for doing so.

For wi th regard to the end we have

in view, namely to determine the nature of the emotions and the power of the mind
to control them, it suffices to have a general definition of each emotion.

It suf;..

fices, I say, to lDlderstand the common properties of the mind and emotions, that
We may determine what kind and degree of power the mind has in moderating and restraining the emotions.

Hence although there may be a great difference between

this and that emotion of love, hatred or desire, e. g. between love towards chi ldren
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and love towards a wife, it is nevertheless unnecessary to ascertain these differ_
ences and to investigate more minutely the nature and origins of the emotions.
Prop. LVII.

The emotions of anyone individual differ from the emotions of anoth-

er, as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other.
Dem.

This proposition is evident from ax. I, which see after lemma 3,

prop. 13, Part II.

s~ol .•

Nevertheless we will demonstrate it from the definitions of

the three primi ti ve emotions.
All emotions resolve themselves into desire, pleasure or pain, as is evident
from the definitions we have given.

But desire is the very nature or essence of

each person (see its def., scho!., prop. 9, Part III)

j

therefore the desire of any

one individual differs from that of another as much as the nature or essence of the
one differs from the nature or essence of the other.

Further, pleasure and pain

are passions, by which the power or tendency of each to persevere in his existence
is increased or diminished, aided or restrained (by prop. 11, Part III and its
scho1.).

But by the effort to persevere in existence, so far as this refers both

to the mind and body, we understand appetite and desire (see scho1., prop. 9, Part
III)

j

therefore, pleasure and pain are desire or appe.ti te in so far as it is in-

creased or diminished, aided or impeded by external causes, Le. (by the same
scho1.) are the very essence or nature of every man.

And therefore the pleasure

or pain of anyone individual differs from the pleasure or pain of another, as much
as the nature or essence of the one differs from the nature or essence of the other; and consequently, the emotion of anyone individual differs etc.; q.e.d.
Scho!.

Hence it follows that the affections of animals which are . called irra-

tional (for after becoming acquainted wi th the origin of the mind. we cannot doubt
that brutes have emotions) differ from those of men as much as the brute nature
differs from the human nature.

Both the horse and man indeed are led by the desire

of procreation; but the one desire is equine, the other human.
tites of insects, fishes and birds respectively must differ.

So again the appeThus although every
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is, and enjoy s it; still
indiv idual lives conte nted with his natur e, such as it
g else than the idea or
that life with which each is conte nted and happy is nothin
rs from the joy of anoth er
soul of the indiv idual ; and hence the joy of one diffe
ce of the other . Lastl y,
as much as the essen ce of the one diffe rs from the essen
it follow s that there is
I observ e in passin g that from the prece ding propo si tion
examp le, and that of a phino compa rison betwe en the pleas ure of a drunk ard, for
as he is passi ve.
Thus much conce rning the emoti ons which belon g to man
emoti ons which belon g to him as
It remai ns for me to add somet hing conce rning the
losop her.

he is acti ve .
Prop. LVIII .

are other
Besid es the pleas ure and desire which are passi ons, there

dered as activ e.
emoti ons of pleas ure and desir e which belon g to us consi
, it feels pleas When the mind conte mplat es itsel f and its power of action
conte mplat es itsel f when it
ure (by prop. 53, Part III). Now the mind neces sarily
II). And the mind does conhas a true or adequ ate idea (by schol ., prop. 43, Part
prop. 40, Part II). There fore he has
ct~ive some adequ ate ideas (by schol . 2,
Dem.

Le. (by prop. 1, Part III)
pleas ure in propo rtion as he conce ives adequ ate ideas ,
so far as it has clear and·
in propo rtion as he is activ e. Next, the mind both in
strive s to perse vere in its
distin ct ideas and in so far as it has confu sed ideas
stand desire (by the same
existe nce (by prop. 9, Part III). But by effor t I under
havin g. clear intell igenc e,
schol .) . There fore desire belon gs to us consi dered as
.
i.e. (by prop. 1, Part III) consi dered as activ e; q.e.d
Prop. LIX.

as it is activ e,
Among all the emoti ons which belon g to the mind so far

ure or desir e.
there are none which do not resolv e thems elves into pleas
ure or pain, as is eviOem. All emoti ons resolv e thems elves into desir e, pleas
dent from the defin itions we have given of them.

But by pain we under stand that

restra ined (by prop. 11, Part
by which the mind' s power of thoug ht is dimin ished or
, its power of under stand III and schol .); and hence so far as the mind feels 'pain
or restra ined. There fore,
ing, i.e. of acting (by prop. 1, Part III) is dimin ished
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no emotion of pain can belong to the mind so far as it is active, but only emotions
of pleasure and desire, which (by preced. prop.) belong to the mind under that condition also; q.e.d.
Schol.

All actions which follow from emotions that belong to the mind so far as

it understands I .refer to strength of mind, which I distinguish into courage and
generosity.

By

courage I understand the desire by which every one strives to pre-

serve in his existence according to the dictate of reason simply.

By generosity I

understand the desire by which every one, according to the dictate of reason simply, strives to aid other men and unite them to him in friendship.

Thus those ac-

tions which have for their object the good of the agent only, I refer to courage,
and those which have for their object the good of another, I refer to generosity.
Temperance, therefore, sobriety and presence of mind in danger are species of courage; while modesty, clemency etc. are species of generosity.

And I believe that I

have now explained and traced to their primary causes the principal emotions and
fluctuations of the mind, which arise from the composition of three primitive emotions, pleasure, pain and desire.

From what has been said it appears that we are

affected by external causes in many ways, and that, like the waves of the sea agitated by contrary winds, we fluctuate in ignorance of the future and of our destiny.
I have shown I say only the principal conflicts of the mind, not all of them.

For

by the same method as has been employed above, we can easily shew that love is sometimes united to repentance, to disdain, to shame etc.

Nay, I think it must be clear

to all from what has been said, that the emotions can be compounded one with another in so many ways, and so many variations may thence arise, that it is impossible
to specify their number.

But for

my

purpose it suffices to have enumerated the

principal only; for an analysis of the rest, which I have omitted, would be rather
curious than useful.

Concerning love however, it remains to be observed, that fre-

quently when we obtain the thing we desired, the body through this fruition acquireS
a new condition in which it experiences new determinations; other images of things
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diffe rent imagi nation s and
are excite d in it, and the mind at once begin s to have
hing which grati fies our
differ ent desir es. For examp le, when we imagi ne somet
palat e, we desire to enjoy , i.e. to eat it.

But while we are thus enjoy ing it the

tion.
stomac h becomes full and the body enter s into a new condi

If there fore, the

the same food from its being
body being alread y diffe rently dispo sed. the image of
or effor t to eat it, the
in our prese nce, is contin ued and conse quent ly the desire
f to that desire oref new I const i tution n condi tion I of our body will oppos e itsel
forme rly desire d will be
fort, and conse quent ly the prese nce of the food which we
tedium . For the rest, I
odiou s to us; and this it is which we can disgu st and
the body, such as tremo r,
have omitt ed to speak of those exter nal affec tions of
kinds of emoti on, becau se they
palen ess, sobs, laugh ter etc. which accompany vario us
mind. Lastl y, there are
belon g to the body only and are witho ut relati on to the
the emoti ons; I shall , there certai n obser vation s to be made on the defin itions of
vation s I have to make on
fore, repea t the defin itions , in their order and the obser
anyon e of them I shall inser t inune diatel y after it.

Defin itions of the Emoti ons
that essen ce determ ined
1. Desir e is the essen ce of man, so far as we conce ive
to an action by any given affec tion.
9 of this Part, that
Expla n. I have said above in the scholi um to propo sition
that appet ite is the essen ce
desire is an appet ite attend ed with consc iousn ess; and
rve its own prese rvatio n.
of man, so far as it is determ ined to action s which stibse
recog nize no real differ ence
But in the same scholi um I have also intim ated, that 1
betwe en human appet ite and desir e.

For wheth er man be consc ious of his appet ite or

I might not appea r guilty of
not, the appet ite remai ns the same; and there fore that
ite, but so to define it that
tautol ogy, I have chosen not to expla in desir e by appet
name of appet ite, will, deevery tenden cy of human natur e which we signi fy by the
might indee d have said that
sire or impul se might be compr ehend ed in one term. I

t

•
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desire is the essence of man, conceived as determined to any action; but from this
defini tion (by prop. 23, Part II) it would not follow that the mind can be conscious of its desire or appeti te.

Hence that I might include the cause of this

consciousness, it was necessary (ace. to same prop.) to add: so far as it is determined to act by any given affection.

For by any affection of the human essence we

understand a certain state of th at essence, whether it be innate, whether it be conceived solely by the attribute of thought, or solely by the attribute of extension,
or lastly whether it be referred to both these attributes at once.
2. Pleasure is the transition of man from less to greater perfection.
3. Pain is the transition of man from greater to less perfection.
Explan. I say transition.

For pleasure is not that perfection itself.

If man

were bom wi th that perfection to which he passes, he would experience no emotion
of pleasure in its possession; and this appears more clearly from the contrary emotion of pain.

For that pain consists in the transition to a lower degree of per-

fection, but not in that lower degree of perfection itself, no one can deny, since
man is incapable of feeling pain so far as he possesses any degree of perfection.
Nor can we say that pain consists in the privation of greater perfection; for privation is nothing.

But the emotion of pain is something positive and can therefore

be nothing else than the process of passing to a lower degree of perfection, i.e.
a process by which man's power of action is diminished or restrained.
prop. II, Part III.

See schol.,

The definition of hilarity, titillation, malancholy, and bo-

dily suffering I omit, because they belong principally to the body and are simply
species of pleasure and pain.
4. Wonder is that state of mind in which we remain fixed in the imagination of
a particular object.

The mind remains fixed, because this single imagination has

no connection with any other.

See prop. 52, Part III with schol.

Explan. In the scholium to proposition 18, Part II we have shown what is the
cause why the mind passes immediately from the contemplation of one thing to the
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idea of another, namely, because the images of those things are so concatenated
and co-ordinated in our minds that the one follows the other.

Now this is incon-

ceivable when the image contemplated is new; for then the mind is detained in the
contemplation of that image until it is determined by other causes to think of
something else.

It is evident therefore that the imagination of a new object con-

sidered in itself is of the same nature as other imaginations, and for this reason
Ido not class wonder among the emotions, nor do I see any reason for doing so,
since this persistence of the mind arises from no positive caUse, which distracts
the mind from other things, but simply from the negation of any cause why the mind
should be determined to pass from the contemplation of one object to the thought of
another.

Hence (as I have intimated in schol., prop. 11, Part III) I acknowledge

only three primi ti ve or primary emotions, namely, pleasure, pain and desire; and I
have made special mention of wonder only because it is customary to give to emotions which are derived from these primitive ones, other names when they referlencel
to an object which excites wonder.

For the same reason I here add a definition of

contempt.
5. Contempt is the imagination of an object which produces so feeble an impres- '
sion on the mind, that the presence of this object leads us rather to think of what
it has not, than of what it has.

See schol., prop. 52, Part III.

I omit the definitions of veneration and disdain, because no, emotions, that I am
aware of, derive their names from these.
6. Love is pleasure accompanying the idea of an external cause.
Explan. This definition clearly enough explains the essence of love, whereas
that of the authors who define love as: the

win

to be united to the be~oved object,

expresses not the essence of love but one of its properties; and because the essence
of love has not been seen by authors with sufficient distinctness, they could have
no clear conception of its properties, which has rendered their definition of it,
as is generally admitted, very obscure.

But it must be observed that when I say the
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will to be united with the beloved object 'is a property of the being who loves, I
do not mean by

wi~Z

a consent of the mind, a deliberate purpose or a free decision

(for I have demonstrated this to be fictitious, prop. 48, Part II), nor even the
desire of being united with the beloved object when it is absent, or of continuing
in its presence (for love can be conceived without either the one or the other of
these desires); but by will I understand a satisfaction of the being who loves in
the presence of the beloved object, which strengthens or at least cherishes the
pleasure of him who loves.
7. Hatred is pain accompanying the idea of an external cause.
Explan. The observations to be made on hatred are easily inferred from what has
been said in explanation of the preceding definition.

See besides schol., prop.

13, Part III.
8. Inclination is pleasure accompanying the idea of any object which is by accident- a cause of pleasure.
9. Aversion is pain accompanying the idea of any object which is by accident a
cause of pain.

On this subject see schol., prop. IS, Part III.

10. Devotion is love towards one who excites our wonder (or admiration).
Explan. We have shewn prop. 52 that wonder arises from the novelty of an object.
If therefore it happens that we frequently imagine an object which we wonder at,
we cease to wonder at it; and thus we see that devotion easily sinks into simple
love.
11. Derision is the pleasure we derive from imagining in an object we hate something which excites our contempt.
Explan. So far as we despise the thing we hate, we negative its existence (see
schol., prop. 52, Part III) and therefore (by prop. 20, Part III) we feel pleasure.
But since we suppose that when a man derides anything he hates it, it follows that
this pleasure is not solid.

See schol., prop. 47, Part III.

12. Hope is an inconstant pleasure arising from a past or future thing concem-

143
ing the issue of which we are in some degree doubtful.
13. Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of a past or future thing,
concerning the issue of which we are in some degree doubtful.

See schol. 2, prop.

18, Part III.
Explan. From these definitions it follows, that there is no hope without fear
and no fear without hope.

For he who is in a s tate of suspense and doubts whether

his hopes will be fulfilled is supposed to imagine something which excludes the
:~

existence of what he hopes for, and therefore to feel pain (by prop. 19, Part III);

'.
m

.

:!:

consequently, he is supposed as long as he is in suspense, to fear that the event
may not occur.

On the other hand, he who is in fear, i.e. who doubts whether what

he hates will come to pass, imagines something which excludes the existence of what
he hates; and thus (by prop. 20, Part III) he feels pleasure inasmuch as he has
some hope that what he hates may not occur.
14. Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something past or future,
concerning which all cause of doubt is removed.
15. Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or future concerning
which all cause of doubt is removed.
Explan. Thus from hope arises security and from fear, despair, when all cause of
doubt is removed.

The reason of this is that man imagines a past or future object

as already existing and con temp 1 ates it as present; or that he imagines some other
objects or events which exclude the existence of that which inspired him with doubt.
For although we can never be certain of the occurrence of particular things (ace.
to coroll., prop. 31, Part II); it is nevertheless possible for us not to doubt of
their occurrence.

For when we have shown (see schol., prop. 49, Part II) that it

is one thing not to doubt and another to be certain; and thus it is possible that
from the image of something past or future we may be affected wi th the same pain or
pleasure, as from the image of something present, as I have shown in prop. 18, Part
III, which see with the scholium appended to it.

1
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16. Joy is pleasure accompanying the idea of something past which has happened
beyond our hopes.
17. Remorse is pain accompanying the idea of something past which has happened
contrary to our hope.
18. Compassion is pain accompanying the idea of an evil, which has happened to
another, whom we imagine to be like ourselves.

See schol., prop. 22 and schol.,

prop. 27, Part III.
Explan. Between compassion and mercy there seems to be no difference tmless
pemaps, that compassion relates to a single emotion, while mercy denotes the habit
of having such an emotion.
19. Approbation is love towards some one who has benefited another.
20. Indignation is hatred towards some one who has injured another.
Explan. These terms, I am aware, have a different meaning in ordinary usage.
But my intention is not to explain the signification of words, but the nature of
things, and to indicate these by words the ordinary signification of which is not
altogether repugnant to that in which I employ them; and it is sufficient for me to
state this once for all.

For the cause of these emotions see coroll. 1, prop. 27

and schol., prop. 22, Part III.
21. Over-estimation is an excessive valuation of a person arising out of love
towards him.
22. Depreciation is the tmdervaluing of a person out of hatred towards him.
Explan. Thus over-estimation is an effect or property of love, and contempt of
hatred; and hence over-estimation may be defined as 'love so far as it disposes man
to think more highly than is just of the being he loves, and on the other hand con-

.

tempt may be defined as hatred so far as it disposes man to think less highly than
is just of the thing he hates.

See on this subject schol., prop. 26, Part III.

23. Envy is hatred considered as causing man to feel pain from another's felicity. and pleasure from another'S misforttme.
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Exp1an. f.1ercy is generally regarded as the opposite of envy which therefore in
spite of the meaning of the word, may be defined thus:
24. Mercy (or benevolence) is love, so far as it causes a man to rejoice in the
good of another, and to grieve for the suffering of another.
Explan. Concerning envy see schol., prop. 24 and schol •• prop. 32. Part III.
The emotions of pleasure or pain which I have hitherto defined, are accompanied by
the idea of an external object as their cause either intrinsically or by accident.
I proceed to emotions which have for their cause something internal.
25. Self-contentment is pleasure arising from the contemplation of ourselves and
our power of action.
26. Humdlity is pain arising from the contemplation of our own weakness or imbecility.
Explan. Self-contentment is opposed to humility. so far as we understand by it
the pleasure arising from the contemplation of our power of action. But so far as
we understand by it pleasure accompanying the idea of an action, which we imagine
ourselves to have performed from the free decree of our minds, it is opposed to
repentance, which we thus define:
27. Repentance is pain accompanying the idea of an action, which we believe ourselves to have performed from free will.
Explan. The causes of these emotions we have shown in schol., prop. 51, Part III
and prop. 53, 54 and 55 with s chol.
Part II.

Concerning Free Wi 11 sees chol., prop. 35,

But here it must be noted further, that it is no wonder all actions which

are commonly called wicked are followed by pain and those which are called right,
by pleasure.

For it is easy to understand from what has been said above that this

depends chiefly on education.

Parents by blaming certain actions and frequently

reproving their children for committing them, and on the contrary by praising other
actions and persuading to their performance have caused emotions of pain to be connected wi th the former and of pleasure wi th the latter.

And this is attested
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by experience also.

For custom and religion are not alike to all; on the contrary,

what is sacred to some is profane to others, and what is held right by some is held
disgraceful by others.

Hence according as each is educated, he repents of an ac-

tion or glories in it.
28. Pride consists in thinking of oneself more highly than is just, out of self
love.
Explan. Pride, therefore. differs from over-estimation in this: that the latter
has reference to an external object, but pride to the man himself, who thinks of
himself more highly than is just.

As

over-estimation is an effect or property of

love, so pride is an effect or property of self-love. and may therefore be defined
as self-love or self-contentment, so far as it induces man to think too highly of
himself.

See schol., prop. 26. Part III.

To this emotion there is no contrary

since no one from hatred of himself thinks less highly of himself than is just.
Nay. more: no one thinks less highly of himself than is just when he imagines that
he is incapable of this or that.

For if a man imagines himself incapable of any

action, he necessarily imagines this, and his nature is consequently so disposed
that he really cannot do what he imagines himself 1.ID.able to do.

As

long as he im-

agines himself 1.ID.able to do this or that, so long he is not determined to its performance; and consequently. so long it is impossible to him to do it.

Nevertheless

if we attend to those things which depend on opinion alone, we may conceive it possible that a man should think less highly of himself than is just.

For it is pos-

sible that a man, in sadness contemplating his own imbecility, should imagine himself despised by all; when notwithstanding others think of nothing less than of
despising him.

Further a man may think less highly than is just of himself if he,

in the present, denies of himself something in relation to the future, of which he
is uncertain; for example. if he thinks that he cannot conceive anything wi th certainty and cannot form any but wicked or disgraceful desires and actions.

Lastly,

we may say that a person thinks of himself less highly than is just when we see
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by his equal s.
him from false shame not dare to do what is ventu red on
iation .
may oppos e this emoti on to pride and call it self-d eprec

Hence we

For as from self-

ed self-d eprec iation , which
conten tment may arise pride , so from humil ity may proce
we conse quent ly defin e thus:
less highl y than is just
29. Self- depre ciatio n consi sts in think ing of onese lf
owing to depre ssion of mind.
to pride ; but we then
Expla n. We are accust omed, howev er, to oppos e humi lity
we call him proud who glori attend more to their effec t than to their natur e. For
who narra tes nothi ng but his
fies himse lf too much (see scho! ., prop. 30, Part III)
who desire s to be prefe rred
own virtue s and of other s nothi ng but their defec ts,
magni ficenc e which belon g to
befor e all other s, and who assum es the impor tance and
call him huml e who often
those who are place d far above him. On the contr ary we
virtue of other s, who gives
blush es, who confe sses his own faults and dwell s on the
ut ornam ent. For the
way to every one, whose mien is modes t and his dress witho
are extrem ely rare. For
rest, these emoti ons of humil i ty and self-d eprec iation
(see prop. 15 and 54, Part
human natur e, consi dered in itsel f, strive s again st them
t and hunDl e are gener ally .
III); and accor dingly those who pass for the most abjec
the most ambit ious and envio us.
which we imagi ne to be
30. Glory is pleas ure accom panyin g the idea of an action
praise d by other s.
we imagi ne to be
31. Shame is pain accom panyin g the idea of an action which
blame d by other s.
30, Part III. But
Expla n. Conce rning these two passio ns see scho! . to prop.
shame and modes ty. For
here I must observ e that there is a differ ence betwe en
ed; where as modes ty is that
Shame is pain follow ing an action of which we are asham
shame ful action . To modes ty
dread of shame which preve nts a man from comm itting a
not an emoti on, .as I shall
is gener ally oppos ed impud ence, which howev er is in fact
I have alread y intim ated)
show in the prope r place : but the names of emoti ons (as
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depend less on their nature than on their usage in ordinary speech.

I have now

completed the definitions of emotions referable to pleasure and pain, and I therefore proceed to those which I refer to desire.
32. Regret is the desire or appetite to possess some object when this desire is
nourished by the memory of the object, and at the same time is c01.D1teracted by the
memory of other objects which exclude the existence of the former.
Explan. Mlen we remember any object, as I have already said, we are thereby disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were present; but this disposition or tendency is generally, when we are awake, restrained by the images of
other objects, which exclude the existence of the one we remember.

When therefore

we think of an object which has affected us with any kind of pleasure, we in consequence strive to contemplate it as present with the same emotion of pleasure; which
effort indeed is immediately impeded by the recollection of objects which exclude
the existence of the former.

Hence regret is in fact a pain which is the opposite

of that pleasure we experience from the absence of the object we hate (see schol.,
prop. 47, Part III).

But as the term regpet appears to refer to desire, I have

connected it with this emotion.
[3J3. Emulation is that desire of an object, which is generated in us by our
imagining that others have the same desire.
Explart. He who flies because he sees others fly, or who fears because he sees
others fear. or he who seeing that another is burning his hand. draws in his own
hand and moves his body as if he himself were burnt, imitates. we say. the action
of another. but we do not say that he emulates it; not because we know that there
is one cause of emulation and another of imitation. but because it is customary to
apply the epithet emulous only to a person who imitates what is honourable, useful
or agreeable.

Concerning the cause of emulation see prop. 27. Part III with schol.

Why envy is frequently united with this emotion. see prop. 32, Part III with schol.
34. Gratitude is that desire or impulse of love by which we strive to benefit
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one, who from a similar impulse of love has benefited us.

See prop. 39 with schol.,

prop. 41, Part III.
35. Benevolence is the desire to do good to one Iwhom we pitylltowards whom we
feel compassionl.

See schol., prop. 27, Part III.

36. Anger is the desire which incites us to do harm to one whom we hate.

See

prop. 39, Part III.
37. Revenge is the desire of inflicting an injury on one who from hatred has inflicted an injury on us.
38. Cruelty is the desire by which anyone is incited to injure an object of our
love or pi ty •
Explan. To cruelty is opposed clemency J which is not a passion but a power of
the mind by which man governs his anger or revenge.
39. Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil which we fear by incurring a
smaller one.

See schol., prop. 39, Part III.

40. Audacity is the desire by which anyone is incited·to an action involving
danger which his equals fear to incur.
41. Pusillanimity is predicated of one whose desire is impeded by a danger
which his equals brave.
Explan. Hence pusillanimity is nothing else than the fear of some evil which is
not feared by the majority; and therefore I do not number it among the emotions of
desire.

Nevertheless I have explained it here, because in relation to desire, pu-

sillanimity is in fact opposed to audacity.
42. Consternation is predicated of one whose desire to avoid an evil is counteracted by astonishment at the evil which he fears.
Explan. Consternation is therefore a species of pusillanimi ty.

But since con-

st,ernation arises from a double fear, it can be more conveniently defined as fear
which so holds a man in stupefaction or fluctuation that he is unable to avert the
threatening evil.

I say stupefaction so far as we lU'lderstand that his desire to

ISO

avert an evil is counteracted by astonishment.

I say fluctuation so far as we Con_

ceive the same desire counteracted by the fear of another evil which equally tor_
ments him: whence it comes that he knows not which of the two to avert.
subject see sellal.

t

prop. 39 and scha!.. prop . 52, Part III.

On this

Concerning pusilla-

nimity and audacity see schal., prop. 51, Part III.
43. Humanity or modesty is the desire to do what pleases men., and to avoid what
displeases them .
44. AnDition is the immoderate desire of glory.
Explan. Ambition is the desire by which all passions (by prop. 27 and 31, Part
III) are cherished and strengthened; and consequently this passion can hardly be

overcome.

For as lanK as a man is in subjection to any desire, he will necessarily

be in subjection to this also.
tible to the desire of glory.
conte~t

"The best men," says Cicero,· "are the most suscep_
The very Philosophers who write treatises on the

of glory, inscrib-e their name on the title page etc."

45. Luxury is the immoderate desire or love of banquetting.
46. Drunkenness is the immoderate desire or love of drinking .
. 47. Avarice is the immoderate desire or love of riches.
48. Libertinism is also the immoderate desire or love of sexual intercourse.
Explan. Whether this desire be moderate or not, it is usually called libertinism.
These five passions (as I have intimated in schol.. prop. 56) have no contraries.
For modesty is a species of anbition (see schol., prop. 29, Part III).

Again, tem-

perance. sobriety and chastity indicate, as I have already said, a power of the
mind, and not a passion .

And although it is possible that the avaricious, the am-

bitious or the timid man may abstain from excessive eating, drinking and sexual intercourse, still avarice, ani>ition and timidity are not the contraries of luxury,
ebriety and libertinism.

For the avaricious man is generally glad to feast at oth-

• Vid. Cic. pro archia cap. XI.

Conf. Tuscul. disput. T. cap. XV.
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er men's expense.

The arrbitious man, too, provided he hopes for secrecy, will put

no restraint on himself, and if he lives amongst the intemperate and the voluptuOUS,

his ambition will incline him the more to those vices.

does what he would rather not do.

The timid man often

The avaricious man for the sake of saving his

life will throw his riches into the sea, but he nevertheless remains avaricious;
the libertine is perhaps sad because he is unable to pursue his wonted manner of
life, but he does not therefore cease to be vOluptuous.

And, in general, these

passions do not consist so. much in the act of eating, drinking etc. as in the appeti te and love for such indulgences.

Hence nothing can be opposed to these passions

except generosity and courage, concerning which see what follows.
I omit the definitions of jealousy and the other fluctuations of the mind, both
because they arise from the blending of passions which I have already defined, and
because many of them have no name, which proves that for practical purposes it is
sufficient to know them in general.

For the rest, from the definitions of the emo-

tions which we have given it is evident that they all arise from desire, pleasure
and pain, or rather that there are but these three emotions, each of which is commonly called by various names on aCC01.mt of its various extrinsic relations.

If,

then, we bear in mind these primi ti ve emotions together with what we have said above concerning the nature of the mind, we shall be able to define the emotions in
general, so far as they relate to the mind, in the following manner.

General Definition of the Emotions

An emotion,· passion, or

pathema animi, is a confused idea by which the mind af-

firms of the body or any part of the body, a greater or less power of existence
than before; and which idea, being given, the mind is determined to one thought
rather than another.
Explan. I say, first, that an emotion or passion is "a confused idea."

For
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we have shown (prop. 3, Part III) that the mind is passive in so far alone as it
has inadequate or confused ideas.

I say further that by an emotion or passion the

mind "affirms of the body or some part of it a greater or less power of existence
than before."

For all the ideas of bodies which we possess, indicate rather the

actual condition.of our own body (by coroll. 2, prop. 16, Part II) than the nature
of an external body; and the idea which constitutes the form of a passion, must
indicate or express I thellthatl condition which the body or one of its parts derives
from the fact that its power of action or of existence is increased or diminished,
aided or restrained.

But it is to be observed when I say "a greater or less power

of existence than before," I do not tulderstand that the mind compares the present
state of the body with a past state, but that the idea which constitutes the form
of a passion, affirms something of the body which involves more or less reality
than it before possessed.

And since the essence of the mind consists in this (prop.

12 and 13, Part II)--that it affirms the actual existence of the body, and since
by the perfection of a thing we tulderstand its essence; it follows, that the mind
passes from a lower to a higher degree of perfection when it happens to affirm of
the body or any part of the body some thing which involves more reality than it
heretofore possessed.

When therefore I said above, that the mind's power of action

is increased or diminished, I meant nothing else than that the mind forms an idea
of the body or of some part of it which expresses more or less reality than it had
previously affirmed of the body.

For the superiority of ideas and the actual pow-

er of thinking are estimated according to the superiority of the ob jects which
thought embraces.

Lastly, I added: "which idea being given the mind is determined

to one thought rather than to another" in order that besides the nature of pleasure
and pain whi ch I explain in the first part of the definition, I mi gh t also express
the nature of desire.

Part IV
On the Servitude of Man and on the Power of the Passions

Preface

The inability of man to govern and restrain his passions I call servitude.

For

when man is subject to passions he is not in his own power, but in the power of
. destiny, so that he is often compelled, even while seeing the better, to follow the
worse.

I propose in the present Part to shew the cause of this servitude, and also

to consider what else there is of good and evil in the passions.

But before I be-

gin, it is desirable to say a few words on perfection and imperfection, on good and

evil.
When anyone has resolved to make something and has completed it, not only he
himself, but every one else who truly knows, or believes that he knows, the mind
and intention of the author of that work, will pron01,mce it to be perfect.

For

example, if we see a structure (which I suppose to be not yet complete) and know
that the object of the architect is to build a house, we say the house is imperfect;
and on the contrary we say it is perfect as soon as we see it carried out so as to
fulfil the end for which the architect had designed it.

But if we see a work. un-

like anything we have seen before, and are unacquainted with the mind of the author,
then assuredly we cannot know whether the work be perfect or imperfect.
seems to have been the primary signification of these words.

And this

But after men began

to form universal ideas, and to conceive types of houses, edi fices, towers etc. and
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to prefer some types of things to others, the result was, that each called that
perfect which appeared to be in accordance with the \.D1i versa1 idea he had formed of
any particular kind of thing, while each pronounced imperfect what appeared less in
accordance with the type he had conceived, although according to the opinion of the
author it might be thoroughly complete.

And it is apparently for the same reason

that natural things, such as are not made by human hands, are commonly called perfect or imperfect; for men are wont to form \.D1iversal ideas of natural as well as
of artificial things, and these \.D1i versal ideas they regard as the archetypes or
models of things.

Moreover, supposing that Nature does nothing save for the sake

of some end, they imagine that it contemplates these \.D1iversal ideas and proposes
them to itself as archetypes.

When therefore they see anything come into existence

in Nature, which is not altogether in accordance with the type or model which they
have conceived of that kind of object, they believe that Nature itself has failed
or erred, and has left the thing in question imperfect.

Thus we see that men are

wont to call natural things perfect or imperfect more from prejudice than from a
true knowledge of those things.

For we have shown in the appendix to Part I that

Nature does not act for the sake of an end; since that eternal and infinite being
whom we call God (or Nature) acts by the same necessity whereby he exists.
shown that he both exists and acts by the same necessity of his nature.
16, Part I.

We have

See prop.

Hence the reason or cause why God (or Nature) acts and why he exists

is one and the same.

As therefore he exists for the sake of no end, he acts for

the sake of no end: his action, as well as his existence, has no gro\.D1d of commencement and no end which is related to it as a motive.

What is called a final

cause is nothing else than a human desire considered as the originating principle
or primary cause of anything.

For example, when we say that habitation was the

final cause of this or that house, we mean nothing else than that a man, because
he imagined to himself the conveniences of domestic life, had a desire to build a
house.

Hence habitation, considered as a final cause, is nothing more than this
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particular appetite or desire, which in fact is the efficient cause; and this men
consider as the primary cause, being commonly in ignorance as to the causes of
their appetites.

For, as I have already often said, they are indeed conscious of

their actions and desires, but ignorant of the causes by which they are determined
to the desire of this or that object.

As to the vulgar notion that Nature some-

times fails or makes a mis take, and produces imperfe ct things, I maber it among
the fictions of which I have spoken in the appendix to the First Part.
and imperfection, therefore,

are

Perfection

in fact merely modes of thinking, or notions,

which we form from comparing together individuals of the same species or genus.
And for this reason I have said (def. 6, Part II) that by pel'fection and mality I
mderstand the same thing.

For we are accustomed to refer all the individuals in

nature to one genus which we call the highest genus; namely, to the notion of a being which belongs absolutely to all the individuals in nature.

Now in referring

the. indi'viduals in nature to this genus, and comparing them together, we perceive
some to have more being or reality than others, and hence we say that some are more
perfect than others.

Again, if we attribute to them anything which involves nega-

tion, as a limit, a term, a certain incapability, we call them imperfect, because
they do not affect our minds equally with those which we call perfect, not that
they are deficient in anything which properly belongs to them or that Nature has
made a mistake.

For nothing belongs to the nature of a thing" but that which fol-

lows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause; and whatever follows
from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause is necessarily what it is.
As

to good and BviL, they also indicate nothing posi ti ve in things considered in

themselves, and are simply modes of thought or notions which we form from a comparison of individuals.
and indifferent.

For one and the same thing can be at the same time good, evil

For example, music is good to the melancholy, evil to those who

are in deep distress, and to the deaf neither good nor evil.
the fact be so, we must retain these words.

Nevertheless, though

For since we desire to form the idea
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of a man, which we may contemplate as an exemplar of human nature, it will be useful to us to retain these words in the sense I have mentioned.

By good therefore

I shall understand in the succeeding propositions, that which we certainly know to
be a means of approaching nearer and nearer to that exemplar of human nature which
we propose to ourselves; by evil I shall understand that which we certainly know to
be an impediment to our attaining that exemplar.

Further, we shall call men more

or less perfect in proportion as they more or less approach the same exemplar.

For

it is to be noted, first, that when I say anyone passes from a lower to a higher
degree of perfection, and the contrary, I do not understand that he is changed from
one essence or form into another (the horse for example would be equally destroyed
whether he were changed into a man or an insect); but I understand that we conceive
his power of action, so far as this is comprehended in his nature, to be increased
or diminished.

Lastly, by perfection I understand, as I have said, rea"Lity, i.e.

the essence of anything whatever, in so far as it exists and acts in a certain manner, without regard to its duration.

For no single thing can be said to be more

perfect because it perseveres longer in its existence; since the duration of things
cannot be determined by their essence, because the essence of things involves no
certain and determinate existence, but every thing, whetheT it be more or less perfect, can, by the same power whereby it began to exist, always persevere in existence, so that all are equal in this respect.

De fini tions

1.

By good I understand that which we certainly know to be useful to us.

2.

By evil I understand that of which we certainly know that it hinders us from

participating in some good.
On these def. see the preceding Preface near the end.

3.

I call individual things contingent so far as that while we attend to their
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essence alone we find nothing which either necessarily posits their existence or
necessarily excludes it.
4.

I call individual things possible so far as that while we attend to the

causes by which they may be produced, we do not know whether these causes may be
deterndned to produce them.
In schol. 1, prop. 33, Part I I have made no distinction between possible and
contingent, because in that place there was no need for accurately distinguishing
them.
S.

By aontrary erootions I \D1derstand. in the succeeding propositions, those

emotions which draw men different ways. although they are of the same kind, as
luxuty and avarice which are species of love,--and are not contraty by nature, but
by accident.
6.

What I lD1derstand by erootion oonaeming a future, present, or past objeat,

I have explained in schol. 1 and 2, prop. 18, Part Ill, which see.
But it is further to be noted here, that distance in time as in space can be
distinctly imagined by us only within certain limits; i.e. as all those objects
which are more than two hlD1dred feet distant from us, or the distance of which from
the place where we are exceeds what we can distinctly imagine, are imagined by us
as equally distant from us and as being in the same plane; so also objects the period of whose existence we suppose to be removed from the pres.ent by a longer interval than we can distinctly imagine, are imagined by us as equally distant from
the present, and are referred by us as it were to the same moment of time.
7.

By an end for the sake of which we do something I understand an appetite.

8.

By virtUE and p01JJer I lD1derstand the same thing: i.e. (ace. to prop. 7, Part

III) virtue is the very essence or nature of man. in so far as he has the power of
doing certain things which can be lD1derstood by the laws of his nature alone.
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Axiom

There is no individual thing in nature which. may not have another above it
stronger and more powerful.

Rather, anything whatever being given, there is also

given another thing more powerful by which the former may be destroyed.

Propos i tions

Prop.!.

Nothing positive in a false idea is nullified by the presence of the true,

as true.
Oem.

Falsity consists solely in that privation of knowledge which. inadequate i-

deas involve (by prop. 35, Part II) and these have nothing positive on account of
which they are called false (by prop. 33, Part II); on the contrary, in so far as
they belong to God, they are true (by prop. 32, Part II).

If therefore what is

positive in a false idea were nullified by the presence of the true, as such, a
true idea would be nullified by itself, which (by prop. 4, Part III) is absurd.
Therefore etc. q.e.d.
. Schol.
Part II.

This proposi tion is more clearly unders tood from coroll. 2, prop. 16,
For an imagination is an idea which indicates rather the actual constitu-

tion of the hunan body than the nature of an external body, not indeed distinctly,
but confusedly; whence it comes that the mind may be said to err.

For example,

when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be about two hundred feet distant from
us, and we are deceived in this so long as we are ignorant of its true distance.
The distance once known, the error is indeed removed, but not the imagination, i.e.
the idea of the sun which expresses its nature so far as our own body is affected
by it; and thus, although we may know the true distance, we shall nevertheless

timte to imagine the

S\Bl

to be near to us.

3S J Part II, we do not imagine the

Stm

aon-

For, as we have said in schol., prop.

to be near us because we are ignorant of its
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true distance, but because the mind conceives the magnitude of the sun in so far

as

the sun affects the body.

So, when the rays of the sun falling on the surface

of water, are reflected to our vision, we imagine them as being actually in the
water, although we know their true place.

And so other imaginations by which the

mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural constitution of the body or an
increase or diminution of its power of action, are not contrary to the truth, and
do not vanish in its presence.

I t does indeed happen that when we are tmder the

influence of a false fear, this fear vanishes when we have heard true tidings; but
it also happens that when we fear an evil which will certainly come, our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings.

And thus imaginations do not vanish in the pres-

ence of truth as such, but because other stronger imaginations supervene, which exclude the present existence of the things previously imagined; as we have shown,
prop. 17, Part II.
Prop. II.

We suffer in so far as we are a part of Nature, which cannot be con-

ceived by itself in abstraction from other parts.
Dem.

We are said to suffer when something arises in us of which we are only the

partial cause (by def. 2, Part III), i.e. (by def. 1, Part III) something which
cannot be deduced from the laws of our nature alone.

Therefore we suffer in so far

as we are a part of nature which cannot be conceived by itself in abstraction from
other parts; q.e.d.
Prop. III.

The power by which man perseveres in existence, is limited, and is in-

fini tely surpassed by the power ..of external causes.
Dem.

This is evident from the axiom.

For man being given, there is alsogi ven

something else, suppose A, more powerful, and A being given, there is further given
another, suppose 8, more powerful than A itself, and so on in infinitWTI.

Therefore

the power of man is limited by the power of another being, and it is infinitely
SUrpassed by the power of extemal causes; q.e.d.
Prop. IV.

It is impossible that man should not be a part of Nature and should suf-
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fer no other changes than those which can be understood by means of his own
nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause.
Dem.

The power whereby each individual thing, and consequently

man,

preserves

his being, is (by coroll., prop. 24, Part I) the power of God (or Nature), not in
so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained by the actual essence
of human nature (acc. to prop. 7, Part III).

Hence the power of man, in so far as

it is explained by his actual essence, is a part of the infinite power, i.e. essence
(by prop. 34, Part I) of God or Nature.

This was the first point to be proved.

Next, if it were possible that man should suffer no changes but such as can be understood by means of his nature alone, it would follow (by prop. 4 and 6, Part III)
that he could not perish but would always necessarily exist.

And this must follow

from a cause, the power of which is either finite or infinite; namely, either from
the power of man alone, who would then be able to keep aloof from himself other
changes, which might arise from external causes; or from the infinite power of Nature, by which all individual things would be so directed, that man could suffer no
changes except such as subserve his preservation.

But the former supposition (by

preced. prop., the demonstration of which is tmiversal and can be applied to all
individuals) is absurd.

Therefore, if it were possible that man should suffer no

changes but such as could be \D1derstood by means of his nature alone, and consequently (as we have just shown) that he should always necessarily exist, this must
follow from the infinite power of Godj and consequently (by prop. 16, Part I) it
must be deduced from the necessity of the divine nature, so far as it is affected
by the idea of anyone man, --from the order of tmi ve'rsal Nature, so far as this is
conceived under the attributes of extension and thought.

And thus (acc. to prop.

21, Part I) it would follow that man is infinite, which (by the first part of this
demonstration) is absurd.

It is therefore impossible that man should suffer no

other changes than those of which he is the adequate cause; q.e.d.
Coroll.

Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always liable to passions,
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that he follows the common order of nature, obeys it and accomodates himself to it
as much as the nature of things demands.
Prop. V.

The power and increase of any passion and its perseverance in existing

are not determined by the power with which we ourselves strive to persevere in
existence, but by the relation between the power of an external cause and our
own power.
Oem.

The essence of a passion cannot be explained by our own essence alone (by

def. 1 and 2, Part III), i.e. (by prop. 7, Part III) the power of a passion cannot
be determined by the power with which we strive to persevere in our existence; but
(as has been shown, prop. 16, Part II) must necessari ly be determined by the relation that the power of an external cause bears to our own power; q.e. d.
Prop. VI.

The power of any passion or emotion may predominate over the other ac-

tions or power of a man, so that the emotion may pertinaciously adhere to him.
Dem.

The power and increase of any passion, and the degree in which it perse-

veres in existence, is determined by the relation between the power of an external
cause and our own power (by precede prop.); and therefore (by prop. 3, Part IV) the
power of any passion can predominate etc.; q.e .d.
Prop. VII.

An emotion can nei ther be res trained nor des troyed except by aeon trary

and stronger emotion.
Dem.

An emotion, so far as it belongs to the mind, is an idea by which the mind

affirms of its body a greater or smaller power of existence than before (ace. to
the gen. def. of emote which will be found at the end of Part III).

When therefore

the mind is agitated by any emotion, the body is at the same time affected by
change which increases or diminishes its power of action.

Further, this affection

of the body (by prop. 5, Part IV) receives from its cause the power of persevering
in its existence; and consequently it can neither be restrained nor destroyed except by a corporeal cause (ace. to prop. 4, Part III), which originates in the body
a contrary (by prop. 5, Part III) and stronger affection (by ax., Part IV).

And
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'therefore (ace. to prop.

12~

Part II) the mind is affected by the idea of a corpo-

real affection contrary to, and stronger

than~

emot.) the mind mdergoes an emotion contrary

former~

the
to~

i.e. (by gen. def. of

and stronger than.the former. and

which excludes or destroys the existence of the former.

Therefore, an emotion can

nei ther be destroyed nor restrained except by a contrary and stronger emotion; q.e.d.
Coroll.

mind~

An emotion so far as it belongs to the

can neither be restrained

nor destroyed. except by the idea of an affection of the body contrary to
... and
stronger than the affection we are experiencing.

For an emotion which we are ex-

perienci!1g can nei ther be res trained nor des troyed except by a stronger and a contrary emotion (by precede prop.). i.e. (by gen.def. of emot.) except by the idea
of an affection of the body stronger than the affection we are experiencing and
contrary to it.
Prop. VIII.

The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else than the emotion of

pleasure or
Oem.

pain~

so far as we are conscious of that emotion.

We call that good or evil which is favourable or mfavourable to the pres-

ervation of our being (by def. 1 and 2, Part

IV)~

i.e. (by prop. 7, PaTt III),

which increases or diminishes. aids or restrains our power of action.
therefore (by def. of pleasuzoe and pain. see schol.

~

prop.

11~

So far

Part III) as we per-

ceive anything to affect us with pleasure or pain, we call it good or evil; and
thus the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else than the idea of pleasure and
pain which follows necessarily from the very emotion of pleasure or pain (by prop.
22, Part II).

But this idea is mi ted with the emotion in the same way as the mind

is mited with the body (by prop. 21, Part II), i.e.' (as I have shown in the scho1.
to the same prop.) this idea is in fact not

distinguished~

save in our conception,

from the emotion itself, or (acc. to gen. def. of emot.) from the idea of an affection of the body.

Therefore this knowledge of good and evil is nothing else than

the emotion i tse If so far as we are cons cious of it. q. e. d.
Prop. IX.

An emotion the cause of which we imagine present to us, is stronger than
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if we imagined the" cause not present.
Oem.

An imagination is an idea by which the mind contemplates a thing as pres-

ent (see def. in schol., prop. 17, Part II) but which indicates rather the constitution of the human body than the nature of the external thing (by coral!. 2, prop.
16, Part II).

Hence an emotion is (by gen. def.) an imagination, in so far as it

indicates the constitution of the body.

But an imagination (by prop. 17, Part II)

is more intense, so long as we imagine nothing which excludes the present existence
of the external thing.

Therefore an emotion also, the cause of which we imagine

to be present, is more intense, or stronger than if we imagined the cause not to
be present; q.e.d.
Scho!.

When in prop. 18, Part III I said, that we are affected with the same

emotion by the image if a past or future thing, as if the thing we imagine were
present, I express ly stated that this was true only so far as we attended to the
image of the thing itself (for this image is of the same nature whether we have already imagined the thing or not); and I did not deny that the emotion is rendered
weaker when we contemplate other things as present to us which exclude the present
existence of a future thing, though I omitted to mention this then, because I had
determined to treat of the power of the emotions in another Part.
Coroll.

The image of a past or future thing, i.e. of a thing which in relation

to past and future time we contemplate as excluded from the present, is, other
things being equal, weaker than the image of a present thing, and consequently an
emotion respecting something past or future is, other things being equal, weaker
than an emotion respecting something present.
Prop. X.

We are more intensely affected by a future thing if we imagine it about
"

to happen soon, than if we imagined the period of its exis tence to be more remote from the present; and we are more intensely affected by the memory of a
thing which we imagine to be recent, than if we imagined it to be long past.
Dem.

In imagining a thing as about to happen soon, or as having happened not
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long ago, we imagine something by which its presence is in a less degree excluded
than if we imagined the period of its existence as more remote from the present
ei ther in the past or the future (as is self-evident); and therefore (by pre-ced.
prop.) we shall be proportionately more affected by it; q.e.d.
Schol.

From the note to def. 6, Part IV it follows that towards objects which

are removed from the present by a longer interval of time than we can definitely
imagine, our emotions will be equally feeble, although those objects may be re•
moved by a wide interval of time from each other.
Prop. XI.

An

emotion towards what we imagine as necessary, is, other things being

equal, more intense than
Dem.

towar~

what is possible or contingent, or not necessary.

So far as we imagine a thing to be necess ary, we affi rrn its exis tence, and

on the other hand we deny its existence so far as we imagine it not to be necessary
(by schol. 1, prop. 33, Part I); and therefore (by prop. 9, Part IV) an emotion
towards what is necessary is, other things being equal, more intense than towards
what is not necessary; q.e.d.
Prop. XII.

An

emotion towards a thing, which we know not to exist in the present,

and which we imagine as possible, is, other things being equal, more intense
than towards what is contingent.
Dem.

So far as we imagine a thing as contingent we are affected by no image of

another thing which posits the existence of the former (by def. 3, Part IV); on the
contrary (by the hypothesis) we imagine some things which exclude its present existence.

But so far as we imagine a thing to be possible in the future, we imagine

some things which posit its existence (by def. 4, Part IV). i.e. (by.prop. 18, Part
III) which excite hope or fear; and therefore an emotion towards a possible thing
is more vehement; q.e.d.
Coroll.

An

emotion towards an object which we know does not at present exist,

and which we imagine contingent, is much weaker, than if we imagined the object
presen t to us.
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Oem.

An emotion towards an object which we imagine as existing in the present,

is more intense than if we imagined it as future (by coroll., prop. 9, Part IV) and
is more vehement in proportion as we imagine the future period of its existence to
be less remote from the present (by prop. 10, Part IV).

Hence an emotion towards

an object, the existence of which we imagine as very remote from the present, is
much weaker than if we imagined it as present, and nevertheless (by precede prop.)
is more intense than if we imagined the same object as contingent.

Therefore, our

emotion towards a contingent object is much weaker than if we imagined the object
as present to us; q.e.d.
Prop. XIII.

Our emotion towards a contingent object, which we know does not exist

at present, is, other things being equal, more languid than our emotion towards
a past object.
Dem.

Inasmuch as we imagine the object to be contingent, we are affected by no

image of another object which posits the existence of the former (def. 3, Part IV).
On the contrary (according to the hypothesis) we imagine some objects which exclude
its present existence.

Rut so far as we imagine it in relation to past time, we

are supposed to imagine something which brings it to our memory or excites the image
of it in our minds (see prop. 18, Part II with schol.), so that we contemplate i t
as if it were present (by coroll., prop. 17, Part II).

And therefore (by prop.-9,

Part IV), our emotion towards a contingent object which we know does not exist at
present, will, other things being equal, be more languid than our emotion towards
a past object; q.e.d.
Prop. XIV.

The true knowledge of good and evil, considered simply as true, cannot

restrain any emotion; but only considered as an emotion.
Dem.

An emotion is an idea, by which the mind affirms of its body a greater or

less power of existence than before (by gen. def. of emot.); and therefore (by prop.
1, Part IV) it has nothing positive which the presence of the true can destroy; and
consequently the true knowledgeof good and evil, considered simply as true, cannot

166

. restrain any emotion.

But considered as an emotion (see prop. 8, Part IV), if it

be stronger than the emotion which is to be restrained, so far alone (by prop. 7,
Part IV) it will be able to restrain that emotion; q.e.d.
Prop. XV.

A desire which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, can be

extinguished ar restrained by many other desires, arising from emotions by which
we are agitated.
Oem.

From the true knowledge of good and evil so far as this (by prop. 8, Part

IV) is an emotion, there· necessarily arises a desire (acc. to 1. def. of emot.),
which is greater in proportion as the emotion whence it arises is greater (acc. to
prop. 37, Part III).

Now since this desire (acc. to hypothesis) arises from the

fact that we truly lDlderstand something, it is a result of our acti vi ty (by prop.
3, Part III).

And therefore this desire must be understood by means of our essence

alone (by def. 2, Part III); and consequently (by prop. 7, Part III) its power and
increase must be determined by human power alone.

Further, desires arising from

emotions by which we are agitated, are also great in proportion as those emotions
are more vehement; and thus their power and increase (by prop. 5, Part IV) must be
determined by the power of external causes, which, if compared with our own power,
must infinitely surpass it (by prop. 3, Part IV).

Thus desires which arise from

such emotions, may be more vehement than that which arises from the true knowledge
of good and evil; and therefore (by prop. 7, Part IV) they will be able to restrain
or extinguish that desire; q.e.d.
Prop. XVI.

A desire which arises from the knowledge of good and evil, so far as

this knowledge has relation to the future, can be more easily res trained or extinguished by the desire of things which are agreeable in the present.
Dem.

An emotion towards an object which we imagine as future is more feeble

than towards what is present (by coroll.. prop. 9, Part IV).

But a desire which

arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, even when this knowledge regards
things which are good in the present, can be restrained or extinguished by some in-
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considerate desire (by preced. prop., the demonstration of which. is \Dli versal) .
Therefore a desire which. arises from the same knowledge so far as it regards the
future, can be more easily restrained or extinguished etc.; q.e.d.
Prop. XVII.

A -desire which. arises from the true knowledge of good and evil J so far

as this knowledge regards contingent things J can be yet more easily restrained
or extinguished by the desire of things which are present.
Dem.

This proposition is demonstrated in the same way as the preceding, from

coroll., prop. 12, Part IV.
~

Sch.ol.

Hereby I believe I have shown the cause why men are more moved by opin-

ion than by true reason, and why the true knowledge of good and evil excites mental
conunotions and often gives way to all kinds of appetite.

Hence the saying of the

poet: I see and approve the better, but I follow the worse.

And the wri ter of Ec-

c1esiastes seems to have had the same thing in his mind when he said: He who increaseth knowledge, increaseth sorrow.

I do not say this for the purpose of draw-

ing the conclusion that it is better to be ignorant than to have knowledge, or that
there is no difference between the stupid and the intelligent as to their power of
re.gulating their passions; but I say it because it is necessary to know both the
power and the weakness of our nature. that we may be able to determine what reason
can and what it cannot do in governing the passions.

And in this Part, as I have

stated, I intend to treat solely of human weakness. having

det~rmined

to treat sep-

arately of the power which reason has over the passions.
Prop. XVIII.

A desire that arises from pleasure is J other things being equal J

stronger than. a desire that arises from pain.
Dem.

A desire is the essence of man (by def. I of the emot.), Le. (by prop. 7,

Part III) the effort by which man strives to persevere in his existence.

Hence a

desire arising from pleasure is aided or increased by that very emotion of pleasure
(acc. to def. of pleasure, see scho!.. prop. 11. Part III); while a desire arising
from pain is diminished or restrained by that emotion of pain (by the same sch.ol.).

168

Hence the force of a desire arising from pleasure mus t be determined not only by
human power, but also by the power of external causes; whereas a desire arising
from pain mus t be determined by human power alone; and there fore the former is the
more powerful; q.e.d.
Schol.

By these few proposi tions I have explained the causes of human weakness

and inconstancy, and why men do not obey the precepts of reason.

It remains that

I should show what it is which reason prescribes to us, and what emotions are in
accordance wi th the laws of human reason, what are opposed to them.

But before I

begin to demonstrate this according to prolix geometrical method, it is desirable
here to state these dictates of PeaJ3on, briefly, that my meaning may be clearer to
the reader.

Since reason requires nothing contrary to nature, it therefore re-

quires that every man shoUld love himself, should seek what is really useful to
himself, should desire everything which really leads him to greater perfection; and,
in general, that every one should strive as far as possible, to preserve his existence.

All this is as necessarily true as that the whole is greater than a part.

See prop. 4, Part III.
to act

acco~ding

Further, since virtue (ace. to def. 8) is nothing else than

to the laws of our own nature, and no one (by prop. 7, Part III)

strives to preserve his existence except according to the laws of his own nature;
it follows,

~pst,

that the foundation of virtue is the effort to preserve our own

existence, and that happiness consists in man's ability to preserve his own existence.

Secondly, it follows, that virtue is to be desired for its own sake, and

not for the sake of something else, there being nothing better or more useful to
us, on account of which virtue should be sought.

Thirdly, it follOWS, that those

who destroy themselves are weak-minded beings, who are entirely vanquished by external causes repugnant to their nature.

Further, from post. 4, Part II it folloWS,

that we can never bring ourselves to a state in which we should want nothing external in order to preserve our existence, or so live as to have no commerce with
things out of ourselves; and if also we consider our mind, it is clear that our in-
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tellect would be more imperfect if the mind alone existed and had cognizance of
nothing besides i tse 1 f.

Thus there are many things out of ourselves which are use-

ful to us, and are therefore to be desired.

Among these none can be conceived more

excellent than the things wh.ich are entirely accordant with our nature.

If, for

example, two individuals of precisely the same nature are uni ted together, they
compose a double individual more powerful than the single.

Hence there is nothing

more useful to man than man; nothing, I say, that man can choose more appropriate
to the preservation of his being, than that all men should so agree in all things,
that the minds and bodies of all should compose as it were one mind and one body,
all at once,

as

far as they are able, striving to preserve their being, and all at

once seeking for themselves what is a common good to all.

Whence it follows that

men who are governed by reason, i.e., men who under the guidance of reason seek
what is useful for them, desire nothing for themselves which they do not desire for
other men also, and thus are just, faithful and honest.

These are the dictates of

reason, which I had proposed to state in few words before I began to demonstrate
them in a more prolix method; and I have done so in order if possible to conciliate
the attention of those who believe this principle, namely that each is bound to

seek What is useful to himself, to be the foundation not of piety and virtue, but
of impiety.

Having now briefly shown that the contrary is the fact, I proceed to

the same method of demonstration by which we have hitherto advanced.
Prop. XIX.

Every man, from the laws of his nature, necessarily desires what he

judges to be good, and shuns what he judges to be evil.
Oem.

The knowledge of good and evil is (ace. to prop. 8) the emotion of pleasure

or pain, so far as we are conscious of that emotion; and therefore (by prop. 28,
Part III) every man necessarily desires what he judges to be good, and shuns what
he judges to be evil.

But this desire is nothing else than the essence of man (by

def. of appetite, which see schol., prop. 9, Part III and def. 1 of emot.).

There-

fore 'every man from the laws of his nature alone, necessarily desires etc.; q.e.d.
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Prop. XX.

The more a man seeks what is useful to him, i.e. strives and is able to

preserve his being, the more highly is he endowed with virtue (or power); and on
the other hand, so far as a man neglects to preserve what is useful to him, i.e.
his being, so far is he weak.
Dem.

Virtue is human power, which is determined solely by the essence of man

(by def. 8, Part IV), i.e. (by prop. 7, Part III) which is determined solely by the
effort whereby man strives to persevere in his existence.

Therefore the more a man

strives and is able to preserve his being, the more highly is he endowed with virtue, and consequently (by prop. 4 and 6, Part III) so far as anyone neglects the
preservation of his existence, so far is he weak; q.e.d.
Scho!.

No one, therefore, unless he be vanquished by external causes, contrary

to his nature, neglects to seek what is useful to him or to preserve his being.

No

one, I say, shuns food or destroys himself from the necessity of his nature, but
only when constrained by external causes.
place in many ways.

This action of external causes may take

For example, a man who has drawn his sword may have his right

hand seized and be forced to turn the sword against his own heart, and may thus be
compelled by another to destroy himself.

Or the command of a tyrant may urge ryim,

like Seneca, to open his own veins, i.e. to incur a smaller evil in order to avoid.
a greater.

Or, lastly, hidden external causes may so dispose his imagination and

so affect his body, that this may put on another nature contrary to its former nature and the idea of which cannot exist in the mind (by prop. 10, Part III).

But

that man by the necessity of his nature should strive not to exist, or to be
changed into another form, is as impossible that something should proceed out of
nothing; as every one will see on slight reflection.
Prop. XXI.

No one can desire to be happy, to act well and to live rightly, who

does not at the same time desire to be, to act and to live, i.e. actually to
exist.
Oem.

The demonstration of this proposition or rather the thing itself is self-
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evident, and is also evident from the definition of desire.

For (by def. 1 of

emot.) the desire to live happily or rightly, to act well etc. is the essence of
man, i.e. (by prop. 7, Part III) this effort by which every one strives to preserve
his being.
Prop. XXII.

Therefore no one can desire etc.; q.e.d.
No virtue can be conceived prior to this, namely, the effort to pre-

serve oneself.
Dem.

The effort to preserve self is the essence of a being (acc. to prop. 7,

Part III).

If therefore any virtue could be conceived prior to this effort, it

must follow (by def. 8, Part IV) that the essence of the being could be conceived
prior to itself; which (as is self-evident) is absurd.

Therefore no virtue etc.;

q.e.d.
Coroll.

The effort to preserve self is the first and only fotmdation of virtue.

For nothing can be conceived prior to this principle (by precede prop.), and no
virtue is conceivable without it (by prop. 21, Part IV).
Prop. XXIII.

Man, so far as he is determined to any action by inadequate ideas,

cannot absolutely be said to act from virtue; but only so far as he is determined by what he lmderstands (by adequate ideas).
Dem.

So far as a man is determined to any action by inadequate ideas, so far

(by prop. 1, Part III) he suffers (or is passive), i.e. (by def. 1 and 2, Part III)
he does something which cannot be perceived by means of his essence alone, i.e. (by
def. 8, Part IV) which does not follow from his virtue (or power).

But so far as

he is determined to any action by what he tmderstands (by adequate ideas), so far
(by the same prop. 1, Part III) he is active, i.e. (by def. 2, Part III) he does
something which is perceived by means of his essence alone or (by def. 8, Part IV)
which adequately follows from his own virtue; q.e.d.
Prop. XXIV.

To act absolutely from virtue is nothing else in us than to act, to

live, to preserve our being (three things which are essentially one) according
to the guidance of reason, on the basis of each seeking his own good.
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Dem.

To act absolutely from virtue is nothing else (acc. to def. 8) than to act

according to the laws of our own nature.

But we act thus only so far as we under-

stand (or have adequate ideas) (ace. to prop. 3, Part III).

Therefore to act from

virtue is nothing else in us than to act, to live, and to preserve our being, according to the guidance of reason, and this (acc. to coroll., prop. 22) on the
basis of seeking our own good; q.e.d.
Prop. XXV.
Dem.

No one strives to preserve his existence for the sake of another being.

The effort by which every being strives to persevere in its existence, is

determined solely by the essence of that being (ace. to prop. 7, Part III); but it
does not necessarily follow from the essence of another being (ace. to prop. 6,
Part III) that each should strive to preserve his own existence.
is further evident from coroll., prop. 22 of this Part.

This proposition

For if a man strove to

preserve his existence for the sake of another being, then. that being would (as is
obvious) be the primary foundation of virtue, which (ace. to the above named cor011.) is absurd.
Prop. XXVI.

Therefore no one etc.; q.e.d.

All that we strive after according to reason is nothing else than to

understand; nor does the mind so far as it uses reason, judge anything useful to
itself except what conduces to understanding.
Oem.

The effort ofa being to preserve itself is. nothing else than the essence

of that being (ace. to prop. 7, Part III) whiCh so far as it exists in a given manner is conceived as having power to persevere in existing (ace. to prop. 6, Part
III), and to perform those actions whiCh necessarily follow from its given nature.
(See def. of appetite in schol., prop. 9, Part III).' But the essence. of reason is
nothing else than our mind so far as it clearly and distinctly understands.
def. of it in schol. 2, prop. 40, Part II.

See

Therefore (acc. to prop. 40, Part II)

whatever we strive after according to reason is nothing else than to understand.
Further, since this effort of the mind, by which, so far as it reasons, it strives
to preserve its existence, is nothing else than to understand (by the first part of
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this dem.); it follows, that this effort to tmderstand (by coroll., prop. 22) is
the first and only foundation of virtue; nor do we strive to understand things for
the sake of any end (ace. to prop. 25); on the contrary, the mind, so far as it
reasons, can conceive nothing as a Good except what conduces to understanding (acc.
to def. 1); q.e.d.
Prop. XXVII.

We know nothing certainly to be good or evil, except that which real-

ly conduces to understanding or which can impede tmderstanding.
Dem.

The mind so far as it reasons, desires nothing else than to understand,

and judges nothing to be a good to itself, except what conduces to understanding
(by preced. prop.).

But the mind (acc. to prop. 41 and 43, Part II.

See also

schol.) has no certitude of things except in so far as it has adequate ideas, or
(what by schol. 2, prop. 40, Part II is the same thing) sp far as it reasons.
Therefore we know nothing certainly to be good except what really conduces to lUlderstanding; and on the other hand we know nothing certainly to be bad, except what
impedes tmderstanding; q.e.d.
Prop. XXVIII.

The highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the high-

est virtue of the mind is to know God.
Dem.

The highest object the mind can tmderstand is God, Le. (by def. 6, Part

I) the absolutely infinite being, without whom (by prop. 15, Part I) nothing can
exist or be conceived.

And therefore (by prop. 26 and 27, Part IV) the highest

good of the mind, or (by def. 1, Part IV) that which [is] most useful to it, is the
knowledge of God.

Further, so far as the mind lUlderstands, so far only does it act

(by prop. 1 and 3, Part III), and so far only (by prop. 23, Part IV) can it be absolutely said to act from virtue.
derstand.

But the highest object the mind can tmderstand is God (as I have already

demonstrated).
Prop. XXIX.

Hence the absolute virtue of the mind is to lUl-

Therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to know God.

Any individual thing, the nature of which is altogether diverse from

our own, can neither aid nor restrain our power of action; and, in general, noth-
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ing can be either a good or an evil to us, tmless it have something in common
with us.
Oem.

The power whereby every individual being and consequently (by coroll.,

prop. 10, Part II) man, exists and acts, is determined only by another individual
being (by prop. 28, Part I) whose nature (by prop. 6, Part II) must be understood
through the same attribute as that through which we conceive the human nature.
Hence our power of action, in whatever way it may be conceived, can be determined
and consequently aided or restrained by the power of another individual being which
has something in common with us, and not by the power of a being whose nature is
al together diverse from our own.

And since we call that good or evil whi ch is a

cause of pleasure or pain (by prop. 8, Part IV), Le. (by scho!., prop. 11, Part
III) which increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of action; therefore, a being whose nature is altogether diverse from our own, can neither be good
nor evil to us; q.e.d.
Prop. XXX.

Nothing can be evil through what it has in common with our nature: so

far as it is evi I to us, it is contrary to our nature.
Dem.

We call that evil which is a cause of pain (by prop. 8, Part IV), Le. (by

def. of pain, scho!., prop. 11, Part III) which diminishes or restrains our power
of action.

If therefore a thing were evil to us through that which it has in com-

mon with us, it could diminish or restrain that which it has in common with us,
which (by prop. 4, Part III) is absurd.

Therefore nothing can be evil to us through

that which it has in CODDnon with us; on the contrary, so far as it is evil, Le.
(as we have already shewn) diminishes or restrains our power of action, so far (by
prop. 5, Part III) it is opposed to our nature; q.e.d.
Prop. XXXI.
Oem.
be evil.

So far as anything agrees with our nature, it is necessarily good.

For so far as anything agrees with our nature, it cannot (by preced. prop.)
It will therefore necessarily be either good or indifferent.

If we sup-

pose the latter, namely, that it is neither good nor evil; then «ace. to> ax.,
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Part IV) nothing will follow from its nature which is subservient to the preservation of our nature, i.e. (by the hypothesis) to the preservation of its own nature.
But this is absurd (by prop. 6, Part III).

Therefore so far as anything agrees

with our nature, it is necessarily good; q.e.d •.
Coroll.

Henc~

it follows, that in proportion as anything agrees with our na-

ture, it is more useful or a greater good to us, and conversely, in proportion as
anything is a good to us, it agrees wi th our nature.

For so far as it does not

agree with our nature, it will necessarily be diverse from or contrary to, our nature.

If diverse, then (by prop. 29, Part IV) it can neither be good nor evil; if

contrary, it will therefore also be contrary to that which agrees with our nature,
Le. (by precede prop.) contrary to good, or evil.

Therefore nothing can be good

except in so far as it agrees wi th our nature; and thus in proportion as anything
agrees with our nature, it is useful or good, and the converse; q.e.d.
Prop. XXXII.

So far as men are subject to passions, it cannot be said that they

agree in nature.
Oem.

Things which are said to agree in nature are understood to agree in power

(by prop. 7, Part III), not in weakness or negation, and consequently (see schol.,
prop. 3, Part II) not in passion.

Hence so far as men are subject to passions it

cannot be said that they agree in nature; q.e.d.
Schol.

This is sel f-evident.

For he who says that black ,and whi te agree only

in this, that neither of them is red, absolutely affirms that black and white agree
in nothing.

So also if anyone says that a stone and a man agree only in this,

that each is fini te, weak, or that a stone as well as a man does not exist from the
necessity of its own nature, or lastly, that it is indefinitely surpassed by the
power of external causes; he affirms that there is no agreement between a stone and
a man.

For things which agree in a negation alone, or in what they do not possess,

do in fact agree in nothing.
Prop. XXXIII.

Men can differ in nature, so far as they are struggling wi th emotions
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which are passions, and so far, one and the same man is variable and inconstant.
Oem.

The nature or essence of emotions cannot be explained by means of our es-

sence or nature alone (by def. 1 and 2, Part III); but must be determined by the
relation between the power, i.e. (by prop. 7, Part III) the nature of external
causes and our

OWB

nature.

Whence it resul ts, that there may be as many species

of emotions as there are species of objects by which we are affected (see prop. 56,
Part III), that men may be differently affected by one and the same object (see
prop. 51, Part III), and so far may disagree in nature, and lastly, that one and
the same man (by the same prop. 51, Part III) may be differently affected towards
the same object, and so far be variable etc.; q.e. d.
Prop. XXXIV.

So far as men are agitated by emotions which are passions, they can

be contrary to each other.
Oem.

A man, for exa.q»le, Peter, may be the cause of pain to Paul, because he

has something similar to a thing or being that Paul hates (by prop. 16, Part III);
or because Peter alone possesses something Which Paul himself also loves (see prop.
32, Part III with schol.); or for other reasons (see the chief of these in schol.,
prop. 55, Part III).

Hence it will arise (by def. 7 of emot.) that Paul hates Pe-

ter, and consequently it may easily happen (by prop. 40, Part III with schol.) that
Peter hates Paul in return, and (by prop. 39, Part III) that the two strive to injure each other, i.e. (by prop. 30, Part IV) to be contrary to each other.

But a

painful emotion is always a passion (by prop. 59, Part III); therefore, men, so far
as they are agitated by emotions which are passions, can be contrary to each other;
q.e.d.
Schol.

I have said, that Paul may hate Peter, because he imagines him to possess

what he, Paul, also loves.

\\hence, on a superficial consideration, it seems to

follow, that these two may be injuring to each other because they love the same
thing and consequently because they agree in nature; and thus, if this were true,
prop. 30 and 31, Part IV would be false.

But on duly weighing the subject, we
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shall find perfect accordance between these propositions and the preceding demonstration.

For these two, namely Peter and Paul, are not odious to each other so

far as they agree in nature, Le. so far as they both love the same object; but so
far as they differ from each other.

For so far as both of them love the same

thing, this very fact (by prop. 31, Part III) heightens the love of both, i.e. (by
I

def. 6 of emot.) heightens the pleasure of both.

Hence it is far from being the

case that so far as they love the same thing and agree in their nature, they are
odious to each other: on the contrary, as I have said, the cause of this is nothing
else than that they are supposed to disagree in their nature.

For let us suppose

Peter to have the idea of the beloved object possessed, and Paul the idea of the
beloved object lost.

Hence it comes that the one is affected with pleasure, the

other with pain; and so far they are contrary to each other.

And in the same way

we can easily show that the other causes of hatred depend solely on this, that men
dis agree in nature, and not on that in whi ch they agree.
Prop. XXXV.

In proportion as men live according to the guidance of reason, they

always necessarily agree in nature.
Dem.

So far as men are agitated by emotions which are passions, they can be

discordant in nature (by prop. 33, Part IV) and in opposition to each other (ace.
to preced. prop.).

But men are said to act in proportion as they live according

to the guidance of reason (by prop. 3, Part III); and therefore whatever follows
from human nature so far as it is determined by reason, must (by def. 2, Part III)
be Understood through human nature alone as its proximate cause.

But since each

from the laws of his nature desires that which is good, and strives to avert that
which he judges to be evil (by prop. 19, Part IV): and since, further, that which
according to the dictate of reason we judge to be good or evil, is necessarily good
or evil (by prop. 41, Part II): it follows that so far alone as men live according
to the dictates of reason do they necessarily perform those actions which are necessarlly good to human nature, and consequently to each individual man, Le. (by
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coro1!., prop. 31, Part IV) accordant wi th the nature of every man.

And therefore

men, in proportion as they live tmder the guidance of reason, will necessarily be
in accordance with each other; q.e.d.
Coro1!.· 1.

There is no individual thing in nature more useful to man, than a

man who lives accQrding to reason.

For that is most useful to man which is most

accordant with his nature (by corol1., prop. 31, Part IV), i.e. (as is self-evident) man.

But man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature when he

Ii ves according to the guidance of reason (by def. 2, Part III), and so far alone

he is necessarily always in accordance with the nature of another man (acc. to
preced. prop.).

Therefore there is nothing in nature more useful to man etc.;

q.e.d.
Coroll. 2.
each other.

When each man most seeks his own good, then men are most useful to
For the more a man seeks his own good and strives to preserve himself,

the more highly is he endowed with virtue (by prop. 20, Part IV) or, what is the
same thing (by def. 8, Part IV), the more is he possessed of power to act according
to the laws of his nature, i.e. (by prop. 3, Part III) to live according to the
guidance of reason.

But men are most accordant in their nature when they live ac-

cording to the guidance of reason (by preced. prop.).

Therefore (by preced. cor-

011.) men will be most useful to each other when each most seeks his own good;

q. e. d.
Schol.

What I have just shown experience every day confirms by such numerous

and striking testimonies, that it is a common proverb: The God of man is man.

But,

it rarely happens that men Ii ve according to the dictates of reason, and in the
present state of things they are generally envious of each other and mutually injurious.

Nevertheless, they can scarcely endure a solitary life, so that most of

them are pleased wi th the definition: man is a social animal.

Indeed, it is the

fact that many more conveniences than' disadvantages result from the social Ii fe of
men.

Let therefore satirists laugh as much as they will at human things; let the-
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ologians detest them, and praise as much as they can the un cui tured and semibarbaroUS life of the melancholy, contemn men and admire brutes: men will nevertheless
experience that by mutual aid they wi 11 procure the things they want much more
easily, and that by \D1i ted powers only can they avoid perils which everywhere
threaten them; not to urge that it is far preferable, and more worthy of
ligence, to contemplate the actions of men than of brutes.

ou~

intel-

But of this I shall

tre at more fully elsewhere.
Prop. XXXVI.

The highest good of those who follow virtue, is common to all, and

all can equally enjoy it.
Dem.

To act from virtue is to act according to the guidance of reason (by prop.

24, Part IV), and whatever we strive after according to reason is, to \D1derstand
(by prop_ 26, Part IV).

And therefore (by prop. 28, Part IV) the highest good of

those who follow virtue, is to know God, i.e. (by prop. 47, Part II and schol.) the
good which is common to all men, and can be equally possessed by all men, so far as
they are of the same nature; q.e.d.
Schol.

But if anyone asks: what if the highest good of those who follow virtue

were not common to all?

Would it not follow from thence, as above (see prop. 34,

Part IV), that men who live according to the guidance of reason, i.e. (ace. to prop.
35, Part IV) men who are accordant in nature, would be in opposition to each other?
We answer: it arises not from accident, but from the very nature of reason, that
the highest good of man is common to all, since it is deduced from the human essence so far as it is determined by reason; and since man could nei ther exist nor
be conceived if he had not the power of enjoying this highest good.

For it belongs

to the essence of the human mind (by prop. 47, Part II) to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.
Prop. XXXVII.

The good which every one who follows virtue desires for himself, he

desires for the rest of mankind, and the more, in proportion as he has greater
knowledge of God.
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Dem.

Men, so far as they Ii ve according to the guidance of reason, are in the

highest degree useful to man (by coroll., prop. 35, Part IV); and therefore (by
prop. 19, Part IV), according to the dictate of reason, we necessarily strive to
effect that men in general shall live according to reason.
every one who

liv~s

But the good which

according to reason, i.e. (by prop. 24, Part IV) who follows

virtue, desires for himself, is to tmderstand (by prop. 26, Part IV).

Therefore

the good which every one who follows virtue desires for himself he will desire for
the rest of mankind.

Further, a desire, so far as it pertains to the mind, is the

essence of the mind (by def. 1 of emot.) .

But the essence of the mind consists in

knowledge (by prop. 11, Part II) which involves the knowledge of God (by prop. 47,
Part II), and without the knowledge of God (by prop. 15, Part I) it can neither exist nor be conceived.

Therefore the greater the knowledge of God which the essence

of the mind involves, the greater will be the desire of him who follows virtue that
the good which he seeks for himself should be shared by all; q.e.d.
Another demo

The good which a man desires and loves for himself he will love

more constantly if he sees that others love the same thing (by prop. 31, Part III).
Therefore (by coroll. of the same prop.) he will strive that others may love it.
And since this good (by precede prop.) is common to all, and all can enjoy it; he
will therefore strive (for the same reason) that all may enjoy it, and (by prop.
37, Part III) the more, in proportion as he himself enjoys this good; q.e.d.
Schol. 1.

He who solely from emotion strives that others may love what he him-

self loves, and that others may live according to his mind, acts merely from impulse, and is therefore odious, especially to those who have different tastes, and
who on their side also study and, from a similar impulse, strive that others may,
on the contrary, live according to their mind.

Further, as the supreme good which

men desire from mere emotion, is often such that one alone can possess it, it happens that those who love fluctuate in their feelings, and while they delight in
praising the object they love, they fear to be believed.

But he who strives to
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lead others by reason, does not act impulsively, but humanely and benignantly, and
is thoroughly stable in his sentiments.

Further, whatever we desire or do, or

cause to be done, in -virtue of our having the idea of God, or of knowing God, I
refer to religion.

The desire of acting rightly which is dependent on our living

according to reason, I call piety.

The desire by which the man who lives according

to reason is actuated, of uniting other men to him in amity, I call honour; that
which is approved by men who live according to reason, I call honourable; and, on
the contrary, I call that dishmlourable which is opposed to human amity.
also shewn what are the fO\mdations of social Ii fe.

I have

Moreover the difference be-

tween true virtue (or power) and weakness is easily perceived from what has been
said above: namely, that true virtue (or power) is nothing else than to live solely
according to reason; and therefore weakness consists solely in this, that man allows himself to be led by things external to him, and is determined by them to actions which depend on the common constitution of external things and not on his own
nature considered solely in itself.

These are the positions which in the scholium

of prop. 18, Part IV I promised to demonstrate; and it is clear from them that the
law of not killing brutes is fO\mded rather on vain superstition and womanish com-·
passion than on sO\md reason.

Our reason indeed teaches us that the necessity of

seeking what is useful to us \mites us to other men; but not to brutes or to things
which differ from us in nature; on the contrary, we have the same right over them
as they have over us.

Nay, as the right of every being is measured by his virtue

or power, men have a far greater right over brutes than brutes over men.

Not that

I deny sentiment to brutes: but I deny that therefore we are not justified in conSulting our own benefit in using them according to our pleasure, and treating them
as it best suits us; since they are not in accordance with our nature and their
emotions differ in nature from ours.

See scho1.. prop. 57, Part III.

It remains

for me to explain what is just and what unjust, what is sin and what merit.
concerning these, see the following scholium.

But
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Scho1. [2.J

In the appendix to Part I I promised to explain what are praise and

blame, merit and sin. justice and injustice.

Praise and blame I have explained in

schol., prop. 29, Part Ill; of the other terms. this is the place to speak.

But

first a few words must be said on the natural and civilized state of man.
Every one exists by the highest right of nature, and consequently, it is by the
highest right of nature that every one does what follows from the necessity of his
nature.

It is therefore by the highest right of nature that every one judges what

is good and what evil, consults his own benefit according to his mind (see prop. 19
and 20, Part IV), avenges himself (see coroll. 2, prop. 40. Part Ill), and strives
to preserve what he loves and to destroy what he hates (see prop. 28, Part Ill).
If men were to live according to reason, each (by coroll. 1, prop. 35, Part IV)
could exercise this right without any injury to others •

But since they are subject

to passions (by coroll., prop. 4, Part IV), which greatly predominate over the power or virute of man (by prop. 6, Part IV), they are often drawn different ways (by
prop. 33, Part IV) and are in opposition (by prop. 34, Part IV) when they need each
other's help (by schol., prop. 35, Part IV).

Hence that men may live in peace and

be useful to each other it is necessary that they should give up their natural
right and give mutual security that they will not do anything to each other's injury.

In what way this can be effected, namely, that men who are necessarily lia-

ble to passions (by coroll., prop. 4, Part IV), inconstant and variable (by prop.
33, Part IV) may render each other secure and have mutual confidence, is apparent
from prop. 7 of this Part and prop. 39 of Part III: namely, that no emotion can be
restrained except by another stronger emotion contrary to the emotion requiring to
be restrained, and that every one is led to abstain from inflicting injury by the
fear of receiving a greater injury.

On

this law therefore Society can be based,

provided that it take into its own hands the right which each man has of avenging
himself and judging what is good and what is evil; and it will thus have the power
of pres cribing the common rule of li fe, of imposing laws, and of sanctioning them,
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not by reason, which is unable to restrain passion (by schol., prop. 17, Part IV),
but by threats.

Now society thus based on laws and on its power of self-preserva-

tion is called the State, and those who are defended by its laws are called citizens _

Whence I <we> iii t may be I easily understand that there is nothing in a natural

state which is by common consent good or bad, since every man in a natural state
consults his own advantage alone, and according to his disposition and in so far as
he has any judgment of what is useful to him. decides what is good and what is evil, and is not bound to obey anyone but himself.

Hence in a natural state sin

cannot be conceived: but it can be conceived in a civilized state, where it is decided by CORmon consent what is good and what is evil, and each citizen is bound to
obey the law.

Sin therefore is nothing else than disobedience which is punished

solely by the law of the state; and on the other hand the obedience of the citizen
is called merit because it is I judgedllheldl worthy of one who enjoys the advantages
of civil life.

Further, in a state of nature, no one is by common consent the pro-

prietor or master of anything, nor is there any thing in nature which can be said
to belong to one man and not to another; but all things belong to all.

Therefore

in a state of nature there can be conceived no will to give every one his due, or'
to deprive anyone of what is his own, Le. in a natural state there is nothing
that can be called just or unjust: such conceptions belong only to a civilized
state in which it is decreed by CORmon consent what belongs to one and what to another.

Hence it is clear that just and unjust, sin and merit are extrinsic notions,

and not attributes which express the nature of the mind.
Prop. XXXVIII.

But enough of this.

That ,which so disposes the human body that it can be affected in

many ways, or which renders the human body capable of affecting external bodies
in many ways, is use ful to man; and it is the more use ful the more capab Ie it
renders the body of being affected in many ways and of so affecting other bodies;
and on the other hand it is hurtful in proportion as it diminishes these aptitudes of the body_
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Dem.

In proportion as the body is rendered more capable of affecting and being

affected in a variety of ways, the mind is rendered more capable of perceiving (by
prop. 14, Part II); and thus that which disposes the body in this manner and renders it capable of affecting and being affected in a variety of ways, is necessari_
ly good or usefu1 (acc. to prop. 26 and 28), and the more useful the more it confers this capabi Ii ty on the body; and on the contrary (by the s arne prop. 14, Part
II taken inversely and prop. 26 and 27. Part IV) it is hurtful if it diminishes

this capability; q.e.d.
Prop. XXXIX.

Whatever tends to preserve the relative degree of motion and rest in

the parts of the htunan body is good; and on the other hand, that is bad which
tends to alter the relative degree of motion and rest in the parts of the human
body.
Dem.

The human body requires for its preservation many other bodies (by post.

4, Part II).

But that which constitutes the form of the human body consists in

this, that its parts communicate their motions to each other in a certain ratio
(by def. before lemma 4, which see after prop. 13, Part II).

Therefore those

things which tend to preserve the relative degree of motion and rest in the parts
of the human body, preserve also the form of the human body, and consequently
cause (acc. to post. 3 and 6, Part II) the human body to be affected in many ways,
and to affect external bodies in many ways; and therefore (by precede prop.) they
are good.

Hence those things which cause a change in the relative degree of motion

and rest in the parts of the human body, also (by the above-named def., Part II)
cause the human body to put on another form, i.e.

(as

is self-evident, and as we

have indicated at the end of the Preface to this Part) they tend to destroy the
human body and consequently to render it altogether incapable of being affected in
various ways; and therefore (ace. to precede prop.) they are evil; q.e.d.
Scho!.

How far these things can be of injury or of service to the mind will be

explained in the Fifth Part.

I will here observe simply, that I regard as death
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that condition of the body in whi ch its parts are so disposed that their re 1 ati ve
degree of motion or rest is altered.

For I do not venture to deny, that though the

circulation of the blood and other conditions Ion accolDlt of <Which the body is
held to live>Bwhich are held to indicate life b~ retainedl, the human body can nevertheless assume a nature altogether different from that which is proper to it.
No reason obliges me to hold that the body is not dead W11ess it be changed into a
corpse; nay, experience itself appears to pronounce otherwise.

It sometimes hap-

pens that a man undergoes such changes that it is not easy to call him the same:
for example, I have heard of a certain Spanish poet, who had been attacked by a
malady, and although he recovered from it, yet his pas t li fe remained so obli terated from his memory, that he did not believe the tales and tragedies he had wri tten to be his. and in fact he might have been regarded as an adult infant if he
had also forgotten his vernacular tongue.

I f this appears incredible, what shall

we say of infants, whose nature the mature man believes to be so different from his
OlM

that he could not be persuaded he ever was an infant were it not that he draws

an inference from the case of others as to his own.

But lest I should be furnish-

ing material to the superstitious for new questions, I prefer qui tting these subjects .
Pl'Op. XL.

Those things which cherish human society, or which cause men to live to-

gether in concord, are useful; and on the contrary those things are evil which
occasion dis cord in the conununi ty •
Dem.

For those things which cause men to live together in concord also cause

them to live according to the guidance of reason (by prop. 35, Part IV), and therefore (by prop. 26 and 27, Part IV) they are good, and (for the same reason) those
which excite discord are evil; q.e.d.
Pi'op. XLI.

Pleasure, directly considered, is not evil but good; pain, on the other

hand, is directly evil.
Dem.

Pleasure (by prop. 11, Part III with scho!.) is an emotion whereby the
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body's power of action is increased; whereas pain is an emotion whereby the body's
power of action is diminished or restrained; and therefore (by prop. 38, Part IV)
pleasure is directly good, etc.; q.e.d.
Prop. XLII.

Cheerfulness cannot be in excess, but is always good, and on the con-

trary melancholy is always evil.
Dem~Cheerfu1ness

(see its def. in scho1., prop. 11, Part III) is pleasure,

which so far as it belongs to the body consists in this, that all parts of the body

are affected alike, that is (by prop. 11, Part III) that the body's power of action
is increased or aided, so that all its parts have the same relative degree of motion and rest; and therefore (by prop. 39, Part IV) cheerfulness is always good,
and cannot be in excess.

But melancholy (see also def. in sameschol., prop. 11,

Part III) is pain, which, so far as it belongs to the body, consists in this, that
the body's power of action is absolutely diminished or restrained; and therefore
(by prop. 38) it is always evil; q.e.d.

Prop. XLIII.

Titillation can be excessive and evil; and bodily suffering can be

so far good as titillation or pleasure is evil.
Dem.

Titillation is pleasure which, so far as it belongs to the body, consists

in this, that one or some of its parts are affected more than the others (see def.
in sebol., prop. 11, Part III); and the power of that affection may be so great

that it may predominate over the other actions of the body (by prop. 6, Part IV),
and pertinaciously adhere to it, so as to render the body less capable of being affected in a variety of ways; and therefore (by prop. 38, Part IV) it can be evil.
Further, bodily suffering, which on the contrary is pain, considered .in itself
alone cannot be good (by prop. 41, Part IV).

But since its power and increase is

defined as the power of external things compared wi th our own power (by prop. 5,
Part IV), we can conceive infinite degrees and modes of this affection (by prop. 3,
Part IV); and therefore we can conceive it such as to restrain titillation, and
prevent it from being excessive, and so far (by the firs t part of this prop.) pre-
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vent the body from having its capabilities diminished.

Therefore, it will be so

far good; q.e.d.
Prop. XLIV.
Dem.

Love and desire can be in excess.

Love is pleasure (by def. 6 of emot.) connected with the idea of an exter-

nal cause.

Hence titillation (by schol., prop. 11, Part III) connected with the

idea of an external cause is love; and therefore (by precede prop.) love can be in
excess.

Further, desire is stronger in proportion as the emotion from which it

arises is stronger (by prop. 37, Part III).

Wherefore, as an emotion (by prop. 6,

Part IV) can predominate over the other actions of a man, so also a desire, which
arises from the s arne emotion, can predominate over other desires, and consequently
can also be in excess, in the s arne way as in the preceding proposition we have
shown that titillation may be in excess; q.e.d.
Schol.

Cheerfulness, which I have pronounced to be good, is more easily con-

cei ved than observed.

For the emotions by whi ch we are dai ly agi tated are mos t

frequently connected with a part of the body which is more affected than the rest;
consequently, emotions are often in excess, and retain the mind in the contemplation of one object alone, so that it is lDlable to think of others.

Arid though men

are liable to many emotions, so that few are fOlDld who are always agitated by one
and the same emotion, nevertheless there are not wanting some to whom one and the
sarneemotion pertinaciously adheres.

For we sometimes see men so affected by one

object, that although it be not present, they nevertheless believe it to be present,
which, when it happens to men who are not asleep, we call delirium or madness; and
no less those who bum with love, who dream night and day of nothing but the beloved
object, are regarded as raving and excite ridicule.

But the miser who thinks of

nothing but money, the ambi tious man who thinks of nothing but glory etc. are not
regarded as mad, because they are usually noxious, and are held worthy of hatred.
In reali ty, however, avari ce, ambi tion, li centi-ousness etc. are species of mani a,
although they are not included among diseases.
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Prop. XLV.
Oem.

Hatred can never be good.

The man whom we hate we endeavour to destroy (by prop. 39, Part III), i.e.

(by prop. 37, Part IV) we aim at something which is evil.
Schol. 1.

Therefore etc.; q.e.d.

Note, that I here and in what follows tmderstand by hatred only that

which is felt towards men.
Coroll. 1.

Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge and the other emotions,

which belong to hatred or arise from it, are evil, which also is evident from prop.
39, Part III and prop. 37, Part IV.
Coroll. 2.

Whatever we desire in consequence of our being affected wi th hatred,

is vicious and socially tmjust.

Which is evident also from prop. 39, Part III and

from def. of vicious and unjust, which see in schol., prop. 37, Part IV.
Scho!. 2.

Between dBrision (which in coroll. 1 I have pron01.mced evil) and

laughter I recognize a great difference.

For laughter, as also jocoseness, is tm-

mixed pleasure; and therefore, provided it be not excessive, is in itself good (by
prop. 41, Part IV).
hibi ts enjoyment.

Nothing whatever, except a harsh and dismal superstition, proFor on what grotmd is it more proper to extinguish htmger and

thirst, than to expel melancholy?
regulated my mind accordingly.

My opinion at least is the following, and I have

No deity, nor anyone else who is not envious, is

pleased with my weakness and discomfort, nor do tears, sobs, fear and other manifestations of that kind,

whi~

are signs of the soul's weakness, lead to virtue;

on the contrary, the more pleasure we feel, the more progress do we make towards
perfection, i.e. the more do we necessarily partake of the divipe nature.

Hence

to use things and as far as possible enjoy them (not indeed to satiety, for this
is not enjoyment) is the part of a wise man.

It is, I say, the part of a wise man,

to refresh and recreate himself wi th moderate and agreeable food and drink, as also with the perfume and beauty of plants, with dress, music, athletic sports, theatres, and other things of the same kind, which each can use without any injury to
the rest.

For the human body is composed of many parts, differing in nature, which
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continually require new and various aliment, in order that the whole body may be
equally capab Ie of everything which can follow from its nature, and consequently
that the mind may also be equally capable of tmderstanding many things at once.
Hence this course of li fe bes t agrees both wi th our principles and wi th conunon
practice; so that, whatever other modes of life there may be, this is the best, and
is in every way commendable; and it is tmnecessary to treat this subject with more
explici tness or prolixity.
Prop. XLVI.

He who lives according to the guidance of reason strives as far as he

can to compensate the hatred, anger, contempt etc. of others towards him wi th
love or generosity.
Dem.

All emotions of hatred are evil (by coroll. 1 of preced. prop.); and

therefore he who lives according to the guidance of reason strives, as far as he
can, to prevent hilliSelf from <being> agitated by emotions of hatred (acc. to prop.
19), and consequently (prop. 37, Part IV) he will strive to prevent another from
suffering the same emotions.

But hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred and can

be extinguished by love (by prop. 43, Part III), so that hatred may pass into love
(by prop. 44, Part III).

Therefore he who lives according to the guidance of rea-

son, will strive to return hatred by love, Le. by generosity (the def. of which
see schol., prop. 59, Part III); q.e.d.
He who seeks to avenge injuries by reciprocal hatred Ii ves in utter mis-

Schol.
ery.

On the contrary, he who strives to combat hatred by love--he assuredly com-

bats joyously and securely; he resists one man or many with equal ease, and needs
not in the least the aid of forttme.

Those whom he truly conquers yield to him

joyfully, not indeed from deficiency, but from increase of power.

All this follows

so clearly from the mere defini tions of love and intellect that it requires no demonstration.
Prop. XLVII.
Oem.

The emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves good.

There are no emotions of hope and fear wi thout pain.

For fear (by def. 13

190

of emot.) is pain, and there is no hope (see exp1an. 12 and 13 of def. of emot.)
without fear.

Consequently (by prop. 41, Part IV) these emotions cannot be in

themsel ves good, but only so far as they may serve to restrain the excess of pleas_
ure (by prop. 43, Part IV); q.e.d.
Schol.

To this must be added, that these emotions indicate imperfection of

knowledge and weakness of mind; and in like manner confidence, despair, joy and remorse are signs of the mind's weakness.

For although confidence and joy are pleas-

urable emotions, they nevertheless suppose an antecedent pain, namely, hope and
fear.

Hence the more we strive to live according to reason, the more shall we

strive to be

indep~ndent

of hope, to liberate ourselves from fear and, as far as

pOSSible, be superior to fortWle, by directing our actions in accordance with the
sure cOWlsels of reason.
Prop. XLVIII.
Dem.

The emotions of over-estimation and contempt are always evil.

For these emotions (by def. 21 and 22 of emot.) are repugnant to reason;

and therefore (by prop. 26 and 27, Part IV) they are evil; q.e.d.
Prop. XLIX.

By over-estimation the man who is over-estimated is easily rendered

proud.
Dem.

If we see some one out of love towards us think more highly of us than is

just, we are likely to exult (by schol., prop. 41, Part III) or to be affected with
joy (by def. 30 of emot.), and easily to believe of ourselves the good which we
hear imputed to us (by prop. 25, Part III).

And thUS, from self love, we think

more highly of ourselves than is just, i.e. (by def. 28 of emot.) we easily become
proud; q.e.d.
Prop. L.

Compassion in a man who lives according to reason, is in itself evil and

useless.
Oem.

For compassion (by def. 18 of emot.) is pain, and therefore (by prop. 41,

Part IV) is in itself evil.

But the good which we do in striving to free the man

we commiserate from his misery (by coroll., prop. 27, Part III) we desire to do
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solely in obedience to the dictate of reason (by prop. 37. Part IV). and on no other ground than the dictate of reason can we do any thing which we certainly know to
be good (by prop. 27. Part IV).

Therefore commiseration in a man, who lives ac-

cording to the guidance of reason, is in itself evil and useless; q.e.d.
Coroll.

Hence it follows. that the man who lives according to the di ctates of

reason strives as far as possible not to be touched by commiseration.
Schol.

He who truly knows that all things follow from the necessi ty of the di-

vine nature. and comes to pass according to the eternal laws and rules of nature-he assuredly wi 11 not find anything deserving of hatred or ridicule or contempt.
nor anything to pity; but. so far as human strength will reach. he will try to do
well. as it is said, and be happy.

Add to this. that he who is easily affected

wi th pi ty and moved by the suffering and tears of others, often does something of
which he afterwards repents ; both because we cannot certainly know that what we do
from feeling is good. and also because we are easily deceived by false tears.
expressly speak here of the man who lives according to reason.

I

For he who is moved

neither by reason nor by compassion to succour others is justly called inhuman;
since (by prop. 27, Part III) he seems to be unlike a man.
Prop. LI.

Approbation is not repugnant to reason, but may agree with it and arise

from it.
Dem.
emot.).

For approbation is love towards him who does good to others (by def. 19 of
And therefore it can belong to the mind in so far as this is said to be

active (by prop. 59, Part III), i.e. (by prop. 3. Part III) so far as it understands; and consequently it agrees with reason etc. q.e.d.
Another demo

He who lives according to reason desires for others the good which

he seeks for himself (by prop. 37, Part IV).

Hence by the fact that he sees any

one doing good to another, his own effort to do good is aided, i.e. (by prop. 11,
Part III) he feels pleasure, and feels it (by the hypothesis) in connection with
the idea of the person who does good to another; and consequently (by def. 19 of
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emot.) he approves of that person; q.e.d.
Schol.

Indignation, as defined by us (see def. 20 of emot.) is necessarily evil

(by prop. 45, Part IV).

But it must <be> noted that when the State, in its desire

to preserve peace punishes the citizen who does an injury to another, I do not call
this indignation 'against the citizen, since the State is not impelled by hatred to
ruin the citizen, but actuated by duty to punish him.
Prop. LII.

Sel f-contentment may arise from reason, and this I satis faction II content_

mentl, when it arises from reason. is the highest that can exist.
Dem.

Self-contentment is pleasure arising from the fact that man contemplates

himself and his power of action (by def. 25 of emot.).

But man's true power of ac-

tion or virtue is reason itself (by prop. 3, Part III), which man clearly and distinctly contemplates (by prop. 40 and 43, Part II).
rises from reason.

Therefore self-contentment a-

Further, when a man contemplates himself, he perceives nothing

clearly and distinctly or adequately, except those things which follow from his
power of action (by def. 2, Part III), i.e. (by prop. 3, Part III) which follow
from his power of understanding.

And thus from this contemplation alone arises the

highest contentment that can exist; q.e.d.
Schol.

Self-contentment is in truth the highest point we can hope to attain;

for (as we have shown in prop. 25, Part IV) no one strives to preserve his being
for the sake of any end out of himself.

And as this self-contentment is cherished

and strengthened by praise (by coroll., prop. 53, Part III), and on the contrary
(by coroll. 1, prop. 55, Part III) is more and more disturbed by blame, the result
is that glory forms the chief motive of action, and life with opprobrium is scarcely supportable . .
Prop. LIlI.

Humilfty is not a virtue; in other words, it does not spring from

reason.
Oem.

Humility is pain, arising from the fact that a man contemplates his own

weakness (by def. 26 of emot.).

But so far as a man knows himself through the me-
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dium of true reason, so far he is supposed to understand his essence, Le. (by
prop. 7, Part III) his power.

Hence if a man, when he contemplates himself, per-

ceives any weakness in himself, this is not because he understands himself, but
(as we have shown, prop. 55, Part III) because his power of action is restrained.
If we suppose that a man has a conception of his own weakness because he understands something more powerful than himself, by the knowledge of "which he estimates
his own power of action, this supposition implies nothing else than that a man distinctly understands himself (by prop. 26), that his power of action is augmented.
Hence humility, or pain arising from the fact that a man contemplates his own weakness, does not arise from true contemplation or reason, and is not a virtue, but a
passion; q. e. d.
Prop. LIV.

Repentance is not a virtue, that is to say, it does not arise from rea-

son; on the contrary, he who repents of a deed is twice miserable or weak.
Dem.

The first part of this proposi tion is demonstrated in the same way as the

preceding.' The second is evident from the mere definition of this emotion (see
def. 27 of emot.).

For he first allows himself to be overcome by depraved desire,

and next by grief.
Schol.

As men rarely live according to the guidance of reason, therefore these

two emotions, namely humility and penitence, and also hope and fear, are more useful than injurious; and since there must be error, this kind of error is preferable.

For if weak-minded men were all equally proud, if they were ashamed of noth-

ing, and afraid of nothing, by what bonds could they be held together and restrained?

The vulgar crowd is terrible if it is not terrified.

Hence it is no

wonder that the prophets, who consulted not the good of the few but of the many,
should have so strongly commended humili ty, penitence and reverence.

And in fact

those who are liable to these emotions, can be led much more easily than others
Ultimately to live according to reason, Le. to be free and enjoy the life of the
blessed.

194

Prop. LV.
Oem.

Extreme pride or extreme self-depreciation is extreme ignorance of self.
This is evident from def. 28 and 29 of emote

Prop. LVI.

Extreme pride or extreme self-depreciation indicates extreme weakness

of mind.
Dem.

The first foundation of virtue is to preserve one's being (by corol1.,

prop. 22, Part IV), and to do so according to the guidance of reason (by prop. 24,
Part IV).

He therefore who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the fOWldation

of all virtues, and consequently of virtue itself.

Further, to act from virtue is

nothing else than to act according to the guidance of reason (by prop. 24, Part IV),
and he who acts

ac~ording

to the guidance of reason must necessarily know that he

acts according to the guidance of reason (by prop. 43, Part II).

He therefore who

is ignorant of himself and consequently (as I have just shown) of all virtues, acts
not at all from virtue, i.e. (as is evident from def. 8, Part IV) is extremely weak
in mind; and therefore (by precede prop.) extreme pride or extreme self-depreciation indicates extreme weakness of mind; q.e.d.
Coroll.

Hence it clearly follows, that the proud I and thellorl self-depreciating

are in the highest degree liable to emotions.
Scho1.

Nevertheless self-depreciation can be more easily corrected than pride,

since the latter is an emotion of pleasure, the former of pain; and therefore (by
prop. 18, Part IV) the latter is stronger than the former.
Prop. LVII.

The proud man loves the society of parasites or adulators, but hates

that of noble-minded men.
Oem.

Pride is joy arising from the fact that a man thinks more of himself than

is just (by def. 28 and 6 of emot.), and this opinion the proud man strives as far
as he can to cherish (see schol., prop. 13, Part III).

Therefore he will like the

society of parasi tes and adulators (whose definitions I have omitted, because they
are too well known), and he will shun the companionship of the noble-minded who
think of him according to his due; q.e.d.
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Schol.

It would be too tedious here to enumerate all the evils of pride, for

the proud are liable to all passions; to none however are they less liable than to
the emotions of love and mercy.

But here it is important not to omit, that he al-

so may be called proud who thinks of others more meanly than is just, and in this
sen5l, pride is to be defined as pleasure arising from a false opinion, which makes
a man imagine himself superior to others.

And self-depreciation, the contrary of

this pride, would be defined as pain arising from a false opinion which makes a man
believe himself inferior to others.

This being premised, we easily conceive that

the proud man is necessarily envious (see sebol., prop. 55, Part III); that he
hates those mas t who are mos t praised for thei r vi rtues, and that his hatred is not
easily overcome by their love or benefits (see schol., prop. 41, Part III); and
that he delights in the presence of those who indulge his mental weakness, and from
a fool tum him into a madman.

Although self-depreciation is the contrary of

pride, the self-depreciator is nevertheless akin to the proud man.

For as his pain

arises from the fact that he judges of his own weakness by others' power or virtue,
his pain will be relieved, i.e. he will rejoice, if his imagination is occupied in
contemplating the vices of others, whence comes the proverb: It is the solace of
the miserable to have companions in misfortune; and on the other hand, he will be
still more depressed in proportion as he believes himself to be inferior to others.
Por this reason, none are more prone to envy than self-depreciators; they generally
observe the deeds of men for the sake of criticising rather than of correcting

.

them; in short, they only praise self-depreciation and glory in it, though in such
a way that they may still appear to be depreciating themselves.

These results fol-

low as necessarily from this emotion, as it follows from the nature of a triangle
that its three angles are equal to a right angle; and I have already said that I
call these and similar emotions evil, in so far as I attend only to human utility.
But the laws of nature have relation to the universal order of nature, whereof man
is a parti a truth to which I refer in passing, lest anyone should suppose that I
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am here recounting the vices and absurd actions of men, and not seeking to demonstrate the nature and properties of things.

For, as I have said in the preface to

the Third Part, I consider human emotions and their properties entirely in the same
way as all other natural things.

And assuredly human emotions, if they do not in-

dicate the power of man, indicate the power and skill of nature no less than many
other things which we admire and in the contemplation of which we delight.

But I

proceed in my task of pointing out Iwhat isllthe affections those things I useful to
men, and what is injurious, in the emotions.
Prop. LVIII.

Glory is not repugnant to reason; on the contrary, it may spring from

reason.
Oem.

This is evident from def. 30 of the Emotions, and from the definition of

honour, which see in schol. 1, prop. 37.
Schol.

What is called vainglory is self-satisfaction which is nourished solely

by the opinion of the VUlgar, and which ceases with that opinion, i.e. (by schol.,
prop. 52, Part IV) the highest good which every one desires.

Hence it comes, that

he who glories in the opinion of the vulgar, is eaten with daily anxiety how he
shall act so as to preserve his fame.

For the vulgar are variable and inconstant,

and therefore unless fame be kept alive by effort, it quickly vanishes; indeed, as
all men desire to captivate the applause of the vulgar, the fame of one is easi ly
eclipsed by the fame of another.

Hence, as they are struggling for what they re-

gard as the highest good, there arises an immense desire of overbearing each other
by whatever means, and he who at length comes out victor, glories more that he has
frustrated others than that he has succeeded himself'.

Thus this kind of glory is

truly vain.
The observations I might here make concerning shame may be easily deduced from
what has been said of compassion and penitence.

I

add this only, that shame, like

compassion, although it is not a virtue, is nevertheless good in so far as it indicates that the man who is suffused with shame has a desire to live rightly, just as
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pain is good so far as it indicates that the injured part is not yet mortified.
Hence although a man \"ho is ashamed of some deed is really pained, he is nevertheless more perfect than the shameless man, who has no desire to live rightly.
These are the points which I had undertaken to note concerning the emotions of
pleasure and pain.

As to desires, these are good or bad, according as they arise

from good or bad emotions.
US

But in fact everything in so far as it is generated in

from emotions which are passions, is blind (as may easily be collected from what

we have said in schol., prop. 44) and would be of no use if men could be easily led
to live according to reason; as I shall now shew in few words.
Prop. LIX.

To all actions, whereto we are determined by an emotion which is a pas-

sion, we can equally be determined by reason alone.
Dem.

To act from reason is nothing else (by prop. 3 and def. 2, Part III) than

to do those things which follow from the necessity of our nature considered in i tself alone.

But pain is evil in so far as it diminishes or restrains this power of

action (by prop. 41, Part IV).

Therefore by an emotion of pain we can be deter-

mined to no action, which we cannot perform if we are guided by reason.

Further

pleasure is an evil so far only as it renders man less fit for action (by prop. 41
and 43, Part IV).

And thus, so far also we can be determined to no action which we

cannot perform if we are guided by reason.

Lastly, wherein pleasure is a good, it

agrees with reason (for it consists in this, that man's power of action is increased
or aided), and it is not a passion except in so far as a man's power of action is
not augmented to the degree that he adequately conceives himsel f and his actions
(by prop. 3, Part III with its schol.).

Hence, if a man affected with pleasure

were led to such perfection that he adequately conceived himself and his actions,
he would be capab Ie, nay, more capab Ie of those actions, to whi ch he is now determined by emotions which are passions.
U1'e,

But all emotions are to be referred to p1eas-

pain or desire (see explan., 4 def. of emot.), and desire (ace. to def. 1 of

ernot.) is nothing else than the effort to act.

Therefore to all actions whereto we
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are determined by an emotion which is a passion, we can be led by reason alone;
q.e.d.
Another demo

Any action whatever is called evil, so far as it arises from our

being affected with an evil emotion (see coroll. 1, prop. 45, Part IV).

No action

however considered in itself is good or evil (as we have shown in the preface), but
one and the same action is at one time good, at another time bad.

Therefore to the

same action which is now bad or which springs from some evil emotion, we may be led
to perform by reason (by prop. 19, Part IV); q.e.d.
Scho!.

These positions will be explained more clearly by an example.

The act

of striking so far 'as we consider it physically, and attend simply to the fact that
a man lifts up his arm, closes his hand and forcibly moves his whole arm downwards,
is a virtue, which is involved in the structure of the human body.

If therefore a

man is impelled by anger or hatred to close his hand· or move his arm, this, as we
have shown in P art II, is due to the fact that one and the same action can be uni ted wi th all varieties of images; and thus both by those images of things which we
concei ve confusedly and by those which we conceive clearly and distinctly, we can
be determined to one and the same action.

It appears, therefore, that every desire

arising from an emotion which is a passion, would be of no use if men could be led
by reason.

Let us see now why a desire which arises from an emotion which is a

passion, may be called blind.
Prop. LX.

A desire arising from pleasure or pain, which belongs to one or several,

but not to all parts of the body, does not relate to the good of the whole man.
Dem.

Let it be supposed, for example, that a part of the body A is by the force

of some external cause so strengthened that i t prevails over the rest (by prop. 6,
Part IV); this part does not strive to lose its powers in order that the other
parts of the body may perform their office.

For it must in that case have the pow-

er of losing its powers; which (by prop. 6, Part III) is absurd.

Hence that part,

and consequently (by prop. 7 and 12, Part III) the mind also, will strive to pre-

199
serve that state; and thus the desire which arises from such an affection of pleasure, is not related to the whole man.

If. on the contrary, it be supposed that the

part A is restrained so that the other parts prevail over it, it is demonstrated in

the 5 arne way th at a des i re whi eh arises from pain a l so. does not re late to the

whole man; q.e.d.
Sehol.

As therefore pleasure for the most part (by schal.. prop. 44, Part IV)

belongs to one part of the body, the desire to preserve our existence often manifests itself in a way inconsistent with our entire well-being.

Add to this, that

the desires by which we are chiefly actuated (by coroll. • prop. g. Part IV) refer
to the present time alone and not to the future.

Prop. LXI.
Oem.

A desire which arises from reason cannot be excessive.

A desire (by def. 1 of emot.) , considered absolutely, is the essence of

man, so far as we conceive him in any way determined to any acti on.

And thus a de-

sire which arises from reason, i.e. (by prop. 3, Part III) which is generated in us
so far as we are active, is the very essence or nature of man conceived as determined to those actions which can be adequately understood through the human essence
alone (by def. 2, Part III).

If therefore this desire can be excessive, it follows

that human nature considered in itself alone can exceed itself or can do more than
it can, which is manifestly a contradiction.

And therefore such a desire cannot be

in exceSSj q.e.d.
Prop. LXII.

So far as the mind conceives things under the guidance of reason, it

is equally affected whether the thing be future, past or present.
Dem.

Whatever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason it conceives un-

der the same form of eternity or necessity (by coroll. 2, prop. 44, Part II). and
is affected wi th the same certainty (by prop. 43, Part II and its sch ol.l.

Hence

whether the idea be of a future, pas t, or present thing, the mind conceives the
thing as having the same necessi ty and is affected with the same ce rtainty; and
whether the idea be of a future, past, or present thing, it will be equally true
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(ace. to prop. 41, Part II), i.e. (by def. 4, Part II) i t will always have the s8.lllt
properties of an adequate idea.

And thus so far as the mind conceives things ac.

cording to the dictate of reason, it is affected in the same way, whether the thing
be future, past or present; q.e.d.
Schol.

If we. could have an adequate knowledge of the duration of things and

could determine the time of their existence by reason, we should contemplate things
future and present wi th the same emotion, and mind would desire the good which it
conceived as future precisely as if that good were present.

Hence it would neces-

sarily neglect a smaller present good for a future greater one, and that which was
good in the present, but the cause of some future evil, it would not desire at all,
as we shall presently demonstrate.

But (by prop. 31, Part II) we can only have an

inadequate knowledge of the duration of things, and we determine the time of their
existence (by scho!., prop. 44, Part II) by imagination alone, which is not equally
affected by the image of a present and a future thing.

Hence it comes, that the

true knowledge of good and evil which we possess is only abstract or universal, and
the judgment whi ch we form of the order of things and of the connexion of causes,
in order that we may determine what is good or evil for us in the present, is rather imaginary than real.

And thus it is not surprizing if a desire which arises

from the knowledge of good and evil in so far as this looks to the future, can be
easily superseded by a desire of things which are agreeable in the present, on
which see prop. 18, Part IV.
Prop. LXIII.

He who is led by fear and does good in order that he may avoid an

evil, is not led by reason.
Dem.

All emotions which belong to the mind so far as it is active, i.e. (by

prop. 3, Part III), which belong to the reason, are emotions of pleasure and desire
(by prop. 59, Part III).

And thus (by def. 13 of emot.) he who is led by fear or

does good in order to avoid some evil, is not led by reason; q.e.d.
Scho!. 1.

The supers ti tious who know how to reprobate vice rather than to teach
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virtue, and who endeavour not to lead men to reason but so to restrain them by fear
that they rather shtm evil than love virtue, aim at nothing else than to make others as miserable as themselves; and thus it is no wonder if they are generally
,

troublesome and odious to men.
CorolI.

A desire, which arises from reason, impels us directly towards the good

and only indirectly causes us to avoid evil.
Oem.

For a desire which springs from reason, can arise only from an emotion of

pleasure, which is not a passion (by prop. 59, Part III), i.e. from a pleasure
which cannot be excessive (by prop. 61, Part IV), and not from pain.

And conse-

quently this desire (by prop. 8, Part IV) arises from the knowledge of good, and
not from the knowledge of evil.

And thus according to the guidance of reason we

directly desire the good, and so far alone we shtm evil; q.e.d.
SchoI. [2.]
healthy.

This corollary may be explained by the example of the sick and the

The sick man takes food which he dislikes from fear of death; but the

heal thy man takes his food wi th pleasure and in this way enjoys life better than if
he feared death and made direct efforts to avoid it.

So also the judge who con-

demns a criminal to death not from hatred or anger. but solely from desire for the
public safety, is led by reason alone.
Prop. LXIV.
Oem.

The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.

The knowledge of evil (by prop. 8, Part IV) is pain, so far as we are con-

scious of that pain.

But pain is a transition to a lower degree of perfection (by

def. 3 of emot.), which therefore cannot be tmderstood by means of the human essence alone (ace. to prop. 6 and 7, Part III).

And therefore (ace. to def. 2, Part

III) it is a passion which (ace. to prop. 3, Part III) depends on inadequate ideas,
and consequently (ace. to prop. 29, Part II) the knowledge of it, that is to say
the knowledge of evil, is inadequate; q.e.d.
CorolI.

Hence it follows that if the human mind had none but adequate ideas, i t

Would form no notion of evil.
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Prop. LXV.

Under the guidance of reason we choose the greater good and the smaller

evil.
Oem.

The good which prevents us from enjoying a greater is in fact an evil; for

the terms evil and good (as we have shown in the preface to this part) are applied
to things in so far as we compare them wi th each other, and (for the same reason) a
smaller evil is in fact a good.

Therefore (by coroll. of preced. prop.) tmder the

guidance of reason we desire or pursue only the greater good and the smaller evil.
Coroll.

Under the guidance of reason we choose a smaller evil for the sake of a

greater good, and forego a smaller good which is the cause of a greater evil.

For

the evil which is here called smaller is in fact a good, and on the other hand the
good is an evil.

Therefore (by coroll. of preced. prop.) we desire the former and

neglect the latter; q.e.d.
Prop. LXVI.

Under the guidance of reason we desire a greater good in the future

rather than a smaller good in the present, and a smaller evil which is the cause
of some future good. *
Dem.

If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of a future thing, it would

be affected thereby in the same way as by a present thing (by prop. 62. Part IV).
Hence so far as we attend simply to reason, as we suppose ourselves to do in this
proposi tion. it is the same thing whether the greater good be supposed to be future
or present.

And therefore (by prop. 6S, Part IV) we desire a greater good in the

future more than a smaller good in the present; q.e.d.
Coroll.

Reason makes us desire a smaller present evil, which is the cause of a

greater future good, and neglect a present good which is the cause of. a greater future evil.

This coroll. is related to the preceding proposi tion as coroll., prop.

6S is related to its antecedent proposi tion.

* The edition of 1843, Tauchni tz reads here evil, but the sense evidently demands good, which is also the reading adopted by Gfrorer.
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Scho!.

I f therefore we compare these conclusions wi th the propositions which I

have laid down in this Part up to proposition 18 concerning the powers of the emotions, we shall easily see what is the difference between the man who is led solely
by emotion or opinion, and the man who is led by reason.

For the former, whether

he will or not, acts in extreme ignorance as to the nature of his actions; but the
latter obeys no one besides himself, and does those things alone which he knows to
be best in life and which he on that accolUlt most desires.
is slave and the latter a free man.

Hence I call the former

And I have yet to add a few particulars con-

cerning the disposition and way of life of the free man.
Prop. LXVII.

The free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom

consists not in the contemplation of death, but of life.
Dem.

The free man, i.e. he who lives according to the dictate of reason alone,

is not actuated by the fear of death (by prop. 63, Part IV), but desires the good
directly (by coroll. of same prop.), i.e. (by prop. 24, Part IV) he desires to act,
to live, to preserve his being on the basis of seeking his own good.

And therefore

he thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom consists in the contemplation of life; q.e.d.
Prop. LXVIII.

If men were born free, they would form no conception of good and

evil, so long as they were free.
Dem.

I have said that that man is free, who is led by reason alone.

He there-

fore who is born free and remains free, has none but adequate ideas, and he has no
conception of evil (by coroll., prop. 64, Part IV) nor consequently (for good and
evil are correlative) conception of good; q.e.d.
Schol.

That the hypothesis of this proposition is false and can only be con-

ceived while we attend to the human nature alone or rather to God, not in so far as
he is infinite, but so far only as he is the cause why man exists, is evident from
prop. 4.

And this as well as other things, which I have now demonstrated, appears

to be indicated by Moses in his history of the first man.

For therein the power of
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God is conceived as nothing else than that which created man, i.e. the power by
which he consults the good of man alone; and accordingly it is narrated that God
prohibi ted the free man in his free state, from eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and warned him that as soon as he ate thereof, he would immediately fear to. die rather than desire to live: further, it is narrated that when
the man had found a wife whose nature agreed entirely with his own, he knew there
could be nothing in existence which could be a greater good to him; but after he
believed the brutes to be like himself, he immediately began to imitate their passions (see prop. 27, Part II) and lost his liberty.

This liberty the patriarchs

afterwards recovere'd, led by the spirit of Christ, i.e. by the idea of God, on
which alone it depends that a man is free and that he desires for other men also
the good which he desires for himself, as we have demonstrated above (prop. 37).
, Prop. LXIX.

The virtue of the free man is seen as much in avoiding as in overcom-

ing dangers.
Dem.

An emotion canI neither be restrained nor overcome except by a contrary and

stronger I affe ction II emotion I (by prop. 7, Part IV).

But blind daring and fear are

emotions which can be conceived as equally great (by prop. 5 and 3, Part IV).
Therefore an equal virtue or fortitude of soul (see def. of fortitude, schol., prop.
59, Part III) is required for repressing boldness and for repressing fear, i.e. (by
def. 40 and 41 of emot.) the free man avoids dangers by the same power of mind as
that by whi ch he ende avours to overcome them; q. e. d.
Coroll.

Hence as great courage is to be attributed to the free man when he

takes flight as when he combats; in other words, the' free man chooses, flight with
the same courage or presence of mind as he chooses combat.
Schol.

What courage is, or what I understand by it, I have explained in schol.,

prop. 59, Part III.

By danger I understand everything which can be the cause of

any evil, namely, of grief, hatred, discord etc.
Prop. LXX.

The free man, who lives among the ignorant, endeavours as far as possi-
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ble to decline their benefits.
Oem.

Every one judges what is good according t o his disposi tioo (see schol..

prop. 39, Part III).

Hence the ignorant man who confers a benefi t on anyone will

estimate it according to his disposition, and i.f he perceives it to be less es-

teemed ,by him to whom

i~

is given, he will be pained (see prop. 42, Part III).

But

the free man desires to unite others to him in friendship (by prop. 37, Part IV);
and it is not his aim to requite men with benefits Itheir feelings may estimatell
which they may esteeml as equivalent to the favours they have conferred on him, but
to guide himself and lead other men by the free judgment of reason, and induce them
to do those things which he knows to be best.

Therefore the free man, that he may

avoid giving offence to the ignorant and that they may not follow their appetites
but reason alone, endeavours as far as possible to decline their benefits; q.e.d.
I say, as far as P088ibZe.

5cho1.

For although men are ignorant they are nev-

ertheless men, who desire to afford help in human necessities; and nothing is more
excellent than this desire .

Thus it often happens that it is necessary to accept

benefi ts from them, and consequently to congratulate them in accordance wi th thei r
own views and disposition.

Add to this that even in declining benefits we must be

cautious lest we appear to despise them, or from avarice dread having to return
them and thus, while we are seeking to avoid the hatred of the ignorant, by that
very means give them offence.

Hence in declining benefits we ' must be guided by

the consideration of what is most useful and honourable.
Prop. LXXI.
Oem.

Only free men are very grateful towards each other,

Only free men are very useful to each other and are united to each other

by a great need of friendship (by prop . 35, Part IV and coroll.). and endeavour
with equal love to do each other good (by prop. 37, Part IV).

And therefore (by

def. 34 of emot.) only free men are very grateful to each other; q.e.d.
5chol.

The gratitude which men who are led by blind desire have towards each

other is more frequently mer.chandise or greediness than gratitude.

Further, in-
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gratitude is not an emotion.

Still. ingratitude is bad, because it generally indi_

cates that a man is affected by excessive hatred or pride or avarice etc.

For he

who from folly knows not how to compensate services is not ungrateful, and still
less he who is not moved by the gifts of a courtezan to be subservient to her licentiousness, or Qf a thief, to conceal his theft, or who is not to be influenced
by other gifts of a similar kind.

On the contrary, this is evidence of a firm

mind. which will not allow him to be corrupted by any gifts to the injury of himse 1 f or of others.
Prop. LXXII.

Oem.

The free man never acts with deceit, but always with fidelity.

If the free man did anything from deceit he would do it according to the

dictate of reason (for so far alone is he called free by us); and thus to act deceitfully would be a virtue (by prop. 24, Part IV). and consequently (by the same
prop.) it would be wiser in every one. for the sake of preserving of his being, to
act with deceit; Le. (as is self-evident) i t would be wiser in men to agree solely
in words, but in fact to be opposed to each other; which (by coroll., prop. 31,
Part IV) is absurd.
Schol.

Therefore the free man etc.; q.e.d.

If it be asked: How if a man can by perfidy deliver himself from imme-

diate danger of death--would not the reason which enjoins the preservation of his
being, cO\D1sel him to use decei t?--the following is our reply: "If reason counsels
this in one case, it counsels the same to every man, and thus reason counsels men
only to make a deceitful contract to unite their powers and have laws in common,
i.e. in fact not to have laws in common; which is absurd."
Prop. LXXIII.

The man who is led by reason is more free in society

w~ere

he lives

according to a common rule, than in soli tude where he merely governs himself.
Dem.

The man, who is led by reason, is not induced to obey by fear (by prop.

63, Part IV). but because he strives to preserve his being according to the dictate
of reason, i.e. (by schol., prop. 66, Part IV) because he strives to be free. he
desires to be bound by the rule of social life and of the cOlTIJOOn weal (by prop. 37.
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Part IV), and consequently (as we have shown in schol . 2. prop. 37, Part IV) he
desires to live according to the law of the community.

Schol.

Therefore etc.; q.e.d.

These and similar characteristics, which we have demonstrated to belong

to the true liberty of man, referred to strength of mind, i.e. (by schol., prop.
59, Part III) of

(!OUl'age

and generosity.

I do not think it worth while here to

demonstrate all the properties of fortitude separately. and much less to show that
the brave man hates no one, is angry with no one, is neither envious, vindictive,
contemptuous nor supercilious.

For these and all other points which relate to true

life and religion, are easily deduced from prop. 37 and 46, Part IV; namely. that
hatred is to be vanquished by love and that every one who is led by reason desires
that the good he seeks for himself may be possessed by others.

Add to this, that

in the scholium of prop. SO and in other places, we have observed that the virtuous

man bears in mind this principle, namely, that everything follows from the necessity of the divine nature, and that therefore whatever he thinks injurious, evil, impious, horrible, lDljust or vicious, appears so to him because his conceptions of
things are perturbed, mutilated and confused; and for this reason his chief aim is
to conceive things as they are in themselves and to lremovenget ridl impediments to
true knowledge. such as hatred. anger. envy, scorn, pride, and other passions of a
similar kind of which we have treated in the foregoing propositions; and thus "he
strives, as far as possible. to act well and be happy.

How far human power extends

towards achieving these results, and what it is capable of, I shall demonstrate in
the following Part.

Appendix

The principles which I have laid down in this Fourth Part concerning the true
rule of life are not arranged consecutively so they can be taken in at a glance .
In my process of demonstration I have had to disperse them for the sake of deducing
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them more easily one from another.

I propose therefore to reassemble them here and

present them in a series.
§1.

All our efforts or desires follow from the necessity of our nature, either

in such a manner that they can be conceived through it alone as their proximate
cause, or in so far as we are a part of Nature, which part cannot be adequately
conceived by itself, in separation from other individuals.
§2.

Desires which follow from our nature in such a manner that they can be lUl-

derstood through it alone, are those which belong to the mind so far as it is concei ved to consist in adequate ideas; other desires do not belong to the mind except
so far as it conceives things inadequately, and their strength and increase is determined not by human power but by the power of external things.
rightly call the former actions and the latter passions.

And hence we

For the former always in-

dicate our power, while the latter indicate our weakness and our imperfect knowledge.
§3.

Our actions, i.e. those desires which are determined by the power or reason

of man, are always good; but other desires, i.e. our passions, may be good, or they
may be evil.
§4.

It is therefore of the first importance in life to perfect the intellect as

far as possible, and in this one point consists the supreme felicity or blessedness
of man.

For blessedness is nothing else than that peace of mind which springs from

the intuitive knowledge of God; and to perfect the intellect is nothing else than
to lUlderstand God and the attributes and actions of God which fOllow from the necessi ty of his nature.

Hence the ultimate aim of the man who is led by reason, Le.

his highest desire, by which he endeavours to govern all other desires is that
which leads to the adequate knowledge of himself and of all objects which can be
embraced by his intelligence.
§S.

Hence there is no rational life without intelligence, and things are good

only so far as they aid man to enjoy the life of the mind which is termed inteUi-
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genae • . Those things, on the contrary, which prevent man from perfecting his reason

and enjoying rational life, are what alone we call evil.
§6.

But as all those things of which man is the efficient cause are necessarily

good, nothing evil can happen to man except from an external cause; that is to say,
so far as he is a part of lD1i versal Nature, whose laws human nature is obliged to
obey, and accomodate itself to in an almost infinite variety of ways.
§7.

It is impossible that man should not be a part of Nature. and follow its

general order; but if he lives among such beings as are accordant with his own nature. his power of action will be by this means aided and cherished; if. on the
contrary. he be among such as are not in accordance with his nature. he can scarcely accommodate himself to them without lD1dergoing great change in himself.
§8.

Whatever there is in Nature which we judge to be evil or capable of hinder-

ing us in the preservation of our existence or the enjoyment of rational li fe, it
is allowable for us to remove in what appears to be the surest way; and whatever on
the other hand we judge to be good, or favourable to the preservation of our being
and the enjoyment of rational life, it is allowable for us to render subservient to
us and make use of in every way.

And, in general, it is permitted to every one by

the highest law of nature to do that which he believes will contribute to his advantage.
§9.

Nothing can be more in accordance with the nature of any being than other

beings of the same species; and therefore (by §7) nothing can be more useful to a
man in furthering the preservation of his being and his enjoyment of rational Ii fe.
than a man who is guided by mason.

Further, as among individual beings we know

nothing which is superior to man, there is nothing by which a man can better show
his ability and mental pre-eminence than by so educating men that they may at
length live lD1der the governance of their own reason.
§10.

So far as men feel envy or any sentiment of hatred towards each other,

they are opposed to each other, and consequently they are more to be feared in pro-
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portion as they are more powerful than other beings.
§ll.

Minds, however, are not vanquished by arms but by love and generosity.

§12.

It is in the highest degree useful to men to have customs in common, to

unite themselves by those bonds which best tend to make all into one, and, in general, to do those. things which strengthen mutual amity.
§13.

But for this purpose skill and vigilance are required.

For men are vari-

ous (since there are few who 1i ve according to the dictates of reason), and many
are envious and more prone to revenge than to mercy, so that remarkable force of
mind is needful in order to bear with each according to his disposition and avoid
imitating his passions.

Those who, on the contrary, find fault with men, and are

more ready to denounce vice than to teach virtue, and not knowing how to strengthen
minds but only how to crush them, are injurious both to themselves and others.
Hence many, from too great an impatience of mind and a false zeal for religion,
have preferred Ii ving among brutes rather than among men; as boys and youths who
are unable to bear with equanimity the objurgations of their parents enlist as soldiers, preferring the hardships of war and the authority of a tyrant to the comforts of domestic life with paternal adrnoni tions, and submi tting to any burthens
for the sake of avenging themselves on their parents.
§14.

Although men for the most part regulate all things according to their pas-

sions; nevertheless, many more advantages than disadvantages arise from their living in society.

Hence i t is better to endure their injuries with equanirni ty and

endeavour to promote those actions which tend to concord and amity.
§lS.

The actions that produce concord are those 'which belong to justiae, equity

and honour.

For besides what is unjust and iniqui tous, men can wi th difficulty

bear what is dishonourable or opposed to the received rules of society.

For the

promotion of amity the primary requisites are those dispositions and actions which
are comprised under reUgion and piety.

Concerning these see s choI. 1 and 2, prop.

37 and schol., prop. 46 and schoI., prop. 73, Part IV.
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§16.

Concord is also frequently produced by fear; but in this case it is not

based on mutual faith.

Add to this, that fear arises from the weakness of the mind

and therefore does not result from the exercise of reason; nor does compassion although it appears to carry in its favour the form of piety.
§ 17.

Men are further bound by gi fts, espe ci ally those who h ave not enough to

obtain what is necessary for the sustenance of life.

But to give help to every one

that is needy far exceeds the powers of the private man.

For his wealth is unequal

to the task, and besides, his capacities are too limited for him to uni te all others to him in friendship; and hence the care of the poor is incutrbent on society as
a whole, and belongs to the common weal.
§18.

In accepting benefits and manifesting gratitude, we must be guided by con-

siderations altogether different; on which subject see scho!., prop. 70 and scho!.,
prop. 71, Part IV.
§19.

Meretricious love, i.e. sensual desire excited by beauty, and, in general,

all love which recognizes any other cause than freedom of soul, is easily transformed into hatred, unless it be, what is still worse, a species of madness, in
which case it nourishes discord rather than concord.

See coroll., prop. 31, Part

III.

§20.

It is certain that matrimony is in accordance with reason, if the desire

of corporeal union is produced not merely by beauty of person but also by the love
of possessing and wisely educating children; and if, besides, the love of both the
man and woman is not excited by the person alone, but is chiefly caused by freedom
of soul.
§21.

Adulation also begets concord, but by a criminal or perfidious compact of

servitude; indeed none seek for adulation more than the proud, who desire to be the
first and are not so.
§22.

Self-depreciation has a false appearance of piety and religion.

And

though self-depreciation is the contrary of pride, the self-depreciating man is

212
nevertheless akin to the proud man.
§23.

See scho!., prop. 57, Part IV.

Shame can conduce to concord only in those matters which are not suscepti-

ble of concealment and, as shame is a species of pain, it does not result from the
exercise of reason.
§24.

All other painful emotions which men feel towards each other are directly

opposed to justice J equity, honour, piety and religion, and although indignation
seems to carry an appearance of piety, yet in fact that is a state without ZC6J)
where each is allowed to judge the actions of another, and vindicate his own right
or that of another.
§25.

Modesty, Le. the desire to please, when it is determined by reason, be-

longs to piety (as we have said in scho!., prop. 37, Part IV).

But if it arises

from passion it is ambition, or the desire by which men, under a false appearance
of piety, often excite discord and sedition.

For he who desires to aid others by

counselor by deeds, so that he and they may mutually enjoy the highest good, will
make it his first effort to win their love; but not to seduce them into admiration
of himself, so that his doctrine may hear his own name, or to give any other cause
for envy.

Hence in society he will avoid turning the conversation on men's vices

and he will talk but sparingly of human weakness; while he will speak freely of human virtue or power, and of the way in which life may be perfected, so that men may
try to live together, not on the basis of fear and aversion, but as far as in them
lies, purely on the basis of pleasurable emotions and the dictates of reason.
§26.

We know nothing in nature besides men, in whose mind we can rejoice and

whom we can unite to us in friendship; and thus whatever exists in nature besides
men, the rule of utility does not require us to preserve, but teaches us either to
preserve, destroy, or in any way adapt them to our use.
§27.

The good whi ch we derive from things external to us, is, besides the ex-

perience and knowledge which we acquire from observing them and changing them from
one form into another, principally the preservation of the body; and for this rea-
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son the most useful things are those which can so feed and nourish the body, that
all its parts may perform thei r ri gh t offi ce.

For in proportion as the body is

capable of being affected in various modes and of affecting external bodies in
various modes, the mind is more capable of thinking.

See prop. 38 and 39, Part IV.

But there seem to be very few in nature, whi ch are capab Ie by themse I ves of giving
complete nourishment to the body, and hence it is necessary for this purpose to use
many aliments of different kinds.

For the human body is composed of many parts

differing in nature, which want continual and various aliment, that the whole body
may be equally capable of all things that follow from its nature, and consequently
that the mind also may be equally capable of conceiving many ideas.
§28.

To attain this end, however, human powers would hardly suffice if men did

not contribute mutual aid.

But money presents a compendium of all things, and thus

the idea of money chiefly occupies the minds of the vulgar, because they can hardly
imagine any form of pleasure without the idea of money as its cause.
§29.

But this preoccupation about money is not a vice in those who desire it

from indigence and necessity; it is a vice in those only who study the arts of lucre, as a means of ostentation.

Such persons do indeed feed the body from habit;

but sparingly, because they believe that whatever they spend on the preservation of
their bodies is as good as lost.

But those who know the true use of money and reg-

ulate their 'riches by their wants, live content wi th Ii ttle.
§30.

Since therefore those things are good whi ch help the parts of the body to

perform their office, and since pleasure consists in man's powers of soul and body
being invigorated or increased; it fOllows, that all those things which produce
pleasure are good.

But on the other hand as things do not act in order that they

may affect us pleasurably, as their power of action is not regulated by our wants,
and lastly. as pleasure most often relates chiefly to one part of the body; the
result is that emotions of pleasure (unless reason and vigilance be exerted) and
consequently the desires also, \\'hich are generated by those emotions, are usually
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in excess.

Add to this, that under the influence of emotion we give the preference

to what is agreeable in the present, and cannot estimate the future with impartial_
ity.

See scho1., prop. 44 and scho1., prop. 60, Part IV.

§31.

Superstition, on the contrary. appears to pronounce that good which causes

pain, and that evil which causes pleasure.

But as we have already said (see schOl.,

prop. 45, Part IV), no one, unless he be envious, delights in my weakness and discomfort.

For in proportion as we are affe cted with pleasure, we advance towards

greater perfection, and consequently participate more fully in the divine nature;
and pleasure can never be evil, as long as it is controlled by the rule of utility.
But he who is led by fear, and does good in order to avoid evi 1, is not under the
guidance of reason.
§32.

See prop. 63, Part IV.

Human power is extremely limited and is infinitely surpassed by the power

of external causes; and therefore we have not absolute power of adapting external
things to our use.

But whatever may happen to us in opposition to our interest, we

shall bear with equanimity if we are conscious that we have done our duty, that our
power does not extend so far as to enable us to avoid those evils, and that we are
a part of Nature, whose order we obey.

If we distinctly and clearly understand

this, that part of us which is called our intelligence, i.e. the better part of us,
will fully acquiesce in it and will strive to persevere in that acquiescence.

For

so far as we possess intelligence, we desire nothing but what necessarily is, and
we can acquiesce in nothing but what is true; and thus in so far as we rightly unders tand what is true, the effort of the better part of our own nature is in unison
wi th the common order of uni vers a1 nature.

Part V
On the Power of the Intellect, or, on Human Liberty

Preface

1. pass at length to the other part of Ethics, the object of which is to point
out the way that leads to liberty.

Herein, therefore, I shall treat of the power

of reason, showing first, how far reason can control the passions, and next, in
what consists the liberty or blessedness of the soul; whence we shall be able to
appreciate the superiority of the wise man over the ignorant.

In what way the in-

tellect must be perfected and with what art the body must be tended, so that it can
rightly perform its functions are points not included in our present inquiry; for
the latter belongs to medicine, the former to logic.

Hence, as I have said, I

shall here consider solely the power of the mind or reason, and before all else I
shall shew what amount and what kind of empire it has over the pasSions, as a means
of restraining and governing them.

For that we have not absolute power over our

passions I have already demonstrated.

The Stoics, indeed, supposed that they de-

pend entirely on our Will, and that we can keep them under absolute control.

Nev-

ertheless, they were compelled by experience, though not by their principles, to
admi t, that considerable practice and effort are required in order to subdue and
regulate the passions.

Some one (if I rightly remember) has attempted to illus-

trate this by the example of two dogs, the one domestic, the other a hunting dog,
which he succeeded in so training that the house-dog acquired and .the hunting dog
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lost, the propensity to pursue hares.
by Descartes.

This opinion is not a little countenanced

For he holds that the soul or mind is especially united to a certain

part of the brain, called the pineal gland, by means of which the mind is conscious
of all the motions that are excited in the body, and of external objects, and which
the mind, by the mere fact that it wills, can move in various ways.

This gland he

supposes to be so placed in the centre of the brain that it can be moved by the
smalles t motion of the animal spiri ts.

He further holds that this gland is sus-

pended in the centre of the brain in as many different ways as the animal spirits
have different ways of impinging upon it and that as many different impressions are
made upon it as there are external objects which propel those animal spirits towards it; whence it results, that if the gland, owing to the impulses of the Will
which moves it in various ways, be suspended in the same way in which it had once
before been suspended when agitated by the animal spirits, then this gland in its
tum propels and determines the animal spirits and places them in the same condition as when they were formerly reacted on by a similar suspension of the gland.
Again, he holds that every voH tion of the mind is by nature united with a certain
motion of some gland.

For example, if anyone has the will to look at a distant

object, this volition causes his pupils to dilate; but if he thinks solely of dilating his pupil, it will be of no use for him to will this dilation, since Nature
has not united the motion of the gland, which. serves to impel the animal spirits
towards the optic nerve so as to induce the dilatation or contraction of the pupil,
with the will to dilate or contract the pupil, but only with the will to look at a
remote or near object.

Lastly, he holds that although each. motion of. this gland

appears to be connected by nature with particular thoughts from the commencement of
Ii fe, it can neverthe less be united wi th others by habi t; and this he has attempted

to prove in his treatise on the Passions, Part I. art. 50.

From these positions he

concludes that no mind is so feeble that it cannot, when well directed, acquire absolute power over its passions.

For these, as defined by him, are perceptions or
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sensations, or emotions of the soul, which belong especially to it, and which are
produced, preserved and strengthened by some motion of the animal spirits.
Descartes, Pass. animo part I. art. 27.
(~he]

See

As, however, we can unite any motion of

gland and consequently of the animal spirits to any volition, it follows that

the determination I andl of the will depends solely on our own power; if therefore
we determine our will be certain and firm judgments, according to which we desire
to regulate the actions of our lives, and if we connect the movement of the passions which we desire to have, with these judgments, we shall acquire an absolute
empire over our pasSions.

Such are options of this celebrated man (so far as I

can gather them from his words); opinions which, if they were less ingenious, I
should hardly believe to have been advanced by so great a mind.
sufficiently express

my

surprise that

&.

Indeed I cannot

philosopher who firmly resolved not to de-

duce any thing save from sel f-evident principles, nor affirm any thing but what is
clearly and distinctly perceived, and who so often reproached the Schoolmen because
they sought to explain obscure things by occult qualities, should assume an hypothesis more occult than any occult quality.
union of the mind and body?

What, I ask, does he understand by the

What clear and distinct conception, I say, has he of

a thought innnediately united wi th a certain minute portion of quanti ty?
wish he had explained this union by its proximate cause.

Truly, I

But he had conceived the

mind as so distinct from the body, that he could have assigned no particular cause
either of this union or of the mind itself, and it would have been necessary for
him to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe, i.e. to God.

Again, I

should like to know what degree of motion the mind can communicate to this pineal
gland, and wi th how great an amount of force it can hold that gland suspended.

For

I do not know whether this gland be impelled more slowly or more quickly by the
mind than by the animal spirits, and whether the movements of the passions, which
we have closely united wi th firm judgments, may not be again dis joined from them by
corporeal causes; in which case it would follow, that although the mind had firmly
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purposed to advance against dangers, and had joined a movement of audacity with
this resolution, yet when the danger was seen, the gland might be so suspended
that the mind could mediate nothing but flight.

And in truth, since there is no

ratio of will and motion, no possibility of comparison between the power or forces
of the mind and those of body; the powers of the latter can never be determined by
the powers of the former.

Add to this, that the s aid gland is in fact not fOWld

so situated in the centre of the brain, that it can be this easily driven about in
an endless variety of ways, and that all nerves do not extend to the cavities of
the brain.

To conclude: everything that Descartes asserts concerning the Will and

its freedom I omit, having already more than sufficiently demonstrated its falsity.
As then, according to what I have shown in the preceding Part, the power of the

mind is determined by the intelligence alone; I shall derive t:le remedies of the
. passions (remedies which indeed I suppose all men to have in some degree experienced, but not to have accurately observed or distinctly perceived) solely from
the knowledge of the mind; and from this also I shall deduce every thing that relates to blessedness.

Axioms

1.

If two contrary actions be excited in the same subject, there must neces-

sarily be a Change either in one or both those actions before they can cease to be
contrary.
2.

The power of an effect is determined by the power of its cause in so far as

its essence is explained or determined by that cause.
prop. 7, Part III.)

(This axiom is evident from
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Propositions

Prop. I.

According as thoughts and the ideas of things are ordered and concate-

nated in the mind, so precisely the affections of the body or the images of
things are ordered and concatenated in the body.
Oem.

The order and connexion of ideas is the s arne (by prop. 7, Part II) as the

order and connexion of things, and viae versa, the order and connexion of things is
the same (by' coroll., ,rop. 6 and 7, Part II) as the order and connexion of ideas.
Hence, as the order ,and connexion of ideas in the mind takes place according to the
order and concatenation of the affections of the body (by prop. 18, Part II), so

viae versa (by prop. 2, Part III) the order and connexion of the affections of the
body takes place a<!cording to the order and concatenation of thoughts and of the
ideas of things in the mind; q.e.d.
Prop. II.

If we disjoin an emotion or affection of the soul from the idea of an

external cause, and unite it with other ideas, then love or hatred towards the
external cause, as also the fluctuations of the soul, which arise from these
emotions, will be destroyed.
"

Oem.

For that which constitutes the form of love or hatred, is pleasure or pain

accompanying the idea of an external cause (by def. 6 and 7 of emot.).

Hence this

idea being removed, the form of love or hatred is removed likewise; and therefore
these emotions, and all arising from them, are destroyed; q.e.d.
Prop. III.

An emotion which is a passion, ceases to be a passion, as soon as we

form a clear and distinct idea of it.
Oem.
emot.).

An emotion which is a passion is a confused idea (by the gen. def. of

If therefore we form a clear and distinct idea of such an emotion, this

idea is not distinguished from the emotion, so far as it belongs to the mind, except by reason (by prop. 21, Part II with schol.); and thus (by prop. 3, Part III)
the emotion ceases to be a passion; q.e. d.
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Corol1.

The better we know or understand an emotion, therefore, the more it is

in our power, and the less the mind suffers from it.
Prop. IV.

There is no affection of the body, of which we cannot form some clear

and distinct idea.
~at

Dem.

is -common to all cannot be conceived otherwise than adequately (by

prop. 38, Part II).

And thus (by prop. 12 and lemma 2 after scho1.. prop. 13, Part

II) there is no affection of the body, of which we cannot form a clear and distinct
conception; q.e.d.
Coroll.

Hence it follows, that there is no emotion of which we cannot form a

distinct and clear conception.

For an emotion is the idea of an affection of the

body (by gen. def. of affect.), and must therefore (by the precede prop.) involve
a clear and dis tinct conception.
Schol.

Since there is nothing from which some effect does not follow (by prop.

36, Part I) and since whatever follows from an idea which is adequate in us [is]
clearly and distinctly understood by us (by prop. 40, Part II); it is to be concluded that every one has the power, if not absolutely, at least in part, of clearly and distinctly understanding himself and hi's emotions and consequently of causing himself to suffer less from them.

Hence, our efforts must chiefly be directed

to attaining as far as possible a clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion, so
that the mind may be determined by its emotion to think of that which it clearly
and distinctly perceives and in which it altogether acquiesces; and that this emotion may thus be separated from the idea of an external cause and uni ted with true
ideas.

The result will be, that not only love, hatr~d etc. will be destroyed (by

prop. 2, Part V) but that the appetites or desires which are wont to arise from
such emotions, cannot be in excess (by prop. 61, Part IV).

For it is important to

observe, that it is one and the same appetite by which a man is said at one time to
act, at another to suffer.

For example, we have shown human nature to be so con-

stituted, that every one desires that others should live according to his mind (see
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schol., prop. 31, Part III); which desire in a man who is not guided by reason, is
a passion called ambition, and is not very different from pride; while, on the contrary, in another man, who lives according to the dictates of reason, it is an action or virtue, which is called piety.
of the same prop.)

(See scho!. 1, prop. 37, Part IV and demo 2

In the same way, all appetites or desires are passions so far

alone as they arise from inadequate ideas; and are ranked as virtues when they are
excited or generated by adequate ideas.

For all desires by which we are determined

to action, may arise as well from adequate as from inadequate ideas.
Part IV.

See prop. 59,

And (to revert to the point whence I have digressed) there is not in our

own power any conceivable antidote to the emotions superior to this, which consists
in the true knowledge or understanding of them, since the mind has no other power
than that of thinking and forming adequate ideas, as we have shown above (by prop.
3, Part III).
Prop. V.

An emotion towards an object which we imagine simply, and neither as nec-

essary, nor possible, nor contingent, is, other things being equal, the strongest of all.
Dem.

An emotion towards an object which we imagine to be free, is greater than

towards one which is necessary (by prop. 40, Part III), and consequently still
greater than towards that which we imagine as possible or contingent (by prop. 11,
Part IV).

But to imagine anything as free can be nothing else than to imagine it

simply, while we are ignorant of the causes by which it was determined to action
(ace. to what we have shown in schol., prop. 35, Part II).

Therefore an emotion

towards a thing which we imagine simply, is, other things being equal, greater than
towards a necessary, possible or contingent thing, and consequently it is the
strongest; q.e.d.
Prop. VI.

So far as the mind re cogni zes all things to be necess ary, it h as power

over its emotions, in other words, it suffers less from them.
Oem.

The mind understands all things as necessary (by prop. 29, Part I) and as
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determined to exist and operate by an infinite series of causes (by prop. 28, Part
I).

And therefore (by preced. prop.) it so far effects, that it suffers less from

the emotions thence arising and (by prop. 48, [Part III]) is less affected by them.
5chol.

That, applied to individual cases, which we imagine more distinctly and

vi vidly, this knowledge that things are necessary gives the mind proportionate
power over its emotions is testified by experience.

For we see regret at the loss

of any good mitigated so soon as the man who has lost it considers that there were
no means of preserving it.

50 also we see that no one pi ties an infant because it

does not know how to talk, to walk, or to reason, and that it lives so many years
as it were \mconscious of itself.

But if the majority were born adult, and one or

two only infants, then every one would pity the infant; because its infancy would
then be considered not as a natural and necessary thing but as a vice or error of
nature.

And we might adduce many other examples of the same kind.

Prop. VII.

Emotions which arise from reason are, taking time into consideration,

more powerful than those relating to individual things which we contemplate as
absent.
Oem.

We do not contemplate anything as absent in virtue of the same affection

by which we imagine it, but in virtue of the fact that the body is affected with
another impression which excludes the existence of the thing in question (by prop.
17, Part II).

Hence an emotion relating to a thing which we contemplate as absent,

is not of such a nature that it predominates over the other actions and powers of
man (see prop. 6, Part IV), on the contrary, it is of such a nature that it can be
restrained in some way by those emotions which exclude the existence .of an external
cause (by prop. 9, Part IV).

But an emotion which arises from reason necessarily

has' reference to the common properties of things (see def. of reason in scho!. 2,
prop. 40, Part II), which we always contemplate as present (for there can be nothing that excludes their present existence), and which we always imagine in the same
way (by prop. 38, Part II).

Hence such an emotion always remains the same, and
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consequently (by ax. 1) emotions which are contrary to it, and which are not cherished by their external causes must more and more accommodate themselves to it, until they be no longer contrary; and so far an emotion which arises from reason is
the stronger; q.e.d.
Prop. VIII.

The greater the number of concurrent causes by which an emotion is ex-

ci ted, the greater will be the emotion.

Oem.

Many causes together can effect more than if they were less numerous (by

prop. 7, Part III).

And thus (by prop. 5, Part IV) the more causes concur to ex-

cite an emotion, the stronger is that emotion; q.e.d.
Schol.

This proposition is also evident from axiom 2, Part V.

Prop. IX.

An emotion which has relation to many and various causes, which the mind

contemplates at once with that same emotion, is less injurious, and occasions us
less suffering, and is smaller in relation to each cause considered separately,
than another equally great emotion which has relation to one cause or to fewer
causes.
Oem.

An emotion is evil or injurious, so far only as it hinders the mind from

thinking (by prop. 26 and 27, Part IV).

And thus that emotion by which the mind is

determined to the contemplation of several objects at once, is less injurious than
another equally great emotion, which so detains the mind in the contemplation of
one objector of fewer, that it is unable to think of others; which was the first
point in the proposition.

Next, since the essence, i.e. (by prop. 7, Part III) the

power of the mind consists solely in thought (by prop. 11, Part III), the mind suffers less from an emotion by which it is determined to the contemplation of many
things at once than from an equally great emotion which keeps the mind occupied in
the contemplation of fewer objects or of one only; which was the second point.
Lastly, this emotion (by prop. 48, Part III) in as much as it relates to many external causes, is less powerful towards each; q.e.d.
Prop. X.

So long as we are not agitated by emotions which are contrary to our
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nature. we have the power of ordering and concatenating the affections of the
body according to the order of the intellect.
Emotions which are contrary to our nature, i.e. (by prop. 30, Part IV)

Oem.

which are evil. are evil in so far as they hinder the mind from Wlderstanding (by
prop. 27, Part IV).

50 long therefore as we are not agitated by emotions which

are contrary to our nature, so long the power of the mind. by which it strives to
understand things (by prop. 26, Part IV) is not impeded.

And thus so long. it has

the power of forming clear and distinct ideas and of deducing one idea from another
(see s chol. 2, prop. 40 and s chol., prop. 47, Part II); and consequently (by prop.
I, Part V), so long, we have the power of ordering and concatenating the affections
of the body according to the order of the intellect; q.e.d.
5chol.

By this power of rightly ordering and concatenating the affections of

'the body, we can preserve ourselves from being easily affected with an evil emotion.

For (by prop. 7, Part V) more force is required for emotions ordered and

concatenated according to the order of the intellect than for Wlcertain and vague
emotions.

The best thing we can do, therefore, as long as we have not a perfect

knowledge of our emotions, is to conceive a right theory of life or certain guiding
p'recepts, to fix them in the memory, and apply them to particular cases of frequent
occurrence that our minds may be deeply impressed by them, and that they may be always at hand.

For example, we have laid down among the rules of life (see prop.

46, Part IV with schol.) that hatred is to be conquered by love or generosity, and
not to be met by reciprocal hatred.

But that we may always have this precept of

reason in readiness, where there is need of it, we must often medi tate on the injuries which are commonly inflicted by men on each other and on the way in which
they may best be repelled by generosity.

By this means we may so unite the image

of an injury with the image of this precept, that the precept will always be present with us (by prop. 18, Part II), when we have injuries inflicted on us.

Now if

we had also present in our mind the principle of true utility and the good which
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follows from mutual friendship and social order; and further we had present to us
the conviction that the highest repose of mind arises from obeying the right rule
of life (by prop. 52, Part IV), and that men, like other beings. act from the necessity of Nature; then the hatred or injury which thus arises, would occupy less
of the imagination and Would be easily overcome; at least, if the indignation which
is usually excited by great injuries is not to be so easily subdued. it will nevertheless ultimately be conquered; not indeed without fluctuations of mind. but these
fluctuations will be less protracted than if we had never medi tated on the subject.
as is evident from prop. 6, 7 and 8.

In the same way we should medi tate on courage

as a means of quelling fear; namely. by enumerating and often imagining the common
perils of li fe, and how they may be avoided and overcome by presence of mind and
fortitude.

But i t is to be observed, that in regulating our thoughts and imagina-

tions we must (by coroll.. prop. 63, Part IV and prop. 59, Part III) always attend
to what is good in each object. so that we may always be determined to act by a
pleasurable emotion.

For example, if anyone sees that he is too eager in the pur-

suit of glory, let him reflect on its right use, on the end for which it may properly be sought, and on the means whereby he can acquire it; not on its abuse and
its vanity, on the inconstancy of men and other things of that kind, which it is
only weakness of mind to dwell upon.

For it is with such thOUght that the ambi-

tious especially afflict themselves, when they despair of attaining the honours
they have sought; and in this way they try to appear wise, while they are only giving vent to their own ill humour; whence it is certain that those are most eagerly
desirous of glory, who most declaim against its abuse and the vanity of the world.
Not that this is peculiar to the arrbitious, for it is a common characteristic of
all feebleminded persons to whom fortune is adverse.

Thus the poor man is con-

stantly talking of the abuse of riches and the vices of the wealthy; by which he
produces no other effect than to afflict himself and manifest to others that he is
unable to bear wi th equanimity not merely his own poverty but also the fact that
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other men are wealthy.

Again, those who have been ill received by their mistres-

ses, think of nothing but the inconstancy and frivolity of women and all the other
much decried vices of the sex, which are immediately consigned to oblivion when the
lover is smiled upon again.

He therefore who studies to regulate his affections

and appetites pur.ely from the love of mental freedom. endeavours, as far as he can.
to Wlderstand the virtues and their causes, and to fill his mind with the joy which
arises from the true knowledge of them; and it is not in the least his aim to contemplate the vices of mankind, to disparage his fellow men and to take pleasure in
a false appearance of freedom.

He who diligently observes and practises these

rules (and they are not difficult), will in a short time be able for the most part
to direct his actions according to the dictates of reason.
Prop. XI.

In proportion as an act of imagination embraces many objects, the more

frequent it is, i.e. the oftener it is excited, and the more it occupies the
mind.
Dem.

In proportion as an image or emotion embraces a greater nunber of objects,

the more causes it has, by which it can be excited and sustained.

All these causes

the mind (by the hypothesis) in virtue of the same emotion contemplates at once.
And thus that emotion is all the more frequent, or is the oftener excited and (by
prop. 8, Part V) occupies the mind more; q.e.d.
Prop. XII.

The images of things are more easily united with images which have re-

lation to what we clearly and distinctly Wlderstand, than with others.
Dem.

Things which we clearly and distinctly Wlderstand, are either the cornmon

properties of things or are deduced from those properties (see def. of reason in
schol. 2, prop. 40. Part II) and consequently (by precede prop.) are more frequently excited in us.

Hence it is more likely to happen that we contemplate other

things together with these than wi th ideas less frequently excited in us. and consequently (by prop. 18. Part II) the images of things may be more easily Wlited
with things which we clearly and distinctly t.mderstand than with others; q.e.d.
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Prop. XIII.

In proportion as an image is united with a greater number of other

images. it oftener occurs.
Dem.

For in proportion as an image is united with a greater number of others.

it has (by prop. 18. Part IV) a greater number of causes by whiCh it can be excited; q.e .d.
Prop. XIV.

The mind can bring to pass that all the affections of the body or

images of things shall be connected with the idea of God.
Dem.

There is no affection of the body. of which the mind cannot form a clear

and distinct conception (by prop. 4). and thus it can bring to pass (by prop. 15.
Part I) that all these affections shall have relation to the idea of God; q.e.d.
Prop. [XV.]

He who clearly and distinctly understands his emotions. loves God.

and loves Him in proportion as he understands his emotions.
(Dem.]

He who clearly and distinctly understands his emotions feels pleasure

(by prop. 53. Part III). and feels it in connection with the idea of God (by preced. prop.).

And thus (by def. 6 of emot.) he loves God. and (for the same reason)

loves him in proportion as he understands his emotions; q.e.d.
Prop. XVI.
Oem.

This love towards God must chiefly occupy the mind.

For this love is united with all the affections of the body (by prop. 14).

and is cherished by all of them (by prop. 15).

And thus (by prop. 11) it must

chiefly occupy the mind; q.e.d.
Prop. XVII.

God is free from passions. and is affected neither wi th pleasure nor

pain.
I

Dem.

All ideas. so far as they belong to God. are true (by prop. 32. Part II).

Le. (by def. 4, Part II) they are adequate; and therefore (by gen. def. of ernot.)
God is free from passions.

Further, God cannot pass either to a higher or a lower

degree of perfection (by coroll. 2. prop. 20. Part I); and therefore (by def. 2 and
3 of ernot.) he is affected with no emotions of pleasure or pain; q.e.d.
Coroll.

God. properly speaking, loves no one and hates no one.

For God (by
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precede prop.) is affected with no emotion either of pleasure or pain, and consequently (by def. 6 and 7 of emot.) he neither loves nor hates.
Prop. XVIII.
Dem.

No one can hate God.

The idea of God, which is in us, is adequate and perfect (by prop. 46 and

47, Part II).

Therefore so far as we contemplate God we are active (by prop. 3,

Part III), and consequently (by prop. 59, Part III) there can be no pain accompanying the idea of God;· Le. (by def. 7 of emot.) no one can hate God; q.e.d.
Coro11.
Schol.

Love to God cannot turn into hatred.
It may be objected, that when we lDlderstand God as the cause of all

things, we by that very fact consider God as the cause of pain.

But to this I re-

ply, that so far as we Wlders tand the causes of pain, it ceases (by prop. 3, Part
V) to be a passion, i.e. (by prop. 59, Part III) it ceases to be pain; and thus so
. far as we lDlderstand God to be the cause of pain, we feel pleasure.
Prop. XIX.
Dem.

He who loves God, cannot desire that God should love him in return.

If a man desired this, he would (by coroll.,prop. 17, Part V)" desire that

God, whom he loves, should not be God, and consequently (by prop. 19, Part III) he
would desire to experience pain; which (by prop. 28, Part III) is absurd.

There-

fore he who loves God etc. q.e.d.
Prop. XX.

This love towards God can be contaminated neither by envy nor jealousy;

on the contrary, it is heightened in proportion as we imagine other men lDlited
to God by the s arne bond of love.
Oem.

This love towards God is the highest good we can desire according to the

dictate of reason (by prop. 28, Part IV) and it is common to all men .(by prop. 36,
Part IV), and we desire that all may enjoy it (by prop. 37, Part IV).

Therefore

(by def. 23 of emot.) it cannot be polluted by the emotion of envy, nor (by prop.
18 and def. of jealousy, which see in scho1., prop. 35, Part III) by the emotion
of jealousy; but on the contrary (by prop. 31, Part III) it must be heightened in
proportion to the number of men we imagine as enjoying it; q.e.d.
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Schol.

We can show in the same way that there is no emotion which is directly

contrary to this love, and by which it can be destroyed; and thus we can conclude
that this love towards God is the most constant of all emotions, and so far as it
belongs to the body cannot be destroyed except

~ith

the body itself.

nature so far as it belongs to the mind, we shall see presently.

What is its

In the foregoing

propositions I have stated all the remedies of the emotions, or all that the mind
considered in itself can do towards resisting the emotions.

Whence it appears that

the power of the mind over the emotions consists I. In the knowledge of the emotions.

(See schol., prop. 4.)

II. In the separation of the emotion from the idea

of external causes which we imagine confusedly.

4.)

(See prop. 2 with schol. and prop.

III. In time, by means of which emotions relating to things that we tmder-

stand, triumph over those relating to things that we conceive in a confused and
mutilated manner.

(See prop. 7.)

IV. In the multitude of causes by which the emo-

tions relating to the common properties of things, or to God, are encouraged.
prop. 9 and 11.)

(See

V. In the order in whi ch the mind can arrange its emotions and

link them together.

(See schol., prop. 10 and prop. 12, 13 and 14.)

But that this

power of the mind over its emotions may be better tmderstood, it must especially be
noted, that emotions are called strong by us, when we compare the emotion of one
man wi th that of another and when we see one more agitated than another by the same
emotion; or when we compare one emotion with another in the same man, and find him
more affected or moved by one emotion than by another.

For (by prop. 5, Part IV)

the strength of each emotion is determined by the relation between the power of an
external cause and our own power.

But the power of the mind is determined by know-

ledge alone; and its impotence or passion is estimated only by the privation of
.

.

knowledge, i.e. by that which renders ideas inadequate.

Hence, that mind suffers

most, or is most passive, which chiefly consists of inadequate ideas, so that it is
characterized rather by what it suffers than by what it does; on the other hand,
that mind is most active which chiefly consists of adequate ideas, so that although
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it may have positively as many inadequate ideas as the other, it is nevertheless
more characterized by those which belong to human virtue, than by those which argue
human impotence.

Further it is to be observed, that the weaknesses and miseries of

the soul derive their chief origin from excessive love towards objects which are
liable to change and which we can never entirely possess.

For no one is anxious

about anything unless he loves it, and all injuries, suspicions, enmities etc. arise from love towards something which no one can truly possess.

These considera-

tions easily enable us to conceive what power over the emotions may be conferred by
clear and distinct knowledge, especially the third kind of knowledge (concerning
which see scho1., p'rop. 47, Part II), the foundation of which is the knowledge of
God.

This knowledge, if it does not absolutely annihilate the passions (see prop.

3, with scho!. prop. 4), at least causes them to form a smaller part of the mind.
, See prop. 14.

Further, it generates love towards the immutable and eternal (see

prop. 15, Part V), which we can really possess (see prop. 45, Part II), and therefore it can be contaminated by none of the vices which are inherent in common love,
but will become always stronger and stronger (by prop. 15, Part V), will mainly
occupy the mind (by prop. 16, Part V) and have a wide influence over its action.
In the foregoing propositions I have comprised all the principles of self-government that relate to the present life; for, as I have said in the beginning of this
sch.olium, I have in those few propositions embraced all remedies of the emotions,
as anyone may easily see who attends to what is contained in this scholium, together wi th the defini tions of the mind and its emotions, and also prop. 1 and 3, Part
III.

It is now time that I should proceed to those considerations which refer <to>

the duration of the mind wi thout relation to the body.
Prop. XXI.

The mind can imagine nothing, nor can it remember pas t things, except

during the existence of the body.
Dem.

The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, nor does it

concei ve the affections of the body as actual, except during the existence of the
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body (by coro1l., prop. 8, Part II), and consequently (by prop. 26, Part II) it
concei ves no body as actually existing save during the existence of its own body.
"n\erefore, it can imagine nothing (see def. of imagination in scho1., prop. 17,
Part II), nor can it remember past events, except during the existence of the body
(see def. of memory in scho1., prop. 18, Part II); q.e.d.
Prop. XXII.

In God nevertheless there is necessarily an idea which expresses the

essence of this or that human body under the form of eterni ty.
Dem.

God is not only the cause of the existence of this or that human body, but

also of its essence (by prop. 25, Part I), which therefore must necessarily be conceived through the essence of God (by ax. 4, Part I) and must be so conceived in
virtue of an eternal necessity (by prop. 16, Part I); hence this conception must
necessarily exist in God (by prop. 3, Part II); q.e.d.
Prop. XXIII.

The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but

something remains of it, which is eterna1.
Dem.

In God there is necessarily a conception or idea, which expresses the es-

sence of the human body (by preced. prop.); and this idea is therefore necessarily
something pertaining to the essence of the human mind (by prop. 13, Part II).

But

we attribute to the human mind no duration which can be defined by time, except so
far as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained and can be
defined by duration, i.e. (by coroll., prop. 8, Part II) we do not attribute duration to the mind, except so long as the body exists.

As nevertheless there is

something which is conceived, in virtue of an eternal necessity, through or by
means of, the essence of God (by preced. prop.), this something which belongs to
the mind will necessarily be eternal; q.e.d.
Schol.

This idea, which expresses the essence of the body \Dlder the form of

eternity, is a certain mode of thought, pertaining to the essence of the mind, and
is necessarily eternal.

It is impossible however that we should remember ourselves

to have existed before the body, since there are no vestiges in the body of this
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pre-existence, and eternity is not defined by time, nor can it have any relation
to time.

Nevertheless we feel, we experience that weare eternal.

For the mind

no less feels those things which it conceives by the l.Ulderstanding, than those
which it has in the memory.

For the eyes of the mind, by which it sees and ob-

serves things, aYe themselves demonstrations.

Al though, therefore, we do not re-

. member that we have existed before the body, we feel our mind, so far as it invol ves the essence of the body l.Ulder the form of eternity, to be eternal, and that
in this sense its existence cannot be defined by time or explained by duration.
Hence we can speak of the duration of our mind, and its existence can be defined by
a certain period of time, only so far as it involves the actual existence of the
body, and only so far has it the power of determining the existence of things by
time, and of conceiving it l.Ulder the fonn of duration.
'Prop. XXIV.

The more we l.Ulderstand individual things, the more do we tmderstand

God.
Dem.

This [is] evident from coroll., prop. 25, Part I.

Prop. XXV.

The highest effort and the highest virtue of the mind is to know things

by the third kind of cognition.
Oem.

The third kind of cognition proceeds from the adequate idea of some attrib-

utes of God to the adequate cognition of the essence of things (see def. of this,
in schol. 2, prop. 40, Part II); and the more we l.Ulderstand things in this manner,
the more (by precede prop.) we l.Ulderstand God.

Therefore (by prop. 28, Part IV),

the highest virtue of the mind, Le. (by def. 8, Part IV) [the] power or nature of
the mind, or (by prop. 7, Part III) its highest effort, is to know things by the
third kind of cognition.
Prop. XXVI.

The more capable the mind is of knowing things by the third kind of

cogni tion, the more it desires thus to know things.
Dem.

This is evident.

For so far as we conceive the mind capable of knowing

things by this kind of cognition, we conceive it aetsrmined to the knowledge of
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things by this kind of cognition, and consequently (by def. I of emot.) the more
capable the mind is, the more desirous is it of such knowledge; q.e.d.
Prop. XXVII.

From this third kind of cognition arises the highest possible repose

of mind.
Dem.

The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (by prop. 28, Part IV) or to

tUlderstand things by the third kind of cognition (by prop. 25, Part V), and this
virtue is great in proportion as the mind knows things by this kind of cognition
(by prop. 24, Part V).

Hence he who knows things by this kind of cognition, at-

tains the highest degree of human perfection, consequently (by def. 2 of emot.) he
is affected with the highest pleasure, and this pleasure (by prop. 43, Part II) is
connected with the idea of himself and his virtue.

Therefore (by def. 25 of emot.)

from this kind of cognition arises the highest possible satisfaction; q.e.d.
Prop. XXVIII.

The effort or desire to know things by the third kind of cognition

cannot arise from the first kind of cognition; but it may arise from the second.
Oem.

This proposition is evident.

For whatever we clearly and distinctly tUl-

derstand, we l.U1derstand ei ther by itself or by means of something else which is
conceived through and by itself; i.e. the ideas which are clear and distinct in us
or which belong to the third kind of cognition (see schol. 2, prop. 40, Part II)
cannot follow from mutilated and confused ideas, which (by the same scho!.) belong
to the first kind of cognition, but from adequate ideas or (by the same scho!.)
from the second and third kind of cognition.

And therefore (by def. 1 of emot.)

the desire to know things by the third kind of cognition cannot arise from the
first; but it may arise from the second; q.e.d.
Prop. XXIX.. Whatever the mind conceives l.U1der the form of eterni ty it conceives
not because it conceives the actual exis tence of the body, but because it concei ves the essence of the body 1.D1der the form of etemi ty.
Dem.

So far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body, it con-

ceives duration, which can be determined by time, and so far alone it has the power
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of conceiving things with relation to time (by prop. 21 of this part and prop. 26,
Part II).

But eternity cannot be explained by duration (by def. 8, Part I and its

explan.).

So far, therefore, the mind has not the power of conceiving things under

the form of eternity; but since it is of the nature of reason to conceive things
under the form of. eternity (by corol!. 2, prop. 44. Part II), it also belongs to
the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body lUlder the form of eterni ty (by prop. 23, Part V), and besides these two modes of conceiving the body
nothing else belongs to the essence of the mind (by prop. 13, Part II).

Therefore

this power of conceiving things under the form of eternity does not belong to the
mind, except in so far as it conceives the essence of the body under the form of
eternity; q.e.d.
Schol.

Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways: either as existing

,with relation to a certain time and place, or as contained in God and following
from the necessity of the divine nature.

But the things which are conceived in the

second way as true or real, we conceive under the form of eternity, and the ideas
of them involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we have shown prop. 45,
Part II.

See also the scholium.

Prop. XXX.

Our mind so far as it knows itself and its body under the form of eter-

nity, has necessarily the knowledge of God, and knows itself to be in God and
to be conceived by and through God.
Dem.

Eternity is the essence of God, considered as involving necessary exis-

tence (by def. 8, Part I).

Hence to conceive things under the form of eternity is

to conceive things so far as they are conceived through the essence of God, or so
far as through the essence of God they involve existence.

And thus our mind so far

as it conceives itself and its body under the form of eternity, has necessarily
the knowledge of God, and knows etc.; q.e.d.
Prop. XXXI.

The third kind of cognition depends Ion the mind as its formal cause,

so far as the mind itself is eternal.
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Dem.

The mind conceives nothing t.mder the form of eterni ty except in so far as

it conceives the essence of its body t.mder the form of eternity (by prop. 29, Part
V)

J

Le. (by prop. 21 and 23, Part V) except in so far as it is eternal.

Thus (by

precede prop.) so far as it is eternal, it has the knowledge of God, which knowledge is necessarily adequate (by prop. 46, Part II); and therefore the mind, so
far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing all that can follow from this given
knowledge of God (by prop. 40. Part II), Le. of knowing things by the third kind
of cognition (see the def. of this in schol. 2, prop. 40, Part II), of which therefore the mind (by def. 1, Part III). so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or
formal cause; q.e.d.
Schol.

Hence the more anyone abot.mds in this kind of cogni tion, the more is he

conscious of himself, and of God, i.e. the more perfect and blessed is he; which
will appear still more clearly from what follows.

But, let me here observe, though

we are now certain that the mind is eternal, so far as it conceives things mder
the form of eterni ty, yet in order that what we wish to demonstrate may be more
easily explained and better mderstood, we shall continue, as heretofore, to consider the mind as if it now began to exist and now began to mderstand things mder the form of eternity, which it is possible for us to do without any danger of
error, provided we take care not to conclude anything save from clear premisses.
Prop. XXXII.

Whatever we t.mderstand by the third kind of cognition, we delight in,

and we associate wi th it the idea of God as a cause.
Dem.

From this kind of cogni tion arises the highest possible repose of mind,

Le. (by def. 25 of emot.) the highest kind of pleasure, which pleasure is connected with the idea of self (by prop. 27), and consequently (by prop. 30', Part V) also
wi th the idea of God as a cause; q. e. d.
Coroll.
love of God.

From the third kind of cogni tion necessarily arises the intellectual
For from this kind of cognition arises (by precede prop.) pleasure in

connection with the idea of God as a cause, i.e. (by def. 6 of emot.) the love of
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God, not imagined as present (by prop. 29, Part V) but tmderstood as eternal; and
this is what I mean by the intellectual love of God.
Prop. XXXIII.

The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of

cognition, is eternal.
Dem.

For the third kind of cognition (by prop. 31 and ax. 3, Part I) is eter-

nal; and thus (by the same ax., Part I) the love which arises from it, is also
necessarily eternal; q.e.d.
Schol.

Al though this love towards God has had no beginning (by preced. prop.),

it has nevertheless all the perfections of love, just as if it had had a beginning,
as we have supposed it to have in the corollary to the preceding proposi tion.

And

indeed there is no difference here, except that the soul has eternally possessed
those perfections, which we have supposed it now to enter on. and has possessed
them in connection with the idea of God as the eternal cause.

I f pleasure consists

in the transition to greater perfection, blessedness must consist in the mind's
being endowed with that perfection.
Prop. XXXIV.

The mind is subject to those emotions which are to be defined as pas-

sions, only during the existence of the body.
Dem.

An act of imagination is an idea, by which the mind contemplates something

as present (see its def. in schol., prop. 17, Part II); an idea however which indicates rather the present constitution of the human body than the nature of the external thing (by coroll. 2, prop. 16, Part II).

Hence a passion (by gen. def. of

ernot.) is an act of imagination so far as it indicates the present constitution of
the body; and thus (by prop. 21, Part V) the mind is liable to emotions which are
to be defined as passions only during the existence of the body; q.e.d.
Coroll.
Schol.

It follows, that no love is eternal except intellectual love.
I f we attend to the common opinion of men, we shall see that they are

conscious of the eternity of their minds, but that they confm,md it with duration,
and attribute it to the imagination or memory, which they believe to remain after
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death.
Prop. XXXV.
Dem.

God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.

God is absolutely infinite (by def. 6, Part I), i.e. (by def. 6, Part II)

the nature of God possesses infinite

perfection~

connected (by prop. 3, Part II)

with the idea of himself, i.e. (by prop. 11 and ax. 1, Part I) with the idea of
himself as a cause; and this is what we have stated in coroll., prop. 32, Part V
to be intellectual love.
Prop. XXXVI.

The intellectual love of the mind towards God is that very love where-

with God loves himself, not so far as he is infinite, but so far as he can be
explained by the essence of the human mind considered under the form of eternity,
i.e. the intellectual love of the mind towards God is a part of the infinite
love wherewith God loves himself.
Dem.

This intellectual love of the mind must belong to the actions of the mind

(by corol1., prop. 32, Part V and by prop. 3, Part III)

J

and is therefore an action

by which the mind contemplates itself in connexion with the idea of God as a cause
(by prop. 32, Part V and corol1.), i.e. (by coroll., prop. 25, Part I and corol1.,
prop. II, Part II) an action by which God, so far as he can be explained by the human, mind, contemplates himself in connection with the idea of himself.

And thus

(by precede prop.) this love of the mind is a part of the infinite love wherewith
God loves himself; q.e.d.
Coroll.

Hence it follows that God, so far as he loves himself, loves men, and

consequently that the love of God towards men and the intellectual love of the mind
towards God is one and the same.
Schol.

From these propositions we clearly understand in what consists our sal-

vation, or blessedness, or liberty; namely, in constant and eternal love towards
God, or in the love of God towards men.

This love or blessedness is in the sacred

writings called glory;* and not without reason.

* Isai. VI.3.

Ps. VIII.6. CXIII.4.

For whether this love be referred

John XI.40.

Rom. 111.23.

Eph. 1.17,18.
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to God or to the mind it may properly be called self-contentment, which in fact
(by def. 25 and 30 of emot.) is not distinguished from glory.

For considered as

belonging to God, it is (by prop. 35, Part V) pleasure (let me be permitted still
to use this expression) in connection with the idea of himself; and it is the same
thing considered as belonging to the mind.

Further, since the essence of our mind

consists in that knowledge alone, of which the principle and f01Dldation is God (by
prop. 15. Part I and schol.. prop. 47. Part II); it becomes clear to us, in what
way our mind in its existence and essence follows from the divine nature and continually depends on God.

I have thought it worth while to make these observations

here, in order to show by this example how much can be done by that cognition of
individual things, which I have called intuitive or of the third kind (see schol.
2, prop. 40, Part II) and that it is more efficient than the 1Dliversal cognition
which I have termed the seaond kind.

For although in the first part I have shown,

generally. that everything (and consequently the human mind) depends for its exis·
tence and essence on God; still that demonstration, though legitimate and placed
beyond reach of doubt, does not affect our mind so strongly as when it is concluded
separately from the essence of each individual thing which we have stated to depend
on God.
Prop. XXXVII.

There is nothing in nature which is contrary to this intellectual

love, or which can annihilate it.
Dem.

This intellectual love necessarily follows from the nature of the mind,

considered as an eternal truth in the nature of God (by prop. 33 and 29, Part V).
If therefore there were something contrary to this love, it would be contrary to
the true, and consequently that which could annihilate this love would cause the
true to become false; which (as is self-evident) is absurd.

Therefore there is

nothing in nature etc.; q.e.d.
Schol.

The axiom of the Fourth Part relates to individual things. so far as

they are considered wi th relation to a certain time and place; of which, indeed, I
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believe no one has any doubt.
Prop. XXXVIII.

The more things the mind knows by the second and third kind of

cognition, the less it will suffer from those emotions which are evil, and the
less it fears death.
Dem.
II).

The essence of the mind consists in cognition or ideas (by prop. 11, Part

Therefore the more things the mind knows by the second and third kind of cog-

nition, the greater is the part of it which will remain (by prop. 29 and 23, Part
V), and consequently (by precede prop.) the greater is the part of it which is not
affected by emotions which are contrary to our nature, Le. (by prop. 30, Part IV)
which are evil.

Therefore, the more things the mind knows by the second and third

kind of cognition, the greater is the part of it which remains lUlinjured, and consequently the less it suffers from emotions; q. e. d.
Schol.

From this we tmderstand what I touched upon in schol., prop. 39, Part IV

and what I promised to explain in this Part; namely, that death is less hurtful in
proportion as the mind possesses clear and distinct knowledge, and consequently in
proportion as it loves God.

Further, since (by prop. 27, Part V) from the third

kind of cognition arises the highest possible repose of mind, it follows that the
human mind can be of such a nature that <that> portion of which we have shown to
perish with the body (see prop. 21. Part V) is of no moment compared with what remains of it.

But of this more by and bye.

Prop. XXXIX.

He who has a body capable of a great variety of actions has a mind

the greater portion of which is eternal.
Dem.

He whose body is capable of the greatest variety of actions is least agi-

tated by emotions which are evil (by prop. 38. Part IV), i.e. (by prop. 30, Part
IV) by emotions which are contrary to our nature.

Thus (by prop. 10. Part V) he

has a power of ordering and concatenating the affections of his body according to
the order of the intellect. and consequently (by prop. 14. Part V) of causing that
all the affections of the body shall have relation to the idea of God. whence it
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follows (by prop. 15) that he is affected with love towards God, who (by prop. 16,
Part V) must occupy or constitute the greater portion of his mind; and therefore
(by prop. 33, Part V) he has a mind the greater portion of which is eternal; q.e.d.
Schol.

Since human bodies are capable of a great variety of actions there is

no doubt that they may be of such a nature as to belong to minds which have a great
knowledge o,f themselves and of God, and the greatest or principal part of which is
eternal, and thus that they may scarcely fear death.

These positions will perhaps

be more clearly tmderstood, if it be observed, that we live in continual change,
and according as we are changed for better or for worse we are called happy or

1.m-

happy; e.g. an infant or boy that becomes a corpse, is called tmhappy, and on the
contrary it is regarded as happiness to pass through the whole course of life with
a sOWld mind in a sotmd body.

And, in truth, he, e.g. an infant or a boy, who has

a body capable of few actions and chiefly dependent on external causes, has a mind
which, considered in itself only, is conscious neither of God nor of things; and
on the contrary he who has a body capable of many actions, has a mind, which, considered in itself, is highly conscious of itself, or of God, and of things.

Hence

in this life our first effort is, that the body of the infant should be transformed
50

far as its nature allows and promotes that end, into another kind of body which

will be capable of many actions and will belong to a mind which is highly conscious
of itself, of God, and of things; so that, finally, everything that is comprised in
its memory or imagination, shall be in comparison with the intellect of scarcely
any moment, as I have already said in the scho!. to precede prop.
Prop. XL.

The more perfection any being has, the more it acts and the less it suf-

fers, and conversely, the more it acts the more perfect it is.
Dem.

The more perfect a thing is, the more reality it has (by def. 6, Part II)

and consequently (by prop. 3, Part III with its schol.) the more it acts and the
less it suffers; and this demonstration proceeds in the same way in an inverse order.

Therefore, a being is the more perfect, the more it acts; q.e.d.
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Coroll.

Hence it follows, that the part of the mind which remains. how much

soever that may be, is more perfect than the rest.

For the eternal part of the

mind (by prop. 23 and 29, Part V) is the intellect, by which alone we are said to
act (by prop. 3, Part III); but that which we have shewn to perish, is the imagination (by prop. 21, Part V). by which alone we are said to suffer (by prop. 3,
Part III and gen. def. of emot.).

And thus (by preced. prop.) the former, how much

soever it may be, is more perfect than the latter; q.e.d.
Schol.

These are the propositions which I had undertaken to demonstrate con-

cerning the mind, considered without relation to the body.

From these, and also

from prop. 21, Part I and others, it appears that our mind so far as it 1.Dlderstands,
is an eternal mode of thought, which is determined by. another eternal mode of
thought and this again by another, and so on in infinitum; so that all together
constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God.
Prop. XLI.

Even if we did not know our mind to be eternal, still piety and relig-

ion, and everything which we have shown in the Fourth Part to belong to courage
and generosity, would be the primary objects of life.
Dem.

The first and only foundation of virtue or right living (by coroll., prop.

22 and by prop. 24, Part IV) is to seek our own good.

But in determining what rea-

son dictates as the good, we derived no argument from the eternity of the mind,
which we have only arrived at in this Fifth Part.

Although, therefore, we had not

then recognized the mind to be eternal, nevertheless we regarded what is included
under courage and generosity as the highest good.

And therefore, even though we

were still ignorant of this truth, we should nevertheless, according to the dictate
of reason, regard this as the highest good; q.e.d.
Schol.

The conunon persuasion of the vulgar seems to be different.

For many

appear to think that they are free in proportion as they are capable of obeying
licentious passions, and that they lose their freedom, in proportion as they are
bound to live according to the precepts of the divine law.

Hence piety and relig-
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ion, and absolutely everything whiCh belongs to virtue or spiritual strength, they
regard as burthens, hoping to lay them aside after death and to receive the wages
of servitude, that is, of piety and religion.

It is not merely by this hope how-

ever, but also, and principally, by the fear lest they should be punished by terrible sufferings after death, that they are induced to live according to the precepts of the divine law, as far as their narrow and feeble souls will enable them.
Indeed, if men were not influenced by this hope and this fear, if, on the contrary.
they believed 'that the soul perished wi th the body. and that there remained no other life for those who are oppressed by the burthen of piety, they would give way to
their innate disposi tion,would hand all things to their passions. and would prefer
obeying fortune to governing themselves.

This view of things seems to me no less

absurd than if anyone, because he does not believe that he can nourish his body
with good food to all eternity. should choose to saturate himself with poisons and
deadly potions; or than if because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal,
he should prefer to be mindless and destitute of reason: absurdities so gross that
they scarcely deserve to be mentioned.
Prop. XLII.

Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but is virtue itself; and we

do not delight in it because we conquer our passions. but because we delight in
it. we are able to conquer our passions.
Dem.

Blessedness consists -in love towards God (by prop. 36, Part V and sCho1.),

which love arises from the third kind of cognition (by coroll., prop. 32, Part V).
Thus this love (by prop. 59 and 3. Part III) must belong to the mind considered as
active, and therefore (by def. 8, Part IV) is virtue' itself; whiCh was the first
point.

Next. the more the mind enjoys this divine love or blessedness, the more it

understands (by prop. 32, Part V), Le. (by corol!., prop. 3. Part V) the more power it has over its emotions, and (by prop. 38, Part V) the less it suffers from
emotions which are evil.

And thus, from this fact, that the mind enjoys this di-

vine love or blessedness, it has the power of controlling its passions; and also
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because human power to control the passions consists in the intellect alone.

There-

fore, no one enjoys blessedness because he has controlled his passions; on the contrary, the power of controlling the passions arises from blessedness; q.e.d.
Schol.

By these proposi tions I have completed what I wished to shew concerning

the power of the mind over the emotions, and concerning the liberty of the mind.
Whence it appears, that the more knowledge we possess, the more does our power exceed that of the ignorant, who act solely from passion.

For the ignorant man--be-

sides that he is agitated in many ways by external, causes, and possesses no true
satisfaction of mind--lives without true consciousness of himself, of God and of
things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to exist; while, on the
other hand, the wise man, so far as he is such, has a soul scarcely moved by external things; he has true consciousness of himself, of God and of things in virtue of
an eternal necessity; he never ceases to exist; and always possesses true repose of
mind.

If the, way which I have shewn to lead to this result appears very difficult,

it can nevertheless be fotmd.
rarely attained.

And in truth that must be difficult which is so

For if salvation were close at hand and could be obtained wi thout

great labour, how were it possible that it should be neglected by almost all.
every thing excellent is as difficult as it is rare.

But

TEXTUAL NOTES

1.9 "or Men's Emotions"; Sp. seu de Affeatmun ViPibus. See 153.2 "and on the
Power of the Passions." Since the contents leaf is in G. H. Lewes's hand, "or Men's
Emotions" may be his translation rather than GE 's.

Part I

4.12 "by ax. S"; Sp. per> A:l:iom. 4.
4.20-21 ''by def. 4 and 5"; editions vary.

Gebh., following Vloten-Land, gives

per> Defin. 4.
4.22 "same • . • attributes"; Sp. ejusdem • •• attPibuti; also in 4.26, 5.4, 5.7.
S.l "or accidents" added by GE.
5.2 "and one.

i tse 1 £I'; Sp. et substantia in se C!Onsider>ata.

5.2 "by def. 3 and 4" ; editions vary. GE follows Saisset; Gebh., following Vloten-Land, gives per De fin. 3. & A:l:iom. 6.
5.9 sive ab aUa non potest produai om. in MS after "other."

S.10 ''produced''; Sp. ab alia produai. See also 5.15,19 and 13.27. GE usually
omi ts translating ab alia when it is used in connection with the verb produai. On
the other hand, she does translate ab alio in schol., prop. 10. It may be her philosophicjudgement that "to be produced" and "to be produced by another" are, for
Sp., equi valen t expressions and that for him a thing whi ch is a se would not be produced by i tse1 f. but would rather be aausa sui.
5.22 "Substance"; Sp. Omnis substantia.
"All substance." then "Substance."

GE first wrote ''Every substance," then

5.24 de ipsius natuzoa om. in MS after "must."
8.13-14 "through and by itself"; Sp. per> se; also in 8.22.
lates per se this way.
9.21-22 "in the nature of these forms"; Sp. ex eo1'U1Tl natur>a.
9.22 "of universal Nature"; Sp. univereas naturae roroporoas.
10.22 "is combined"; Sp. oompetit.
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GE usually trans-
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11.11 adeoque earum exi8tentia ex 80la perfectione causae
8uae on tur om. in p.f) after "themse 1ves ."
11.13 quae proinde nihil aliud

e8t~

extemae~

non autem

quam ejus essentia om. in MS after "nature."

12.3 "when the . . . divided"; Sp. cum tota substantia • . . esset dim-sa.
here seems to have causal rather than temporal significance for Sp.

Cum

12.8 absolute infinitae om. in MS before "substance."
12.28 "sole of his kind"; Sp. unicum; but see def. 6, explan.
not belong to a kind or class.

For Sp., God does

14. 17 "produced"; Sp. protendi.
15.19 "they conceive as fini te, as"; Sp. eam ipsi ad concluckndum, eandem esse
• . . concipiunt (they, to prove it finite, conceive it as).

finitam~

16.13 et eam, qua tenus substantia est concipimus om. in

p.f)

after "intellect."

17.3 "matter"; i.e., the divine nature considered as having the attribute of
extension.
17.10-11 "an infinity of modes"; Sp. infinita infinitis rrodis; also in 17.20 and
19.8.
19.7-8 "from the . . . God"; Sp. a swrma Dei potentia.
19.25-26 "and indeed can agree"; Sp. nee in uUa :re • • . conveni:re pOs8ent (nor
indeed can they agree).
20.11 "he himself"; Sp. ipse, which, strictly speaking, refers to the intellect
of God; also "his" in 20.11,12.
20.27 "in relation to God"; Sp. per Deum.
22.17-18 "in which . . . thought"; Sp. quae. GE carefully specifies the reference here to thought as contrasted wi th the idea of God.
22.22 "or something"; Sp. aut aliquid.

27.7 (per Prop. 27.) am. in MS after "manner."
28.13 (per Defin. 5.) om. in MS after "thus."
28.13 "through the conception of"; Sp. per; 28.14-15 "in :relation to"; Sp. per.

28.17 ''natura naturans . . • natura naturata";
naturantem. '

Sp. Naturam

naturatam~

non vero

29.14 certo rrodo om. in MS before "existence," whereas it is translated in 29.12.
29.14 "Wi 11 and understanding"; Sp. voluntate~ sive intellectu.
29.24 "actual"; Sp. data.

Elsewhere GE translates data as "given"; see 29.14
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30.3 ''by prop. 14"; Sp. per CoroU. 1. Prop. 14.
31.5 nostraru.rrque demonstrationum seriem reate seaum pe1pendere om. in MS after
"sub je ct. "
31.24 "could have"; Sp.

voluisset~

et oondpisset (had).

32.5 "For according..
"Ejus enim inteZlectus, et voluntas om. in MS at
the beginning of this sentence.
33.7 quod a Deo non dependet, ad quod Deus, tanquam ad exemplar, in operando
attendit, vel ad quod, tanquam ad oortum soopum ooZlimat. Quod perfeato nihil
aliud est, quam Deum fato subjicere om. in MS after "outside God."

34.5 "or absolute arbitrement"; Sp. sive absoluto benepladto.
36.16 "causes"; Sp. fines.
37.12 et Metaphysid om. in MS after "theologians."

38.9 "natural forces";

fP.

roodhaniaa . • . arte.

38.28-39.1 "never have . . . are"; Sp. nihil de rebus affirmant.
39.4 ''be • • . embraced"; Sp. imaginari.
39.13 "still more"; Sp. plurima (very many).
40.14 "them"; Sp. iZlas ormes.
40.23 "deformity of objects, things which excite nausea"; Sp. rerum deformitas,

quae nauseam moveat (deformity of things which excite nausea).

Part II

42.4 "that order of existences"; Sp. ea.
42.7 " an infinity . . . modified"; Sp. infinita
infinitis modis (an infinity of infinite modes); also in 44.17; 44.26-45.1; 45.24; 45.28-46.1; 81.10.
45.25 "sole of its kind"; Sp. uniaa.
God; cf. note to 12.28; also in 45.27.

Sp. means that there is only one idea of

46.5 "objects"; Sp. ideata.
47.14 "is"; GE follows Sp., who uses the singu1arverb est; also in 47.16,20.
48.11 "This proposition . . . scholium"; Sp. Hasa Propositio patet ex

prasoodenti~

sed inteZligitur aZa:rrius ex prasoodenti Saholio.
48.21 "right angle"; Sp. reatanguZa (rectangle); also in 48.22,23; 49.2,6,7; Sp.
reatus anguZus for right angle, as in 90.8-9.
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48.23 aequaZia om. in MS before "right angles. II
49.14 "distinguished • • • actuality"; Sp. et a reZiquis dis-tinatus, i.e.,
distinct from other modes of thought. GE interprets Sp. to distinguish non-actual
from actual existence. See schol., prop. 29, Part V, where Sp. distinguishes between two kinds of actual existence.

49.22 et hujus etiam, quatenus aUa affeatus est om. in MS after "idea."
49.23 "of any simple idea"; Sp. aujusounque ideae.
50.2 "in any simple object"; Sp. in singuZari aZiquo objeato.
50.4 "(or, i. e. essence)" added by GE.
51.22 "Comp. def. 2." added by GE.
52.2 "ax. 3"; as GE indicates in the footnote, she wisely departs from all the
editions available to her, which give Axiom 4.
52.6-7 ''by prop. 21 and 23"; GE follows editions available to her.
lowing Vloten-Land, gives 21 & 22.
52.7-8 "that the

Gebh., fol-

• thing" added by GE.

53.23 "prop. 11"; GE follows editions available to her.

Gebh., following the

N.S., gives Prop. 12.
53.23 "some effect"; Sp. aZiaujus ejus effeatus idea.
54.13 "to know.

body"; Sp. ejus obJeati ••• hoa est COI'(Jons humani

naturam aognosaere.
57.19-20 "If the parts . . . escape"; Sp. Si partes, Individuum aorrponentes,
majores minoresque evadant (If the parts composing an individual become greater or
smaller) .
57.20 "rate"; Sp. !'atio (lit. ratio).
57.24 "the bodies "; Sp. aOI'(Jora quasdam.
58.6 "it"; Le., from the definition of the individual, which is given before
lemma 4.

58.6 quam vide ante om. in MS before "lemma 4."
58.11 "of many different individuals"; Sp. ere pZuroibus divereae naturas Individuis.
58.21 "of the body"; Sp. de ooI'(Jore. Sp. seems to mean body in general, the object of physics. See N.S.: van ~ stoffe, of van de Zighaam (Gebh., II, 361).
59.23 At om. in MS before "The idea."

59.25 "of all the ideas"; Sp. ere pZuroimis hisae ••• ideis.
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60.12 quod in Appendiae PaPtis primae rrruLtis exerrpUs expUcui am. in MS after
"external bodies."
60.22 "coral!."; Sp. CoroU. 1.
60.28 "of these bodies"; Sp. earwn pLana, i.e., the surfaces of the softer parts.
61.26-27 "constitution of Paul"; Sp. oonstitutionem oorporis PauU.
62.10-12 "knows, is . . . to be attributed," and "depends" are in Sp. in the
imperfect subjunctive, indicating that the supposition is contrary to fact.
62.15 "always"; Sp. statim (lit. immediately).
. way.

GE often translates statim this

64.13 "thought.
its"; Sp. tam ejus, quam orrnium ejus affectionum • . . idea.
Sp. is referring to the idea, not of thought, but of God.
65.15 "immediate"; Sp. ipsae.

65.17 CoroU. om. in M5 before ''prop. 11."
66.18 "ax. 2"; GE follows the editions available to her.
Land, gives Axiom. 1.

Gebh., following Vloten-

67.3 "which produces the affection" added by GE;. also 67.13, "producing the affection. "
67.20 "coral!."; GE follows the editions available to her.
Leopold, gives CorolL. 1.
73.13 "common"; Sp. oormrune

Gebh., following

et proprium; also in 73.17.

74.19 "seoondaPy"; Sp. Secundas.
75.3-4 "coro11., prop. 17 and 18"; Sp. CoroLL. Prop. 17 & Prop. 18.
75.24 "records"; Sp. reoorda1:ur, but see 76.9, where GE translates reoordor as
"remember. "
76.10-11 "form ideas . • . us"; Sp. earum qUaEdam ideaE formemus similes iis, per
qUaE res imaginamur (form certain ideas of them similar to those by which we imagine
things) .
76.13-14 "From adequate . . . things"; Sp. ex eo, 'quod notiones 00171111U11eS, rerumque proprietatum ideaE adaequataE haberrrus (From conunon notions and adequate ideas).
77.1 "and this . . • others"; Sp. atque hoc rrrulto cZarius.
fact that the fourth proportional munber is 6.

Hoc refers to the

78.8 sive optirm am. in MS after "perfectly."
78.9 nerrrpe ipsum inteUigere am. in MS after "mode of thought."
79.21 prima viae om. in MS after "yesterday."
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80.4 "on the following day"; Sp. mane; also cwn tempom vespertino om. in MS
after "day."
81.20 "it"; i.e., that idea, referring to "the idea of it" in the previous
clause.
81. 27 "coroll. "; GE follows the editions available to her.
Vloten-Land, gives Cb~ll. 1.
82.14-15

Gebh., following

tum saltem om. in MS after "understands."

86.11 ad infinitis aliis

rebus~

qUaB non

percirimus~

assentiendwn om. in MS after

''have. "
86.24-25 "than to . • . false"; Sp. ad aliquid~ quod falswn est~ verum esse af-

firmand£m.
89.1 hac ratione tantum om. in MS from the phrase "and must be the same in all."
89.2 "a particular" added by GE.
89.19 "boys"; Sp. pueri. GE varies in her trans 1 ation of puer throughout the
Ethics between ''boy'' and "child" in those places where Spa does not limit the meaning just to males.
89.23-24 "and that • • . God"; Sp. et eo magis~ quo perfectiores actiones agimus~
et quo magis magisque Dgum intelligiTTTU8 (and that we are 50, the more perfect are
our actions, and the more and more we unders tand God).
90.2 "service"; Spa servitute(lit. servitude).

Part III

title ''Emotions''; through the first pages of Part III GE first translated affec-

tus as "passion," but then revised it to "emotion."
92.10 "laws of nature"; Spa natuJ'M
as in 92. 13) •

IfSges~

et regulae (laws and rules of nature,

92.22 "solids"; Sp. (d£) oo'I'poPibus.
93.10 "Explan." added by GE.

94.2 "schol."; prop. 40 has two scho1ia, but Sp. does not specify which.
95.4 "generally"; Sp. absolute.
96.2 "the mind"; Sp. ipsius mens, i.e., the mind belonging to the body.

96.6 absque admiratione om. in MS after "ignorant."
96.24 "solely from the laws of its nature"; Spa ex solis naturae legibus.

250
97.15 ''boy''; see note to 89.19.
98.1-2 "strongest" added by GE.
98.5 ''naturally simultaneous"; Sp. simul esse natu:ra.
98.13-15

''Hence • • • • "; ex sola 77t3ntis deeroeto om. in MS from this sentence.

99.27 "meet"; Sp. inter se conveniroe.
100.14 "things can be nothing else"; Sp. nee res aUudposswtt.
101. 22 "our existence"; Sp. COT'poPis nostPi existentiam (the existence of our
body) .
102.11-14 GE usually translates laetitia and tPistitia as "pleasure" and "pain"
in the last three Parts of the Ethics, though her cancellations indicate that she
first tried "joy" and "grief," "joy" and "sadness," and then "joy" and "sorrow"
before settling on "pleasure" and ''pain.'' Commentators like Hampshire, Pollock and
Wolfson, and translators like Boyle and Elwes are in agreement wi th her. The most
literal translation of laetitia and tristitia is "joy" and "sorrow." Sp. has other
terms for pleasure and pain, namely titiUatio and dolor. The terms "pleasure" and
''pain'' may unduly localize and make physical these "affections of the body" which
eventually become, for Sp., not only active emotions, but love of God.
103.18 "of that prop. "; GE follows the editions available to her.
lowing V10ten-Land, speci fies Prop. 17.

Gebh., fol-

104.7 quod hujus existentiam seeludit am. in MS after "objects."
104.12,13 "joy . . . sadness"; Sp. laetitia . . • tristitia.
102.11-14.
105.6 "always"; Sp. statim.

See note above to

See note to 62.15.

107.9 "by the idea"; Sp. ex imagine.
107.17 "affection"; Sp. affeetus.
as "emotion."

GE also translates affectus as "passion" and

108.3 Throughout schol. 2 GE translates gaudium as "joy"; cf. note above to 102.
11-14.
108.7 "the doubt connected with these emotions";

~p.

horum affeetuum dubitatio.

108.11 "grie fl'; Sp. tPisti tia.

112.1 &que re amata om. in MS after ''himself.''
112.2 "This hallucination"; Sp. quae quidem imaginatio.
112. 10 "es teem"; Sp. exis timatio; cf. note to 144.19 ff., where GE trans 1 ates
existimatio as "over-estimation."
114.23-24 "so strive . . . vulgar"; Sp. adeo impense vulgo placere oonamur.

GE
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takes impense as an adjective modifying vurgo and not oonaJ1'lUl'.
115.8 "others to be affected"; Sp. se Z'6Ziquos
others) .

. affioere (1i t. he affects

115.14 et contra om. in MS before "q.e.d."
115.23 "external"; GE follows the editions available to her.
the N.S., gives "internal."

Gebh., following

115.25 "the pleasure . . . affected"; Sp. Lastitia~ qua aUquis se roeZiquos
imaginatur; cf. note to 115.8.

af~oeroe

117.3

10m. in MS after "coroll."

117.15 ''boys''; see note to 89.19.
118.17 "emotion"; Sp. amoroe.
119.2 ''he possesses"; Sp. aeZectatur.
119.15 "as giving herself to another"; Sp. aZte1'i sese prostitueP6.
119 . 17 "in the .

another"; Sp.

puaendis~

et exc1'ementis aUe1'ius.

120.7 ''passion''; Sp. affectusj cf. 120.20 "impressions"; Sp. affectus.
121. 7 "painfully"; i.e., will painfully affect.
122.3 "according to his passions"; Sp. ex suo affectu; cf. 122.7-8 "according to
his ruling passions"; Sp. ex suo affectu.
122.10 ''passion''; Sp. metus.

122.12 Sed si

maZum~

quod

tirret~

Pudor

est~

tum Tinvr appeUatur Veroecundia om.

in MS before the sentence beginning "Lastly."
122.14 "one of the evils"; Sp. utX'W1rlU6 maZum (both of the evils).
123.14 "to remetrber"; Sp. corrminisei (to contrive).

123.24 Cujus etiam SchoZiwn vidB. om. in MS after "preceding."
124.18 ''he is compelled to imagine"; Sp. imaginatur.
124.28 "prop. 40"; GE follows the editions available to her, except Auerbach.
Gebh., following Auerbach and Schmidt, gives Prop. 41.
125.9-10 "For he . • . pleasure"; Sp. Nam qui l'6m~ quam odit~ sive quam CW1I Trissorebat~ ama1'B ineipit, eo ipso~ quod amat, Zaetatur (For he who
was wont to contemplate the being he hated with pain, begins to love, and simply
from this cause, i.e., that he loves, he feels pleasure).

titia contemplari

125.16-17 "to incur a 10ss";Sp. darrnum sibi inferre (lit. inflict a loss on himself) .
127.3 "always"; Sp. statim; see note to 62.15.
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127.18 "effect"; Gebh., following the N.S., gives "affect"; also in 128.1.
128.9 "scho1."; GE follows the editions available to her.
Leopold, specifies Sehol. 2.

Gebh., following

128.18 "just"; Sp. justo (lit. correct).
129 fn. "in prop. 17"; editions vary.

Gebh., following Vloten-Land, gives in

Sehol. Prop. 13. p. 2.
130 . 11 "When" ; Sp. Simu latque (li t . as soon as).
130.15 "in this case"; Sp. eo ipso.
130.17 "something"; Sp. aliquid singulare.
130.18-19 "nothing within . . . memory"; Sp. nullwn aliud in se.
130.21 "this peculiar property"; Sp. iUud soZwn.
131. 21 POSSW'l'lUS denique Amorem" Spem" Glorriam" e t alios Affe etus junatos oon temptui aonaipere" atque indE alios praeterea Affeatus dEduCJere" quos etiam nullo
singulari voeabulo ab aliis distinguere solemus. This last sentence of the scho!.
om. in MS.
132.10 (ut pep se notwn) am. in MS after "of the mind."

132.23 "imbecility"; Sp. irribeaiUitas (lit. weakness).

Also in 133.2 and 146.22.

133.7 "as peculiar"; Sp. ut res singulares.
133.21 "a passion"; Sp. affeetio. "Modification" may be preferable here because
Sp. does not limit the reference of affeetio to just emotions, but indicates all
interaction of bodies, including our own, with other bodies.
134.16 "1" added by GE, following Bruder.
135.1 "him determined"; Sp. essentia" seu natura detemrinata.
135.18 "gluttony";Sp. Lu.xurriam; cf. her translation of luxul'iam as "luxury" in
135.12,14.
135.23 "the nature of the emotions"; Sp. affeetuum vires.
136.3 "The emotions"; Sp. QuiUbet .

affeetus.

136.8 "resolve themselves into"; Sp. refeY'W'ttur.
136.23 "the affections of animals"; Sp. affeatus ani mali wn.
136.25 "that brutes have emotions"; Sp. bruta sentire.
137.15 ''he''; Sp. Zaetatur, i.e.,the mind has pleasure; also ''he'' in 137.16,17.
137.22 "belong to"; Sp. referuntur; also in 138.1,2; cf. 137. 23,24 "resolve themselves into"; Sp. referun tur.
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137.26 "restrained"; GEts cancelled footnote to this clause reads: <The [undecipherable word] edition gives per tristitiam autem inteUigirrrus quod roontis oogitan~ but we agree with Saisset in thinking this a corrupted reading and substituting

id quo.>
139.6 "is continued"; Sp. fomentetur.
139.22 "I have also intimated"; Sp. m::mui; also in 141.11.

140.8 Hic igitur Cupiditas norrrine inteUigo horrrinis quos<YUnque aonatus, impetus,
appetitus, et voUtiones, qui pro varia ejusdem horrrinis aonstitutione varii, et non
rara adeo sibi inviaem oppositi sunt, ut homo diversimode trahatur, et, quo se
vertat, nesaiat. This last sentence of the explan. om. in MS.
140.18 "something positive"; Sp. actus; cf. 140.19,20 "process"; Sp. actus.
141. 8 ''persistence''; Sp. distractio.
141.9 "the negation of any cause"; Sp. causa . •. defeait.
142.7 "cherishes "; Sp. fovetur (fosters).
142.11-12 "prop. 13"; GE follows Bruder; other edi tions of her day give "prop. 11."
142.28 "from a past or future thing"; Sp. ex idea rei futurae, vel praeteritae.
143.28 "scholium"; GE follows the editions available to her.
plural because prop. 18 has two scholia.

Gebh. gives the

144.1 "Joy"; Sp. Gaudium; see note to 108.3.
144.19 ff. "Over-estimation"; Sp. EX'istimatio; see note to 112.10.
144.27 In defs. 23 and 24 GE translates aontristetur as "to feel pain" and also
as "to grieve"; and gaudBat as "to feel pleasure" and also as "to rejoice."
145.3 "(or benevolence)" added by GE.
145.8 "something internal"; Sp. idBa

rei internae.

146.22 "imbecility"; see note to 132.23.
147.1 "from false shame"; Sp. ex nirrrio pudoris rootu.
147.6 "owing to depression of mind"; Sp. prae Tristitia.
147.16 "see prop. 15 and 54"; GE follows the editions available to her.
gives 13 & 54.

Gebh.

148.22 "action"; Sp. affectum.

149.5 ex

o~o

om. in MS after "us."

149.8 Vide 2. Coroll. Prop. 40. hujus cum ejusdBm Sohol.
149.9 seu Saevitia om. in MS after "cruelty."

om. in MS after "us."
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150.18 "the inunoderate desire"; Sp. Cupiditas.
with the following explanation.

"Immoderate" is incompatible

151.1 "provided he hopes for secrecy"; Sp. modo speret fom alamo
151.9 "for such indulgences" added by GE.
151.17 "on account . . . relations"; Sp. proptero varias eor>um mlationes, et
cknorrrinationes extI"inseaas.
151.20 "to the mind"; Sp. ad solam

~ntem.

152.6 "of a passion"; Sp. affeatus; also in 152.12.
152.14 "12"; Sp. 11.
152.16 "from a lower to a higher"; Sp. ad majorem, rrrinommve (to a higher or
lower) •
152.17 "more reality"; Sp. plus, minusve malitatis (more or less reality).

Part IV

153.2 "and on the Power of the Passions"; see note to 1.9.
153.8 "what else there is"; Sp. proaetema (what there is).
154.3 "of any particular kind of thing"; Sp. ejusnvdi mi.
154.22-23 ''no grotmd . . . motive"; Sp. pI"inaipium, vel finem habet nuUum.
154.24 "originating principle"; Sp. pI"inaipium.
155.12-13 "a being"; Sp. entis (being, existence).
155.13,16 "Now . . . Again"; Sp. Quatenus • • • Quatenus.
155.22 "is necessarily what i t is"; Sp. neeessaI"io fit (lit. necessarily happens).
156.8 "noted, first"; Sp. appI"ime notandum.
156.24 "participating"; Sp. aompotes.

157.24 "virotue"; Sp. virotus, quatenus ad horrrinem referoturo.
158. 11 ''be long to"; Sp. m feroun turo.
159.3 "them"; Sp. eunckm; also 159.4 "their"; Sp. ejus.
159.14 "which" refers to "part."
160.13-14 "other changes"; Sp. mliquas mutationes.
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161.27 "prop. 4, Part III"; GE follows Bruder.
including Gebh., have Prop. 6. p. 2.

The a.p. and the other editions,

163.15 "emotion"; Sp. eandem, i.e., the image.
165.4 "to be less remote"; Sp. non multwn distare.
169.5-6 "they compose . . . single"; Sp. individuum corrponunt singulo duplo

po ten ti us .
169.16 "conciliate"; Sp. conciUarem (win).
170.2 "(or power)" added by GE; also in 171.21; 181.10 ,II.
171.17 "(by adequate ideas)" added by GE; also in 171.22; 172.3 "(or have adequate ideas)" added by GE.
171.19 "(or is passive)" added by GE.
172.9 "but"; Sp. eaque sola data.
173.12 "scho1. 2"; 2 is GElS precise addition.
175.18 "Part II"; GE follows the editions available to her.

Gebh., following the

N.S. and V1oten-Land, gives p. D.
175.24 "it"; the implied subject of superatur is uterque (each).
176.21 "a painful emotion"; Sp. affeatus tnstitiCl£?.
178.12 "his own good"; Sp. suum sibi utile.
180.2 10m. in MS after "corol1."
181.9 "social life"; Sp. civitatis.
182.4 "civilized state"; Sp. statu aiviU. GE interprets Sp. as treating of the
passage from the pre-social to the social, and not just from the pre-political to
the political; also in 183.9.
183.11 "the law"; Sp. aivitati; cf. 183.12 "the law"; Sp. jure.
183.26 "so" added by GE.
184.9 "relative degree"; Sp. ratio; also in 184.11,17,21; but see 184.15 "ratio."
185.19 "cherish"; Sp. conducunt.
185 .21 "the commtmi ty"; Sp. ci vi tatem.

186.1 vel juvatur om. in MS after "increased."
186.19 "affection"; Sp. affectus; also in 186.26.
186.25 "as the power"; Sp. potentia (ablative sing.; by the power).
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187.23-24 "the beloved object"; Sp. amasiam, vel meretriaem.
187.27 "licentiousness"; Sp. Libido; cf. 150.18 "Libertinism."
188.10 "and socially unjust"; Sp. et in civitate injustum.
188.19-20 "nor do . . . virtue"j Sp.nea nobis laerimas, singultus, metum, et
alia hujus1Wdi, quae animi impotentis sunt signa, virtuti ducit (nor does he count
as vi rtues in us ·te ars. • . .).
188.26 "with . . • plants"; Sp. odoribus, plantarium virentium amaenitate.
189.15 contra om. in MS before "can."

190.28 J om. in MS after "co roll. "
191. 20 "to others"; Sp. aZteri.
191.26 ''by prop. 11"; GE follows the editions available to her.
Vloten-Land, gives pel' Sehol. Prop. 11.

Gebh., following

192.3 "the State"; Sp. summa potestas; also in 192.5.
192.6 ''by duty"; Sp. pietate.
192.20 "out of himself" added by GE.
192.22 "coroll. I"; 1 added by GE.
194.8 "of virtue itself"; Sp. omnes virtutes.
195.25 "a right angle"; Sp. duobus metis.
196.16-17 "how he shall act"; Sp. ni tatur, faciat, experiatur.
196.23-24 seu acquiescentia om. in MS after "glory, It and quia nuUa est om. in
MS after "vain."
197.11 absque eo om. in MS after "detennined"j "alone" added by GE.

198.4 "with an evil emotion"; Sp. Odio, aut aliquo malo affeetu.
200.21 ''prop. 18"; GE follows the editions available to her.
Vloten-Land, gives 16.

Gebh., following

202.14 "a smaller evil"; Sp. malum praesens minus.
202.14-15 "which is . . • good"; see, in addition to GE' s note, Gebh., II, 385.
GE follows the O.P. but adopts Gfrorer's reading of "good" instead of Bruder's
"evi I. "
202.23 "a present good"; Sp. bonum praesens minus.
203.15 "good"; Sp. utile; also in 204.2.
204.4 ''warned him" added by GE.
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205.11 "they"; Sp. ne obsequatur (he).
205 .14 "desi re"; Sp. queunt (qui.re: to be ab Ie to).
205.15 "this desire"; Sp. quo, whi ch refers to auxiliwn.
205.24 10m. in MS after "carol I. "
206.23 "in society"; Sp. in civitate.
207.7 "vindictive"; Sp. indignetur; also minimeque am. in MS before "supercilious."
208.2 "and present them in a series "; Sp. et ad sumna aapita redigere.
208.28 ''which is termed inteUigenae"; Sp. quae inteUigentia definitur.

209.24 qui. ratione ducituI' om. in MS after "man."
209.25 "mental pre-eminence"; Sp. ingenio.
211. 3 "does not

. re as on"; Sp. ad rationis usum non pe I'tine t.

211. 7 "powers"; Sp. vires et utiZ-itatem.
211.17 "coroll."; GE follows the editions available to her.
Baens ch, gi ve s S aho l.

Gebh., following

211.20 ''by beauty of person"; Sp. ex • . . forma; also 211.22 "by the person";
Sp. formam.
211.24-25 "by a . . . servitude"; Sp. foedo sePvitutis aI'imine~ vel perfidia.
212.3 "result from"; Sp. ad •

speatat.

212.7 "piety"; Sp. aequi.tatis (equity).
212.11 "schol."; GE follows the editions available to her.
Vloten-Land, adds 1.

Gebh., following

212.23 aut aliquo aonsuetudinis om. in MS after "friendship."
212.2S pro ejus vaI'io usu am. in MS after "preserve."
214.11 "See prop. 63, Part IV" added by GE, following Bruder.
214.15 "we have done our duty"; Sp. nos funatos nostro officio fuisse.

Part V

216.17 "of some gland"; Sp. glOJ1,dis.
217.4 "i t follows that"; Sp. et.
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220.21-22 "this emotion"; Sp. ipse affeatus.
221.18 "prop. 40"; Sp. Prop. 49.
222.4 "individual cases"; Sp. PeS singuZaPes.
222.6 "regret"; Sp. tristitiam.
222.17,19,20 "affection," "impression," "emotion"; three different renderings of

affectus.
223.13 "considered separately" added by GE.
223.22 "Part III"; GE follows the editions available to her except Auerbach.
Gebh .• following the N.S., Auerbach and V10ten-Land, gives p. 3.

224.14 ad coepcendum om. in MS before "emotions."
225.25 "the poor man"; Sp. paupel' etiam ava1'US.
226.4 "affe'ctions"; Sp. affectus.
226.12 "an act of imagination"; Sp. imago aUqua.
227.4 "Part IV"; Sp. p. 2.
227.11 ''his emotions"; Sp.

8e~

8uasque affectus; also in 227.12,13,16.

229.5 "to the mind"; Sp. ad solam rrentem. See 230.24 "the mind without relation
to the body"; this scholium is a transition to a consideration of the mind alone.
229.10-11 "See prop. 2 with schol. and prop. 4." GE follows the editions available to her. Gebh., following Vloten-Land, gives vide Prop. 2. cum eodem Sokol.

Prop. 4.
229.11 "emotions"; Sp. affeationes; also in 229.13-14.
229.26 "or is most passive" added by GE.
232.5 "themselves demonstrations"; Sp. ipsae derrrmstl'ationes.
232.12 "it"; Sp. easque (them).
232.18 "some"; Sp. quo:rurndam.

234.5 et om. in MS before "it."
234. 7 "modes of conceiving the body" added by GE.

234.23 ut entia PeaUa om. in MS after "essence of God."
236.5 "prop. 31"; Sp. Prop. 31. hujus, i. e., Part V.
237.5 "ax. 1"; GE follows the editions available to her.
Land, gives Defin. 1.

Gebh., following Vloten-
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237.5-6 "with the idea of himself as a cause"; Sp. idea suae causae.

238.5 peT' Prop. 27. hujus om. in MS after "mind."
238.6 "in that knowledge alone"; Sp. in sola cognitione.
invol ves God.

All knowledge, for Sp.,

238.10-12 "how much can be done • . . and that it is more efficient"; Sp. quan-

tum . . • polleat, potioTque.
238.22 "in"; Sp. peT'.
239.5 "or ideas" added by GE.
240.1 "who"; Sp. qui.

Sp. is referring to the love of God rather than to God.

240.10 "boy"; Sp. puero; also in 240.12.

See note to 89. 19.

240.14 sui om. in MS before "God."

240.19 "highly conscious"; Sp. plurilTMrl

oonscia, the superlative of muZ-

tum • •• conscia in 240.16.
241.18 "our own good"; Sp. suum utile; also 241.19 "the good"; Sp. utilia.
241.23-24 "according to . . . good"; Sp. eadem tamen T'ationis pT'aescripta pY'ima
habe1'eT11W3 (give first place to these dictates of reason).
241. 27 "licentious passions"; Sp. libidini; '243.1 "the passions"; Sp. libidines;
243.7 "from passion"; Sp. libidine. Cf. def. 48 of the emotions, where GE translates libidini as "libertinism."
243.6-7 "the more knowledge . . . exceed"; Sp. quantum Sapiens poUeat, potioY'-

que sit.
243.11-12 "has a soul . . . things"; Sp. vix animi nvvetUT'.
243.12 ''he has true consciousness"; Sp. conscius.

